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# THE USSR

A  
SHORT  
HISTORY

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## Chapter I

### THE LAST ANNIVERSARY

The year was 1913. The storm-clouds of the First World War were gathering over Europe and the roll of thunder had already been heard in the two Balkan wars. The balance of forces had already been determined. Against the powers of the Triple Alliance—Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey—stood the Anglo-French-Russian Entente.

Russia was in turmoil. As early as 1911 a wave of student strikes shook the country, in response to which the government sent police into the halls of the universities. Muffled tremours passed over the country and more than 105 thousand workers had gone out on strike. The masses were slowly moving into action.

Suddenly the stunning news raced through the country. On April 4, 1912, in a distant Siberian settlement soldiers had without warning opened fire upon the workers. Two hundred and seventy were killed and 250 wounded. The rounds fired against the unarmed crowd of workers from the mining company Lena Goldfields, who had come to the office with a petition for improvements in their intolerable living conditions, broke the ice of silence. It had gripped the country during the years of dark reaction after the collapse of the first Russian revolution of 1905-1907.

The response of the government and of the people to the Lena tragedy differed. "So it has been and so

it will be hence," the Minister of Internal Affairs, Makarov, replied confidently to the queries of deputies from the State Duma. But the number of strikers protesting against the arbitrary action of the government rose to 300 thousand. This was only the beginning. All in all in 1912 there were more than 3,000 strikes in the country involving more than one million workers. In the following year the number of strikers reached two million. A general strike was imminent.

Official Russia during this year celebrated with unusual pomp and to the peal of bells the tricentennial of the ruling dynasty. It toasted the future of the Romanov House, little suspecting that this was the last such celebration for tsarist Russia.

Three hundred years earlier the tsarist crown had been placed upon the head of the 16-year-old Mikhail Romanov. One hundred and eight years later this crown had become an Imperial one. On the throne now sat the fifteenth representative of the dynasty—Nicholas II—by the will of God Emperor and autocrat of all Russia, the Tsar of Poland, the Grand Duke of Finland, and so forth, according to the official documents. He had not inherited the mind of Peter 1, who had founded the capital of the empire and cut through a "window to Europe". However he did have the cruelty of Nicholas I, for which the great Russian writer Lev Tolstoy had called him "Genghis Khan with a telegraph" and he demonstrated the poverty of intellect characteristic of his father, Alexander III. The last emperor of Russia confessed that the effort to think was so difficult that it could disturb the horse on which he was sitting at the time! Nicholas II and his wife Alexandra Fyodorovna, an imperious woman, both hysterical and superstitious, were the embodiment of the fossilised absolute monarchy and the power of the feudal landowners.

During those 300 years the Romanov dynasty had done much to consolidate and protect the privileges of the throne's bulwark—the estate of the nobility. Although at the turn of the twentieth century the nobility had suffered a certain diminishment in its economic position (landed proprietorship had declined 41 per cent in the 40-year interval following 1861) it retained political power as well as its economic basis—the private ownership of land. At the close of the nineteenth century the hereditary nobility made up roughly 0.8 per cent of the country's population but owned 67 per cent of all land held in private ownership. In the European area of Russia 30 thousand landowner families (some 150 thousand individuals) owned 70 million dessiatines\* of land while 10,500 thousand peasant households (or 50 million individuals) had 75 million dessiatines. On the average each landowner family disposed of 2,300 dessiatines, each peasant family of seven.

In 1861—later than in other European countries—serfdom was abolished in Russia. This reform, which fawning court historians called the "Great Reform", was designed to ensure a maximum of advantages for the big landowners. As a result of this great deceit the peasants lost about 20 per cent of the land earlier in their usage. In certain of the most fertile regions 40 per cent of the peasant land went to the landowners. Still worse, the "cut-offs", as the strips of land taken from the peasant were called, included the best parcels of arable, woods, meadows and watering-places; the peasants were left with swamps and sandy soil. The peasant allotments were surrounded by landed estates on all sides. The peasant could scarcely budge an inch without infringing on the landowner's ploughland, hayfields or woods.

\* *Dessiatine*—an old Russian unit of land area equal to 2.7 acres, or 1.09 hectares.



Peasant land hunger was graphically described by Lev Tolstoy in the words of one of the characters in his play *Fruits of Enlightenment*: "Land is so scarce that there is no room for a chicken, never mind a cow." Moreover, that parcel of land, which could not even feed the peasant family, was burdened with a large number of taxes and obligations. Meeting these taxes often consumed all that the peasant could squeeze out of his holding. Two-thirds of all direct taxes paid to the state came from the peasantry. In addition they were saddled with redemption payments for the land they had received. The market price for this land was 544 million rubles, but the peasants paid 867 million rubles, thus paying 323 million in excess.

Land shortage, the intermingling of strips and the crushing burden of taxes obliged the peasantry to go, cap in hand, to the landowner and rent land from him under the most unfavourable terms. In return for the rental of land, for loans received either in kind or as monetary loans, for access rights to watering-places or grazing strips the peasant had to work the lord's land with his wooden plough and wasted nag. This system of *corvée* labour and "an economy through land cut-offs" by which the landowner raked in substantial income without capital investment and without outlays on live or dead inventory, differed but little from the former *barshchina*. It burdened, then ruined the peasantry. It also led to stagnation and decline of the landowner economy. The banks held mortgages over 50 million dessiatines of landed estates and the indebtedness of the latter's owners amounted to 2,300 million rubles. A profound agricultural crisis enveloped the country. It was provoked by the fact that the process of liberating Russia from feudal bonds was too protracted, that *corvée* labour and other forms of bondage had long outlived their day.

If the first distinctive feature of the Russian

countryside were the survivals of serfdom, the second was the development of capitalism in agriculture, which was retarded and restrained by these vestiges. Now the peasant had not only to produce but also to sell goods on the market in order to gain money. In order to pay his taxes and meet his redemption payments, to procure the necessary industrial goods and pay the landowners for rental and other land usage rights the peasant needed a tidy sum. The overwhelming majority of peasants could not make all these payments.

Of course among the peasantry there were the wealthy, or kulaks, as their fellow villagers called them. In certain provinces these kulaks held up to one-half of all peasant land. Many of these "smudgy landlords", to use Lenin's phrase, owned more than 100 dessiatines of land. But they made up about 20 per cent of all peasant households and only 0.3 per cent of the population. One-half of all peasant households fell into the smallholding or landless category. Some 33 per cent were without horses and nearly as many had but one horse, that is, the majority of peasants lacked the necessary means to work even the average land allotment, which in itself was insufficient in the subsistence needs of a family. In this economic context there could be no surplus and the peasant, in order to have money to meet his obligations, sold all that he could, even dipping into his own food reserves. In a word the peasant went hungry. Instead of bread he ate goose-foot. "They pour boiling water over goose-foot and the end product is a muddy substance used to bake bread. Dogs and cats turn their noses up at it. Children whine and go to bed hungry." So wrote the bourgeois writer Shingarev, one quite distant from revolutionary sympathies, in his book, *The Dying Countryside*.

With increasing frequency the peasant abandoned his plot and went in search of work. There were

more than 10 million such semi-peasants, semi-workers by the end of the last century. The village emptied out, the landscape was dotted with boarded up peasant huts, abandoned plots overgrown with weeds, and the wind whistled through blackened wisps of straw on the roofs as the rickety gates plaintively creaked in idleness. Thus proceeded the slow tormenting process of "depeasantisation" which touched every third household in the countryside which was doomed to ruin and gradual extinction.

The peasants had no wish to reconcile themselves with the deplorable fate prepared for them by tsarism. Inexorably, at times ebbing and at others bursting out anew, a bitter peasant war was waged against the gentry for land and freedom. The peasants set the torch to the estates of the lords and drove the overseers and tsarist officials from the countryside. In response they were met by Cossack whips and the bullets of punitive detachments. In 1913—the jubilee year—there were registered more than 146 peasant actions, among which 32 were directed specifically against the tsarist authorities. While in 1907-1909 armed clashes with the authorities made up one-quarter of all peasant actions, in the interval 1910-1914 the proportion rose to one-third.

In agrarian Russia, where agriculture in 1913 accounted for 58 per cent of all production, the peasantry was the most numerous class, encompassing two-thirds of the total population of 165 million. Numerically second, but first in its economic and political significance, was the working class. After the 1861 reform its numbers grew without interruption. It suffices to observe that even at the moment of the reform four million peasants were liberated without land and poured into the ranks of the proletariat. In 1913 the working class was 18 million strong. The most rapid growth was observed among

factory, mine and railway workers. In a twenty-year interval their numbers rose 2.5 times, to a total of 4,200 thousand workers. Of the total number of workers 35 per cent were engaged in mining, metallurgy, metal-working and machine-building while the textile and food industries accounted for 43 per cent.

The bulk of the proletariat was concentrated in a small number of industrial centres that were simultaneously political centres. Approximately a million workers toiled in the factories of Moscow and Petersburg, where they made up 40 per cent of the gainfully employed population. Forty per cent of all workers were employed at huge factories which accounted for 2.5 per cent of all industrial enterprises. More than a half (56.5 per cent) of the workers were concentrated in the large and largest enterprises employing more than 500 workers each. In contrast, in the USA this group of workers amounted to 31 per cent of the total.

One striking feature was the growth of the ranks of permanent workers—40 per cent of the country's work force. Among metal-workers more than half were second generation (or more) proletariat. However many workers retained firm ties with the countryside and agriculture. Among the metal-workers, having joined the labour force between 1906-1913, some 22 per cent had land allotments.

Despite all obstacles put forth by the tsarist government, which had once published a circular, appropriately referred to as the edict on the "cook's children" and restricting the admission of children of common origin to the gymnasium as well as specifically forbidding the acceptance of children of "coachmen, lackeys, cooks, laundresses, small shopkeepers, etc.", the cultural and educational level of the workers, and above all industrial workers, rose markedly. Two out of every three industrial

workers were literate, while the comparable figure for the population as a whole (excluding children of preschool age) was 27 per cent. The worker thirsted eagerly after knowledge and education. He was distinguished by a broad political outlook and a high level of organisation, consciousness and persistence in the political struggle.

The economic situation of the proletariat was unenviable. Through a protracted and stubborn struggle and especially as a result of the first Russian revolution (1905-1907) which, despite its ultimate defeat, nevertheless forced a number of palliative measures from the government, the worker won certain improvements in both living and work conditions. Wages were increased somewhat. This however did not signal an increase in real wages, since prices on essentials rose. We must also keep in mind the sizeable wage differentials both geographically and from one branch of industry to the next. In the metal-working and machine-building industries wages were twice as high as they were in the textile industry. In turn, the metal-worker in the south drew much higher wages than his counterpart in the Urals and the Moscow textile worker received 40 per cent less than the textile worker in the Baltic region. The average annual wage of the worker, according to official statistics, was 246 rubles, and the profit he provided for the capitalist—252 rubles. In terms of political economy, the norm of exploitation was over 100 per cent.

Of essential importance for the material conditions of the hired worker was the widespread system of fines, which at times swallowed up one-third of his wages.

After a number of workers' actions, and in particular after the immense strike at the Morozov works, when the jury, once informed of the terrible conditions at the works, acquitted the workers

brought to court for participation in the strike, the tsarist government was forced to engage in labour legislation and, in particular, to adopt a law limiting fines. But this law was by no means universally applied. In fact it was designed to place primacy on the interests of the factory owner. For example, if the owner of an enterprise violated the law, he was to be fined 300 rubles by the government, whereas the worker, for participation in a strike or other violations of the law, was subject to imprisonment for a term of one to four months.

The mandatory sale of goods in the factory stores was practised, and the factory owner would force the workers to buy inferior-quality goods at inflated prices. The dwellings of the workers were in deplorable condition. After a long work day, which according to the law of 1897 was not to exceed 11.5 hours but in practice sometimes extended to 12-14 hours, the workers returned to their barracks, stuffy, crowded and teeming with vermin, to sleep in two- or three-tiered bunks. In oil-rich Baku in the south half of the workers lived in damp, dark and cold dugouts. In substance, at the enterprise there were no safeguards taken to protect the worker, and it was no accident that Russia was first in Europe in the incidence of occupational injuries.

Thus the growing material and spiritual demands of the working class stood in blatant contrast to the actual standard of living.

The working class and peasantry of Russia were composed of numerous nationalities. The Russian Empire was populated with more than 180 nationalities and ethnic minorities living at widely differing levels of civilisation—from the patriarchal clan order to the highest stage of capitalism. Some, like the Ukrainians and Byelorussians, numbered in the tens of millions, and others, such as the Nivkhs and Koryaks, were less than ten thousand strong.

While the Ukrainians, Georgians and Uzbeks had their own cultures and their national poets — Taras Shevchenko, Shota Rustaveli, and Alisher Navoi — were known throughout the world, the Karakalpaks, Yakuts, Chukchis had as yet no written language.

The outlying regions of Russia comprised her internal colonies. According to Lenin's estimates, the colonial territories of the country occupied 17,400 thousand square kilometres, or 76 per cent of the territory of the Empire (22,800 thousand square kilometres in 1914) and included 33,200 thousand inhabitants, or 20 per cent of the total population. These territories were above all sources of agricultural and mineral raw materials for industry. The land was expropriated from the native population. For example in Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia between 1906 and 1915 the government confiscated more than 36 million dessiatines. In spite of this the taxation of the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Buryats and others grew heavier. In Turkestan direct taxes rose threefold in fifteen years. The burden of taxation was also intensified by the methods of collection. Local feudal lords who collected the taxes arbitrarily imposed higher taxes to receive a rake-off for themselves. The thoroughly rotten bureaucratic apparatus pillaged both the local population and the settlers, forcing them to work at their beck, extracting bribes and practising every conceivable form of extortion. The outlying regions were also subjected to capitalist exploitation, primarily in its most primitive and burdensome forms. Most active here was merchant and usury capital, which, without contributing to production, extracted a huge profit through deceit, shortchange and false-measure, foisting upon the people poor-quality goods at exorbitant prices and ensnaring them with credits and loans granted on enslaving terms.

In 1913 there were, all told, 7,145 industrial enterprises in Siberia, Central Asia, Kazakhstan and in the Caucasus, with the total number of workers just exceeding 100 thousand. On the average, each enterprise employed 15 workers; the comparable figure in Russia was 75. As a result the demand for manpower was low and the surplus hands in the countryside could find no employment. The consequence was the intensive impoverishment of the population. In Uzbekistan, 63 per cent of all households fell into the poorest category, while in some steppe districts the figure rose to 85 per cent.

Lenin's postulate that in Europe there was no other country in which the masses of the people were robbed to such an extent of education, light and knowledge as in Russia was even more appropriate to the population of the outlying districts. Thus Turkestan was a territory of virtually complete illiteracy. Among the population of what is today the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic the rate of literacy before the revolution was 0.6 per cent. In 1913, there were 139 doctors for all of Uzbekistan, 21 for Kirghizia and 19 for Tajikistan.

Tsarist Russia was justly called a prison of nations. For the autocracy there was one scornful term to designate all the non-Russian peoples — "aliens". The newspapers which supported the tsarist government stated quite unabashedly that aliens "are not, and should not be" such citizens of the Empire, as the Russians were. Thus the peoples of Central Asia, the Volga region, Poland, Finland, the Baltic area, the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Siberia were equally mistreated and oppressed. Acting according to the principle "divide and conquer", tsarism strove to separate the peoples, setting one against the other, subjecting them to forcible Russification, and keeping them in poverty and ignorance.



The oppressed peoples did not accept this deprivation of rights. The history of Russia is rife with instances of popular uprisings in support of social and national liberation. The national liberation struggle of the peoples of Russia was one of the elements of the growing revolutionary movement in the country. If a democratic transformation was impossible without a resolution of the nationalities question, the latter in turn could not be resolved without a fundamental change in the state system. The revolution could not afford to ignore such a fundamental task as that of toppling the tsarist colonial system, which was retarding the socio-economic development of the entire country.

We must not, however, conclude—as is often done in the historical literature on Russia written in the West—that Russia was a completely backward country, differing fundamentally from the West European countries. The distinctive feature of her economy lay in the sharp contrasts, in the combination of a semi-feudal backward agriculture with the latest forms of industrial capitalism. Evidence of this may be found in the high degree of concentration of industrial production. Thus, in the ferrous metals industry the monopoly Prodamet (Society for the Sale of Russian Metallurgical Factory Goods) was dominant. This syndicate amalgamated 30 factories and marketed from 76 to 95 per cent (according to the individual product) of the total output of the Russian metallurgical industry. More than half of the output and sale of coal was cornered by Produgol (Society for the Trade of Mineral Fuel) incorporating 24 enterprises—among them French and Belgian. The entire oil industry was concentrated in three concerns: the Nobel Brothers, Shell (a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell) and Russian General Oil Corporation. The largest monopoly conglomerates were the Med (Copper) and Kolomna-Sormovo societies, which played a leading role in

the transport and agricultural machinery industries. There were others of this scale as well.

The establishment of monopolies took place under the aegis of large banks. The Russian-Asiatic Bank was the organiser of a powerful military-industrial concern and organised the tobacco industry into a trust as well. The Petersburg International Commercial Bank founded a group which monopolised the building of warships. These two banks as well as the Russian Bank of Foreign Trade, the Azov-Don and the Russian Trade and Industrial banks had their subsidiaries in London, Paris and other major European cities as well as in China and India. They concentrated in their hands almost one-half of the country's financial resources and bank operations. No country in the West had such a level of concentration. Approximately five thousand industrialists, bankers and merchants owned one-half of the country's wealth. In sum by 1913 a monopoly capitalist system had evolved in Russia.

Industrial production in Russia grew at a relatively rapid pace, exceeding that of the developed capitalist countries. This pace was nevertheless insufficient to overcome the country's long-standing backwardness. Although Russia held fifth—and in some branches fourth—place in world industrial production, the relative weight of her gross industrial output among the five leading powers (Germany, Britain, France, Russia and the USA) was an insignificant 4.2 per cent.

The level of capitalist development in Russia was average; her industrial production approached that of France. France's overall volume of industrial production was twice that of Russia's, but in terms of iron-smelting and coal output she only lagged behind France by 11-12 per cent and surpassed her in steel and rolled metal production, machine-building and cotton processing. Russia's large-scale industry lagged far behind Germany and the USA in

a technological sense. This must however be qualified by noting the substantial differences in plant and equipment, both regionally and from one sector to another, for in contrast to the technologically backward Ural metallurgical industry was that of Southern Russia which differed but little from the metallurgical industry of Western Europe.

Foreign capital in Russia must not be passed over in silence since it played a significant role in the country's economy and politics. The influx of foreign capital proceeded in two directions: first, through capital investment in Russian industry and second, through loans to the tsarist government. Heavy industry was the basic sphere of investment for foreign capital. French and Belgian capital occupied commanding positions in the metallurgical and coal industries of the south, British capital was invested in the oil, copper and gold extraction industries, etc. The preservation of the autocracy and gentry landownership required an expanding volume of foreign capital, since the tsarist government contributed a sizeable proportion of its capital to non-productive usages. In 1914 the state foreign indebtedness stood at the colossal figure of 5,400 million rubles; 35 per cent of all state loans had been spent for purposes not connected with production. The general thrust of this was to increase the country's economic and political dependence upon foreign capital.

The tsarist autocracy embodied the most backward of political systems. It represented an absolute monarchy differentiated into estates and relying upon the big landowners which in turn were in alliance with the reactionary big bourgeoisie. The latter collaborated with tsarism and the landowners and used the survivals of serfdom to its own profit. The big bourgeoisie actually merged with the landowners and shared political power and medieval privileges with them. As a result of this alliance, in

the words of Lenin, "we see, instead of a broad, free and rapid development of capitalism, stagnation and decay". To be sure, there existed contradictions between these allies, since the bourgeoisie strove to augment its economic strength with political power, and the nobility to restore its declining economic position. The fear of revolution and the open political alliance with the autocracy isolated the big bourgeoisie from the socio-political movement, while the ruling élite of the nobility treated it condescendingly.

The striking features of the autocracy on the eve of World War I were to be found in the intensification of both its reactionary nature and of the process of decay. The salient feature of its policies was nationalism, in the form of the most deep-seated great-power chauvinism which sometimes took on bestial forms.

This is illustrated by the following incident. A group of Ukrainian deputies to the State Duma proposed that the fiftieth anniversary of the death of the great Ukrainian poet Shevchenko be observed. "Who was Shevchenko," said one of the leaders of the monarchists, Purishkevich, "but a revolutionary of the 1860s. Have you not heard in his songs a call to a popular insurrection? Indeed what else could a poet who was a former serf be? He considered himself a noble above nobles. In fact he and his kind should have been taken to the stable and given a thrashing." This speech, a direct slap in the face of society, did not meet with the rebuff of the majority in the Duma, a good indication not only of the composition but also of the thrust of this institution.

Having repulsed the onslaught of the revolution of 1905-1907, the tsarist government was nevertheless forced to make certain concessions, to create at least the façade of a constitutional system together with the representative organs appropriate to this system. This gave birth to the State Duma which,



possessing virtually no substantial rights, executed primarily a consultative function. Its members were elected according to a curia system ensuring the return of majorities for the landowners and the bourgeoisie. In June 1912 the Third State Duma was dissolved. The majority in this Duma had belonged to reactionary groups. The Duma had, on the one hand, promoted the implementation of an agrarian policy directed against the peasantry, of a "tough" policy on the worker question and of overtly great-power chauvinist policy against the national minorities; on the other, it had established a verisimilitude of parliamentary norms of political life.

But in the opinion of the tsar and government even this loyal Duma was obstreperous. The next, Fourth Duma, suffered, in the opinion of its contemporaries, from an incurable "legislative paralysis". This was recognised even by the leaders of the bourgeois factions and parties. The Cadet Party, the main party of the bourgeoisie, tried without success to lead it out of this supine state. The Cadets came to the conclusion that in the prevailing conditions the party should place itself in irreconcilable opposition to the authorities until a democratisation of the state system, such as is possible given universal suffrage, equal rights for nationalities, and the accountability of ministers, was implemented.

The growing opposition of the commercial and industrial circles was reflected in the policies of the monarchist party of the big bourgeoisie—the Octobrists. Guchkov, the leader of the party, declared that their attempt to reconcile the powers that be, whose authority had never before sunk so low, and society had suffered defeat. Consequently, the party should struggle for reform, employing all legal parliamentary means. In his words, it was necessary to "make the final attempt to bring the authorities to

their senses, to implant in them the fear which fills us".

The declarations of the leaders of both bourgeois parties signified the collapse of the Right-wing majority in the Duma and was signalled by the sharp shift to the Right of the government "upper circles". There could be no question of the accountability of ministers, since the government itself had been replaced by a court camarilla and turned into a plaything, or rather a deck of cards to be shuffled about in the hands of the rogues surrounding Nicholas II and the Tsarina. The last prime minister to attempt to achieve something with the tsar, Kokovtsov, earned the disfavour of the royal couple by insisting on the expulsion from the court of Grigory Rasputin.

With the replacement of Kokovtsov and the appointment to the post of head of the Council of Ministers of Goremykin—a reactionary bureaucrat, indifferent and impervious—the last measure of independence separating the official government from the court camarilla disappeared. In the immediate circles of the tsarist family "the notion and significance of government was somehow effaced", Kokovtsov wrote in his memoirs, "and the motif of personal leadership of the state stood out more and more conspicuously and boldly". It was possible for "everything to be handled by one person" and the power of the ministers and the Duma should be limited "to the narrowest possible confines" since this power reduced the prestige of the tsar.

The nature of the coterie surrounding the last emperor and empress, which determined the policy of the state as well as formed the government, indicates the level of degradation and decomposition characterising the monarchy. It was a clique of rogues and adventurers, the most flagrant of whom was Rasputin, a drunkard and degenerate, posing as a "healer" and "soothsayer". A former horsethief

from Siberia, having inveigled his way into the court, he gained unlimited influence over Nicholas II and Alexandra Fyodorovna. His semi-literate scraw, "do this, dearie", held sway over government affairs and his recommendation, "a good soul", sealed the appointment of a minister.

And if strikes and actions by workers, peasant disturbances, and the national liberation struggle demonstrated that the masses would no longer accept the ways of the past, the situation in the Duma, the decadence of the court and the complete ineffectiveness of the government pointed to a crisis of the upper circles.

Such was the situation in Russia as the country observed the tricentennial of the ruling family and neither the peal of bells nor the pompous sermons marking the laying of the first stones for dozens of commemorative churches, nor yet the incantations of loyalty read by marshals of the nobility could drown out the death rattle of the autocracy. The only people deaf to this were those who had no wish to hear. The power crisis spread and the wave of revolution rose higher and higher.

## Chapter II

### BEFORE THE STORM

With the arrival of 1914 the revolutionary movement in the country gathered momentum. The growing number of strikes was paralleled by added stubbornness, an expanding geographical compass and rising numbers of participants. On the anniversary of Bloody Sunday (the massacre on January 9, 1905 by tsarist troops of a peaceful procession of workers, who had assembled to present a petition to the tsar; 4,600 people were killed and wounded) 260 thousand participated in strikes and demonstrations.

On March 12 as a result of administrative negligence at the Krasny Treugolnik Rubber Factory in St. Petersburg scores of workers were exposed to lethal fumes, as a result of which 200 individuals (including 180 women) were casualties. Twelve thousand workers at the Putilov Works went out on strike in protest, and by March 20 the number of strikers had risen to 158 thousand in St. Petersburg, 60 thousand in Riga and 10 thousand in Moscow. The owners decided to break the will of the workers through lock-outs and mass dismissals. Seventy thousand workers were affected. In response to an appeal by the Petersburg Committee of the Bolshevik Party, the workers fought against this action with a mass demonstration, forcing the owners to call a halt to the lock-outs.

Between April 23-26, 74 thousand workers went on strike in protest against the exclusion from 15 sessions of the Duma of the Social-Democratic and Trudovik deputies, who had been obstructing the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Goremykin. On May 1 more than 500 thousand participated in a strike, half of whom were concentrated in the capital. The strikers and demonstrators marched to the slogan: "Long Live May 1! Down with the Autocracy!" "Long Live May 1! Down with Militarism!", and demanded an eight-hour work day.

The end of May marked the beginning of a strike of 50 thousand workers in the Baku oilfields. The immediate cause of the action was an outbreak of the plague in a nearby settlement which threatened to spread to the oil works where extreme congestion, deplorable hygienic conditions—both work and residential—and miserable diets greatly increased the chances of an epidemic. The workers demanded from the oil industrialists improvements in their living conditions, an eight-hour working day and a halt to persecution for participation in strikes. From its inception the strike assumed a bitter political character. The oil industrialists evicted the strikers from their apartments, cut off their supplies of drinking water and the police carried out mass arrests. In June there were 500 arrests and on July 6 the number rose to 892. On June 20 a demonstration of 20 thousand was dispersed by Cossacks and police and 111 workers were arrested.

The news spread rapidly throughout the country. On June 24 the Moscow metal-workers went on strike in protest and were followed by workers in St. Petersburg and other cities. In July when 12,000 workers of the Putilov Works in St. Petersburg gathered for a solidarity meeting in support of the Baku oil workers, the police opened fire against the participants. Two workers were killed and 50 wounded. The incident shook the country. On

July 4, 90 thousand workers were on strike in St. Petersburg, by July 7 the number had risen to 130 thousand. Armed clashes with the police occurred in a number of the city's districts and barricades were erected.

On July 5 the Moscow workers from several enterprises—the Sytin Printing Works, the List Factory and the Dobrov-Nabholz Works gave their support to their St. Petersburg and Baku comrades. On July 8 the Governor of Moscow reported to the Minister of Internal Affairs that on that day "roughly 14 thousand workers from 60 enterprises were on strike.... The strikes are of an exclusively political nature and represent a response to the events in St. Petersburg". The Rostov workers wrote in an address: "We, the workers of Rostov, as members of the Russian proletariat, must not look on with indifference upon the slaughter of our brothers—the workers in Baku and St. Petersburg.... We must rise one and all in defence of our comrades. We must express our solidarity with them through a protest strike." In Moscow at this time 55 thousand workers were on strike, in Riga—54 thousand, in Kharkov—12 thousand.

All in all for the first half of 1914 there were 1,500 thousand strikers, more than in 1905, when, according to official data, the figure was 1,300 thousand. In turn, the majority of strikers were clustered in the capital and in the major industrial centres—Moscow and Riga.

The peasant disturbances did not die out either. The first half of 1914 witnessed 90 peasant actions, among which 36 were against the tsarist authorities and 26 against the landowning nobility. The peasants were gradually coming to the conclusion that it was necessary to support the actions of the workers in the cities. "We are waiting for a general strike," were, according to witnesses, the words of peasants from Smolensk Province. "The workers have woken

up once again, begun striking and demanding that which they, in concert with the peasantry, demanded in 1905," it was written in a peasant letter. "...We, peasant brethren, must also wake up. We must extend our hand to our comrade workers and together struggle for our common cause, for a better lot."

Neither was it peaceful in the non-Russian regions. Tiflis and Baku in the Transcaucasus, Warsaw and Riga were rocked by strikes; the Azerbaijanians, Ukrainians, Letts, Poles, Byelorussians and Estonians went on strike. In Central Asia there were major disturbances among the Kazakhs and Kirghiz.

The tsarist government moved to the offensive. Estimating that the workers' actions were proceeding under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, it directed its first blow against the party organ—*Pravda*—the printing press and office of which were smashed on July 8. *Luch*—the paper of the Mensheviks, and *Trudovoi Golos*—that of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, were also closed down. The police also raided the trade unions, closed down workers' clubs and troops were deployed in the workers' districts of the capital. The Black Hundred newspapers called for physical retaliation against the Bolshevik deputies to the State Duma and the leaders of the workers' movement.

However the revolutionary wave did not reach its culmination for its progress was interrupted by the outbreak of World War I. A general mobilisation was declared on July 17, and on July 19 (August 1, New Style) Germany declared war against Russia.

Germany chose the militarily most convenient moment to declare war. "Basically," wrote the secretary to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, in the summer of 1914, "Russia is not at this point prepared for war.... In a few years, according to all competent estimates, she will in fact be militarily prepared." Tsarism's state of

unreadiness was not simply the result of error and oversight. Rather it was the consequence of general economic backwardness, the insufficiency of financial means, the weight of routine and the bureaucratic methods by which the autocracy governed.

This unpreparedness was evident from the very beginning of the war. As early as August Russian troops, through the bungling of the tsarist command, suffered a heavy defeat in East Prussia. Three months after the outbreak of war it was discovered that the army was shy 820 thousand rifles—at a time when monthly output was set at only 60 thousand rifles.

Russia's participation in World War I aggravated to the limit her economic, social and political contradictions. The war provoked the collapse of industry and the decline of agriculture, famine and a transport and fuel crisis. As early as 1916, 36 out of 51 blast furnaces had been shut down because of shortages of fuel and iron ore. In Petrograd (as St. Petersburg was called after the war began) 50 enterprises were closed down. The smelting of metal declined from 16,500 thousand poods in October 1916 to 9,500 thousand poods by the beginning of 1917. Labour productivity at the coal mines fell sharply. Average output for the miner in the Donets Basin was 12.2 tons per month in 1913; by the winter of 1916 it had fallen to 9.26 tons. Deliveries of coal to all industrial enterprises hovered between 50 and 80 per cent of demand in 1916. Transportation was in disarray. There were shortages of rolling stock and track. As early as 1914 there accumulated a backlog of 84 thousand waggons of freight waiting to be hauled. This figure grew to over 140 thousand by the close of 1916. The Chief of Staff of the Russian Army, General Alexeyev reported to Tsar Nicholas II: "At the present time there is no sphere of government or public life not subject to serious disorder caused by the failures of the transport

system.... A defence factory is having only 50-60 per cent of its transport needs met on the average and for the Petrograd district the Minister of Transport has declared that instead of the requisite 18,500 thousand poods, only 8,000 thousand can be freighted."

The army experienced shortages in artillery, shells and ammunition. In the spring of 1915 some of the soldiers even lacked rifles. In May 1916 the guns on the Western Front had shells enough to last but a few days, while on the South-western Front reserves had been exhausted. The Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, General Yanushkevich, wrote to the Minister of War that with the dwindling supply of weapons and ammunition, casualties had risen 50-60 per cent, and the commander of one corps added, "They (the Germans) are spending metal, and we—human lives." The shortages of weaponry and military supplies and the absence of any hope of making up these deficits in the near future provoked pessimism even in the upper ranks. "Indeed, no military science has as yet taught this method of conducting a war: without bullets, rifles, artillery...."

In terms of firepower the Russian army lagged far behind its allies. In the middle of 1916 it was worse supplied (per kilometre of front) with field artillery (the ratio was 1:5), with heavy guns (1:9), and machine-guns (1:4.5). By the end of the same year the Russian front had an average of two guns per kilometre, the French—twelve. In total numbers Russia had two times less field artillery, three times fewer heavy guns and six times fewer shells than the Anglo-French forces.

However, despite the fact that by September 1915 there were 140 Austrian and German divisions facing the Russian lines, and 91 facing the Anglo-French and that military operations on the Russian front had directly supported the allies at a number of

critical moments, Britain and France, while calling for "a fight till victory" and demanding action on the part of Russia, made no attempt to provide weaponry for the Russian army. "... History will return a true bill against the military directors of France and Britain for their selfish obtuseness in abandoning their Russian comrades in arms to hopeless carnage..." wrote the British Prime Minister Lloyd George at a later date. "...Whilst the Russian armies were being shattered and pounded by the overwhelming artillery of Germany, and were unable to put up any defence owing to the lack of rifles and ammunition, the French were hoarding their shells as if they were golden francs, and were pointing with pride to the enormous accumulation of reserve dumps behind the lines ... the British generals treated the production as if we were preparing to enter for some great race or contest."

Poorly trained, lacking weapons and supplies and led by incompetent generals from the court camarilla, the Russian army suffered defeat after defeat. Its losses were staggering. Roughly four million soldiers and 77 thousand officers were killed or wounded, 2,300 thousand were listed as missing. 111 thousand died of disease and another one million were discharged from military service. For every thousand enlisted men the British lost six, the French 59 and the Russians 85. Exhausted and debilitated, the Russian army was forced to retreat before the onslaught of Germany and her allies.

The crisis in food supplies grew ominous. The area of unsown land multiplied severalfold. While land untouched by the plough amounted to 5-6 per cent of arable at the outbreak of the war, by 1916 this figure had risen to 20-50 per cent from province to province. Sown area declined by 10 million hectares and the number of households without sown acreage doubled. Holdings of livestock dropped sharply. As a result of manpower shortages, the

decline in draught animals and stepped-up food requisitions, the countryside not only could not feed the army and the cities, but was itself dying of starvation.

Despite cutbacks in grain production there could have been enough bread for the army and the cities if the government had properly organised procurement and distribution. However, of the 13,500 million poods harvested in 1914-1916 it purchased only 1,500 million poods (10 per cent of the gross harvest, or 50 per cent of marketable grain). Large stores of grain lay untouched in the country's hinterlands and could not be used because of the bottleneck in transport. The delivery of foodstuffs to Petrograd declined by 50 per cent, and to Moscow by 67 per cent. As early as autumn 1915 the army was receiving only half of the food stipulated for it. At the close of 1916 and in early 1917 the delivery of bread to the army fluctuated from 33 to 50 per cent of the established norm. At the beginning of February 1917 on the Northern Front food reserves had dwindled to a two days' supply. Bread rations in the cities dropped lower and lower. In Petrograd and Moscow the daily ration was first set at 600 grams, then fell consecutively to 400, 200 and even at times to 100 grams. There were days when bread was simply not available.

The country experienced an acute shortage of essential goods—salt, soap, kerosene, matches, manufactured goods. Prices rose and speculation became rife. During the war the price of bread rose to six times its original cost, a metre of cotton to 12 times, and of wool to 20 times. The bourgeoisie however, waxed fat both through the inflated prices and through profits from war orders. In the 142 largest textile enterprises alone, the capitalists' profits rose from 60 million rubles in 1913 to 174 million rubles in 1915. The owners of flax-processing enterprises in 1915 doubled their profits

as compared with the pre-war period. Returns on investment for metallurgical factories in 1916 amounted to 50 per cent and for the metal-working industry the figure climbed to 81 per cent.

Government finances were in a state of total disarray. From the outbreak of war to the fall of the autocracy 39,000 million rubles were expended: 30,500 million swallowed up by military outlays. This sum was gathered through the release of paper currency, tax hikes and foreign loans. On March 1, 1917, paper money in circulation totalled 9,950 million rubles, while actual reserves of gold amounted only to 1,476,300 thousand rubles. As a result of inflation the official value of the ruble dropped to 55 kopeks by February 1917; its purchasing power fell to 27 kopeks and continued to decline. By virtue of tax increases the government pulled in 1,225 million rubles, collected in the main from working people, since the incomes of the Romanov House and the property of the court were not subject to taxation and for the first two and a half years of conflict war profits were also exempt (they were projected in the budget for 1917 alone, and then only to the sum of 55 million rubles). Through foreign loans Russia received 6,300 million rubles, primarily from Britain (4,500 million) and France (1,250 million). Smaller sums were borrowed from the USA (250 million rubles), Japan (154,500 thousand) and Italy (121 million). The loans were granted under extremely difficult terms much to the disadvantage of Russia. Military orders fell under the control of the British and French governments. High interest rates were attached to the loans. Of the credits granted by France, 40 per cent went to cover previous loans.

In sum the economic and military situation in Russia offered clear evidence that the country was approaching a national catastrophe. In these circumstances a revolutionary crisis once again



emerged, grew and began to assume acute form in Russia in the autumn of 1915.

When war first broke out it was not only the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie (particularly the intelligentsia, student youth and the prosperous peasantry) but also a certain sector of the workers who succumbed to the chauvinistic intoxication. However a peace between classes in the country was not forthcoming. First, the more advanced detachments of the proletariat stood up against the war. In Petrograd, Riga and Baku anti-war demonstrations took place. Second, a number of encounters between the police and the workers and peasants occurred. At the Lysva Works, for example, the workers and peasants of the surrounding villages demanded that subsidies be paid to the families of recruits, 50 people were killed or wounded, 22 were sentenced to death and 23 to life penal servitude. Third, the peasant disturbances continued. By the close of 1914, 56 provinces had recorded 265 peasant actions, one-half of which were directed against the landowners. Thirty-five demonstrations were suppressed by fire. But all in all, the introduction of martial law, the cruel repression unleashed by the autocracy and the influence of chauvinistic propaganda resulted in a decline of the revolutionary movement in general and worker activity in particular.

The situation began to change from the summer of 1915. In May a general strike was declared in the enormous textile centre of Ivanovo-Voznesensk. The strike ended in a victory for the 30 thousand workers when prices on foodstuffs were reduced. Following a decision of the regional Bolshevik conference of the Central Industrial District—which included Ivanovo-Voznesensk—it was decided to carry out a general political strike. On August 10 the strike locked the entire town in its grip. Demonstrators marching to the slogans "Down

with the Government", "General Amnesty" and others moved in the direction of the prison to free the workers who had been arrested the day before. The police opened fire on the demonstrators, killing 100 and wounding 40. The workers of Petrograd, Nizhni-Novgorod, Tula and Sormovo responded to this violence with protest strikes. In Petrograd alone 23 thousand workers went on strike. All in all the number of strikers reached 55 thousand in August, of whom 44 thousand were politically motivated.

September 1915 was marked by the inception of a mass political strike of metal-workers, accompanied by meetings and clashes with the police. During the September actions demands were made for universal suffrage, the renewal of the normal work of the Duma (it had been dissolved by Nicholas II on September 3, 1915) and the release of the arrested Bolshevik deputies. The demands of the Petrograd workers were taken up by the workers of Moscow, Nizhni-Novgorod, Saratov and Kharkov. According to official data, 114 thousand were on strike. Of this number almost 90 thousand were engaged in political strikes.

In the following year the political level of activity of the proletariat advanced yet further. With the subsequent aggravation and deepening of the crisis, the workers' movement, having gained from the autumn of 1915 a persistent and mass character, linked up with demonstrations of students and the middle strata of the urban population. The proletariat now came to the fore of the democratic front. Workers' strikes were notable for their stubbornness and scale. One hundred thousand participated in the political strikes in Petrograd on January 9 to commemorate the martyrs of Bloody Sunday. During meetings the participants linked economic demands with a call for an end to the war. The workers of the Putilov Works, in declaring a

strike against the closing of the works, simultaneously demanded an end to the war, the establishment of a democratic republic, the introduction of an eight-hour work day, and the confiscation of landed estates. In October 1916, 250 thousand workers were on strike in the capital. The strikes bore a clearly expressed political nature and proceeded under the leadership of the Bolshevik party organisations. The troops sent to pacify refused to fire at the workers. Events were moving towards a general political strike. "The idea of a general strike," reported the tsarist secret police, "is winning new supporters as each day passes, and is becoming as popular as it was in 1905."

The immense casualties and shortage of weapons provoked dissatisfaction with the command among the soldiers and sailors. Desertions took on a mass scale. The army was being inexorably and actively revolutionised. This process was particularly rapid on the Northern Front and in the Baltic Fleet, closely connected with Petrograd. In October 1915 spontaneous action erupted among the sailors on the battleships *Gangut* and *Pavel I*, the cruisers *Ryurik* and *Rossiia*. Many of the participants were dismissed from their posts on the ships and Bolshevik agitators were placed under arrest. Despite the repressive measures, however, the unrest in the army and the navy continued to grow. In 1916 the incidence of fraternising on the front grew as "soldiers' truces" were concluded, registering a new form of protest against the war.

The military censor, citing soldiers' letters, reported that as a result of military failures, growing prices, the proliferation of speculation and exhaustion from two years of war, in the autumn of 1916 "a major turn to the worse could be observed in the mood of the army". But the reports of the censor were not the only evidence substantiating the fact of this change and describing its nature. Further

evidence was offered by the rapid rise in the desertion rate (the number climbed to 1,500 thousand) and refusals to carry out the orders of superiors, culminated in armed conflicts. An exchange of fire between insurgents and troops sent to pacify them ended a demonstration of four thousand soldiers at the distribution point in Gomel. The Second Siberian Corps refused to launch an offensive in the direction of Riga. Soldiers of the Twenty-Second Odoyev Regiment similarly refused to take up their positions.

The peasant movement also gathered momentum. In 1916, 216 actions against landowners and war requisitions were registered. The government sent troops into the insurgent villages 91 times.

A new element in the development of the revolutionary crisis was the upsurge in the national liberation struggle which took the form of armed uprisings in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Land confiscation on a mass scale, sharp increases in taxes and requisitions exacerbated the already deteriorating position of the native population. The measure which exhausted the population's reserves of patience was a tsarist edict ordering the conscription of 480 thousand local inhabitants who had not yet been called into military service to carry out work in the rear. Spontaneously erupting action against the departure of those mobilised for work turned into an uprising against the tsarist government and local feudal magnates. Breaking out in Khojent in July 1916, it then spread to the large Central Asian cities—Tashkent, Samarkand, Fergana. The uprising was most widespread in Kazakhstan, where it was led by the national hero of the Kazakh people, Amangheldy Imanov. By autumn the insurgents numbered 50 thousand. To put down the uprising the government despatched 17 companies, 19 cavalry squadrons, 14 artillery pieces and 17 machine-guns. Nevertheless these forces were

insufficient. The uprising stopped only after the victory of the revolution.

In the situation which had unfolded and which promised, in the words of the poet Alexander Blok, "unprecedented changes, unheard-of tumult" three political camps were competing for power: the tsarist monarchist, the liberal bourgeois, and the democratic camps.

In the camp of the autocracy were the landowning nobility, the upper echelons of the government officials and the higher ranks of the officer corps. This camp had no political parties in the strict sense of the word, but it did have such Black Hundred organisations as the Union of the Russian People and the Union of Michael the Archangel. They received the nomenclature "Black Hundreds" by virtue of their extreme reactionary nature, obscurantism, and organisation of pogroms. The conspicuously active Council of the United Nobility and the Union of Land Proprietors also belonged to this camp.

The autocratic camp was in a state of profound crisis, one indication of which was the advanced state of disintegration characterising tsarism. The government was virtually deprived of the possibility of running the affairs of state and all matters were conducted by the court camarilla headed by Rasputin, whose influence during the latter years of the tsarist regime was literally unlimited. In January 1916, on the recommendation of Rasputin, B. V. Stürmer—an unprincipled careerist and embezzler as well as obedient servant of his benefactor's will—became Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Rasputin himself said of the role of Stürmer: "The old joker will have to dance on strings; otherwise, his neck will be broken." He succeeded in having Shcheglovitov appointed Chairman of the State Council and his minion A. D. Protopopov Minister of Internal Affairs, after which he de-

clared, pointing at his clenched fist: "Protopopov has been appointed. Now Russia is right here."

All those who expressed opinions contrary to those held by the court were drummed out of the tsar's government, particularly those ministers inclined to seek an alliance with the bourgeoisie, represented in the Duma by the "Progressive bloc". They quite justly assumed that Milyukov was "an exemplary bourgeois and feared social revolution above all else", and saw in this the opportunity for an alliance. But the extreme reactionary group insisting that the Duma be dissolved held sway. All ministers connected with Duma circles were dismissed. An indication of the government's further turn to the Right was the appointment of Stürmer to the post of Prime Minister, which provoked sharp criticism from bourgeois leaders, who considered him "if not a complete traitor, then at least ripe for treachery", and from military circles as well as Russia's allies. Stürmer was soon replaced by Trepov, who in turn only lasted 48 days at the post.

Ministerial leap-frog and the influx of rogues and adventurers at the tsar's court and into the highest governmental posts provoked dissatisfaction even within monarchist circles. There it was assumed that matters could be set right by getting rid of Rasputin, who had discredited the regime. During the night of December 18, 1916, he was murdered by a group of conspirators, including the leader of the monarchists in the Duma, Purishkevich, the nephew of the tsar Grand Duke Dmitry Pavlovich, and Prince Yusupov. The murder, however, could not and did not alter the situation. After the corpse of Rasputin—who had been both poisoned and shot—was dragged from an icehole cut in the Moika, the autocracy carried its reactionary policies yet further. Trepov was replaced in the post of Prime Minister by Prince N. D. Golitsyn. Preparations were under way for elections to a new Fifth State

Duma to be composed solely of representatives of the nobility and the clergy. The rights of bourgeois organisations, established to attract the bourgeoisie to the task of organising the military effort and supplying the front lines, were curtailed. It was suggested that the larger cities be placed on a siege footing and factories militarised. Plans for concluding a separate peace with Germany were entertained.

Lenin quite accurately described tsarism's policies on the eve of its downfall: "We have before us the clear-cut stand of the monarchy and the feudal-minded landowners — 'no surrender' of Russia to the liberal bourgeoisie; better an understanding with the German monarchy. Equally clear is the liberal bourgeoisie's stand — exploit the defeat and the mounting revolution in order to wrest concessions from a frightened monarchy and compel it to share power with the bourgeoisie." The latter position was carried out by the Constitutional Democrats, or Cadets, as they were popularly known. This party was formed in 1905 to bring together the liberal bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intelligentsia. At the first party congress its leader, Professor P. N. Milyukov, declared that the party stood for "the principle of a united Russia and for the inviolability of private property" and was a party of "social reformists".

The Cadet programme included the demand that peasant landholdings be expanded "through the alienation ... at the expense of the state, to the degree necessary, of private landholdings, with a just compensation to be paid to the present-day owners", that is, they in fact proposed the redemption of the land of the landowners. It was no accident that the Cadet programme found no support among the peasantry. It included demands for freedom of speech, assembly, the right to form unions and an eight-hour working day.

Numerically the party was weak; for this reason at their congresses and in official documents the Cadets referred to the number of organisations (around 600) rather than to the actual membership. It would seem that even in its heyday membership never exceeded a few tens of thousands. Among the more than 60 members of the Central Committee there were five representatives of the titled nobility, some 20 major industrialists, bankers, merchants, as well as professors, engineers and other representatives of the upper strata of the intelligentsia.

The Cadets functioned as an opposition party, but as an opposition faithful to rather than against the tsar. After Russia entered the war the Central Committee of the Cadet Party published a proclamation in which it appealed for a truce on internal disputes "to preserve our country whole and intact and to maintain for her that position among the world powers under assault by her enemies". As representatives of the imperialist bourgeoisie the Cadets shared the annexationist ambitions nursed by tsarism and appealed for support to the government for the sake of resolving the "age-old national mission" of seizing the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits on the Black Sea. It was no coincidence that Milyukov received the mocking nickname "Dardanellsky". However, defeat at the front, economic dislocation, the situation at the court, the policies of the autocracy, which had no desire to share power with the bourgeoisie — combined to force the Cadets to speak up for reform, however moderate their proposals.

The Cadets entered into the so-called Progressive bloc with the other bourgeois party — the Octobrists. The latter had also arisen during the first Russian revolution and had received its name from the tsarist Manifesto of October 17, 1905, which had granted certain limited civil freedoms. The sub-

stance of the manifesto was quite biting summarised in a contemporary epigram:

*The tsar took fright—published a manifest'.  
For the dead, freedom—the live, arrest.*

It was the programme given in the manifesto which the Octobrists adopted as their political credo. This party of the big monarchist bourgeoisie shared a majority with the Cadets in the Third and Fourth Dumas. One of its leaders, M. V. Rodzyanko, was the Chairman of the Fourth Duma. The Octobrists were the fulcrum of the throne, but even they, under the force of circumstances, began to voice criticism of the tsarist government. At a session of the Fourth Duma in the summer of 1915, Rodzyanko expressed the wish for "changes in the very spirit of the acting system" and for the creation of a government relying "on the trust of all vital forces in the country". Another leader of the Octobrists, A. I. Guchkov, emphasised in postscript that they remained loyal supporters of the monarchy. "We appeal for a joint effort to meet the demands of society," he said, "not for revolution but precisely for the consolidation of power and the defence of the homeland from revolution and anarchy."

When it became clear that the tsarist government was in no position to rule over the state and the army and that a revolution was brewing in the country the leaders of the bourgeoisie, fearing a separate peace with Germany, began to act more decisively. Milyukov gave a sensational speech in the Duma, ending each accusation directed against the government with the words, "What is this—stupidity or treason?" However words were not translated into action. The liberal bourgeois party yearned for a little palace coup and the replacement of Nicholas II by another tsar. This matched the inclinations of certain members of the High Command, the high-

ranking officials, even the royal family. By replacing one tsar with another the bourgeois opposition counted on the formation of a new government in which it would participate. It was suggested that Nicholas be forced to sign a manifesto abdicating the throne in favour of his brother, the Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. This plan was supported by Britain and France who were interested in preserving Russia as an ally and in the activation of military operations on the Russian-German front. Thus, the bourgeoisie was against a democratic republic. It wished to seize power, preserve the monarchy and continue the war for the implementation of its imperialist designs.

Fundamentally different tasks were set by the democratic camp, led by the working class and its vanguard, the Bolshevik Party. It was specifically the proletariat which provided the thrust of the revolutionary movement and was the prime mover of the revolution, although during the war years certain changes had taken place in it.

The number of industrial workers rose, amounting to almost one-quarter of the working class. By the outset of 1917 there were 4,523 thousand workers engaged in large-scale industry and transport. Notable advances were made in the ranks of the workers in the metal-working industry, which swelled by more than 200 thousand new members. A slight decline was registered in the number of workers in certain branches of light industry—textiles, wood-working, and the printing industry. The number of agricultural and construction workers also declined. At the same time 15-20 per cent of the pre-war proletariat had been drafted into the army (this figure rises to 20-25 per cent if we include only males). As a consequence the proportional weight of adolescents, women and aged (over 40) workers grew. The ranks of the working class were replenished by recruits from the bourgeois and

petty-bourgeois strata. Further additions from the middle and prosperous strata of the countryside facilitated the dissemination of petty-bourgeois views and outlooks within the workers' milieu. Nevertheless the political consciousness of the workers and their revolutionary nature grew at an accelerated pace during the war years.

Besides the Bolsheviks there were in the democratic camp the petty-bourgeois Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary (SR) parties, which vacillated between the bourgeoisie and the working class. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party was formed in 1902 on a platform characterised by pre-Marxist utopian petty-bourgeois socialist views. The SRs declared that "neither the rich nor the poor, the bourgeois nor the proletariat, the landowner nor the peasant" were the centre of their attention, but each of them "inasmuch as each is a human personality capable of uninterrupted and harmonious development". But under the influence of Marxism they recognised the existence of "impersonal class antagonisms", that is, of the class struggle, but rejected the decisive role of economic relations in this struggle. The Socialist-Revolutionaries took the principle of "labour norm" as the basis for dividing society into classes and therefore considered it possible to establish a party above classes. "Genuine socialist party," wrote their defenders, "must unite the entire working class—the people: the toiling peasantry, hired labour (the proletariat) and the working intelligentsia: teachers, doctors, writers, in short, all those living on their own labour, and not on the labour norm of others." The SRs considered the peasantry to be the motive force of revolution and the peasant to be a "socialist by instinct".

The SR party programme envisioned the establishment of a democratic republic, the introduction of civil freedoms, the abolition of private property in land and its redistribution among the peasantry

according to the principles of equal repartable land tenure. This alleged socialisation of the land was the central point of the programme and did receive the support of the peasantry. However this support is explained not by the peasants' adherence to socialism, but rather by their ambition of eliminating landed estates. There was nothing socialist in the SR programme, its demands did not transgress the confines of a radical democratic coup. Therefore contemporaries observed that SR socialism was not revolutionary, and that its revolutionary impulse was not socialist.

The SRs advocated individual terror as the chief weapon in the struggle against the autocracy. They asserted that the "crowd" was powerless against the tsarist police and gendarmes. With the aid of acts of terrorism carried out by "elusive" terrorists the autocracy could be toppled and the people prodded into revolution. Their position represented a brand of revolutionary adventurism.

During the revolution of 1905-1907 the Socialist-Revolutionaries represented the Left wing of petty-bourgeois democracy, expressing the interests and outlook of the peasantry in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. But their position was inconsistent. On the one hand, they lashed out against the tsarist government, producing pamphlets with appeals for "agrarian terror" against the landowners, and carried out a number of terrorist acts against the more conspicuous representatives of the tsarist bureaucracy. All in all, more than 200 terrorist acts were carried out, and the victims included two ministers, thirty-three governor-generals and others. On the other hand, in their political demands they formed a bloc with the Cadets, taking part with them in the Conference of Oppositional and Revolutionary Organisations of the Russian Empire in which even the Mensheviks refused to participate—they who attributed to the bourgeoisie the role of leading



the revolution. It was no accident that the SRs earned the nickname "Cadets with bombs" or that a cartoon was printed in the newspapers depicting a Cadet, ingratiatingly bowing before the tsar and saying: "Your Majesty, give us a constitution, or the SRs will open fire."

In the years of reaction after the first Russian revolution there set in within the SR party, in the words of the SR leader V. Chernov, "an ideological stupor, a state of confusion and perplexity". A variety of tendencies within the party emerged, and those advocating only "non-parliamentary methods of struggle" held sway, while simultaneously rejecting the possibility of mass revolutionary activity, since the "energies of the masses were fettered".

The Azef affair was a serious blow to the prestige of the party. For five years Azef led the Militant SR Organisation carrying out terrorist acts before being uncovered as an agent of the tsarist secret political police (*okhranka*). Having organised a number of successful assassinations including that of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Pleve, and the Moscow Governor-General, the Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich—he earned for himself the unlimited trust of the leadership and full freedom of action. Subsequently Azef twice betrayed to the police almost the entire body of the organisation, the underground printing press in Tomsk and others. After his provocational activities were uncovered he fled abroad. The Azef affair revealed the internal rot and the unhealthy void of principles creating the dominant atmosphere in the party. Verbal revolutionism, adventurism and the Azef affair transformed the party into isolated groups. According to the testimony by party functionaries, even sympathisers expressed doubts in its vitality and that of its programme, which was considered utopian.

In the years of the new revolutionary upsurge (1910-1914) the position of the Socialist-Re-

volutionaries improved somewhat. After Russia's entry into World War I differences emerged in the party concerning the position to be taken towards the war. At a conference of socialists from the Entente nations in London one section of the SRs presented a declaration in which it was proposed that a truce be worked out among the classes in the interests of victory, which allegedly would "consolidate the progressive European democracies, and smash one of the major reactionary forces of Europe". Another group of SRs demanded that the party "remain resolutely aloof from all attempts to idealise the war" and protested against the appeals for civil peace and party disarmament. However, as a whole the SR Party with the exception of a small group of internationalists (the founders of the future Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party) took a defencist and social-chauvinist position.

Second in size among the petty-bourgeois parties in the democratic camp were the Mensheviks. This party broke away from the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party at the Second Congress in 1903. The immediate cause for the split was the discussion of organisational questions. The supporters of L. Martov believing that it was necessary to create "an open door" party, without firm discipline and organisational principles, received a minority in the elections to the central organs (hence the name Menshevik, or "minority", as distinct from Bolshevik, or "majority") and then brought matters to a split. This marked the emergence of the Menshevik Party, although the final and official division into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks took place only in 1912 at the Prague Conference and an independent Menshevik Central Committee was established as late as August 1917.

As distinct from the SRs, who proclaimed themselves a party of the entire people, the Mensheviks regarded themselves a party of the working class.

However their Marxism was of a sort refashioned to fit liberal-bourgeois measures. The Mensheviks asserted that the proletariat must concentrate on the economic rather than the political struggle. Since Russia stood on the threshold of bourgeois-democratic revolution, the political struggle must be the affair of the bourgeoisie as the leader of this revolution. The task of the working class was limited to supporting the bourgeoisie, to whom power must be transferred intact after the collapse of the autocracy. In fact the proletariat was to take no part whatsoever in the formation of the new order. The Mensheviks assumed that socialist revolution in Russia was quite inconceivable since the proletariat made up a minority of the population and could emerge victorious only after the triumph of revolution in the West European countries. They opposed an alliance of the working class and peasantry, considering the latter a reactionary force.

During the revolution of 1905-1907 the Mensheviks opposed the overthrow of autocracy, maintaining that the working class must limit itself to support for the liberal bourgeoisie, since an armed uprising might frighten it away. This represented a policy directed at curtailing the revolution and reducing it to partial reforms. After the defeat of the revolution the Mensheviks reiterated that it was wrong to take up arms and that in general it was necessary to curtail illegal activity and replace revolutionary methods with the struggle for partial reforms.

A process of decline and disintegration, parallel to that occurring among the SRs, began in the midst of the Mensheviks too. A large proportion of Menshevik organisations collapsed and many rank-and-file members left the party. During World War I the Mensheviks, like the SRs, took up a defencist, social-chauvinist position. Only a few members formed a Menshevik-Internationalist group which

was extremely inconsistent and, fearing above all a split with the social-chauvinists, gave way to the latter in all disputes.

The only steadfastly consistent, highly organised and truly revolutionary party was the Bolshevik Party which wielded great influence among the workers. As early as 1911 Bolshevik publications were predominant in the illegal press and the issue of legal publications had been arranged. The Prague Conference, held in January 1912, was of enormous significance. It set forth three fundamental revolutionary slogans: a democratic republic, an eight-hour working day and the confiscation of landed estates. These demands expressed the interests of the overwhelming majority of both urban and rural toilers. The conference excluded the Mensheviks from the party and chose a Bolshevik Central Committee. In the period of the new revolutionary upsurge the Bolsheviks were the first to mobilise their forces and determine their strategy and tactics.

The Prague Conference adopted the decision to publish a daily newspaper and on April 22 (May 5, New Style) 1912—much earlier than the newspapers of the other parties—the first number of *Pravda* was issued in an edition of 60 thousand copies. The first number of the Menshevik *Luch* appeared only in September and the Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper still later. *Pravda* rapidly gained a wide following among the workers who considered it their newspaper. Evidence of this is offered by the fact that as early as 1912 *Pravda's* fund included 620 group contributions from workers. In 1913 this number reached 2,181 and in 1914, by the outbreak of war—2,783. In this same interval *Luch* received 1,332 contributions, and the SR newspaper—788. *Pravda* immediately became a powerful means of influence by the Bolshevik Party over the masses, over tens of thousands of workers.

The Bolshevik faction in the Fourth Duma, which became a second legal centre for revolutionary organisation of the working class, exerted great impact in winning over the masses, explaining the political situation to them and mobilising forces for the assault on the autocracy. The Bolsheviks, as distinct from the Mensheviks and SRs, looked upon legal organisations, workers' clubs, trade unions and cultural societies as important sources of political enlightenment and as a means of uniting the working people for economic and political struggle. This position predetermined victory in these organisations, and above all in such industrial centres as St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga and Baku. The influence of the Bolsheviks grew among other sectors of the population—the democratic intelligentsia, employees in commerce and industry, the low ranking civil servants and the student body.

The Bolsheviks made solid gains in consolidating the international solidarity of the working people. The party programme on the nationalities question, guaranteeing the equal rights of nations and their right to self-determination, the party's defence of oppressed peoples, of national cultures against the Russification policy of tsarism contributed to the fact that the working people of different nationalities began to look upon the Bolsheviks as their defenders. Support of this is offered by the flood of collective letters to *Pravda* from the workers of Estonia and Poland and the peasants of the Ukraine. The Bolsheviks emerged victorious in the Social-Democratic organisations in the outlying regions.

The Bolsheviks were the only party immediately to take a stance against the war and lay bare its imperialistic goals and nature. "A war against war," declared the Bolshevik A. Y. Badayev to representatives of the press in the name of the Duma faction. While the other parties, gripped by nationalist fever, cried out for the defence of the monarchist home-

land and appealed for a class truce, the Bolsheviks advanced the programme of a war against the war. They published 600 anti-war pamphlets in an edition of more than two million copies. Despite the repression levelled against the party and the arrest of the Bolshevik faction in the Duma the anti-war activity persisted and continued to grow in scale. One of the pertinent tasks set forth and revolved by the Bolsheviks under the leadership of Lenin was that of bringing together all internationalist elements both in Russia and abroad.

The decisive activities of the Bolshevik Party had great import under circumstances indicating the formation of a revolutionary situation, the exhaustion of the last reserves of the "upper circles" and the collapse of the old way of governing, with the "lower orders" opposed to a compromise with the autocracy. In order that a revolutionary situation result in revolution objective conditions alone are not sufficient. What is also necessary, Lenin underlined, is the "ability of the revolutionary class to take revolutionary mass action *strong* enough to break (or dislocate) the old government, which never, not even in a period of crisis, 'falls', if it is not toppled over".

The leading force of the revolution that was ripening in Russia, though it be a bourgeois-democratic revolution by nature, could only be the proletariat as the most revolutionary class, destined to head the struggle of the masses and, taking advantage of hesitations and difficulties in the tsarist government and the bourgeois camp, to lead the revolution to its conclusion. Infused with revolutionary determination, united and tempered in the class struggle, the working class was ready for this role above all by virtue of its advanced detachment—the Bolshevik Party—which at the moment of revolution was with the masses, with the revolutionary proletariat.

## Chapter III

### THE OVERTHROW OF THE AUTOCRACY

Early 1917 was marked by the tempestuous development of events. In January the number of strikers rose to 270 thousand — the highest in all the war years. One-half of this number was accounted for by the workers of the capital's enterprises. The activity of the revolutionary underground gained momentum. The alarmed police carried out their fifth raid against the Petrograd Bolshevik Committee, arresting ten members and seizing the illegal printing press. Searches and arrests took place in Moscow, Rostov-on-the-Don and other cities. However the political strike set for January 9 could not be deterred. "Power must be wrested from the hands of the tsarist government and placed in the hands of a government created by revolution"—pamphlets distributed among the workers urged.

The Duma was called back into session on February 14. The Mensheviks and SRs attempted to organise a support demonstration but succeeded in mustering only about 400 people around the Taurida Palace. The Cadet leader Milyukov explained that the Duma, in criticising the government "would act in word alone". But at the same time columns of workers marched on Nevsky Prospekt in the centre

of the city, bearing aloft the signs, "Down with the War!", "Hail the Second Russian Revolution!". The police tried to disperse the demonstrators but to no avail.

On February 22 spontaneous demonstrations, spurred by hunger, erupted in the capital. The crowd broke into bakeries and food stores. On February 23 (March 8, N. S.), on International Women's Day, mass meetings sponsored by the Vyborg District Committee of the RSDLP(B) were held at a number of enterprises in protest against the war, high prices and the difficult plight of women workers. The speeches of the Bolshevik agitators found an avid audience. Women workers from the Sampsoniyevskaya Manufactory, the Lebedev Factory and the Russian Spinning Mill Factory proceeded to the metallurgical and machine-building works where they urged the workers to strike. In this first day of revolution more than 128 thousand people were on strike. Mass meetings and strike actions poured over into street demonstrations. An evening gathering of representatives of the Central Committee Bureau, of the Petrograd Committee and the Vyborg District Party Committee decided that the time had come to carry out in practice the slogan "Down with the Autocracy!"

On February 24 mass strikes and demonstrations achieved even greater scale. The number of strikers exceeded 200 thousand and at a number of enterprises workers began to elect deputies to the Petrograd Soviet.

On February 25 the political strike of Petrograd workers became a general strike, and armed clashes with the police broke out. The Bureau of the CC and the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party put out leaflets with the call: "Everyone up! Down with the tsarist monarchy! Hail the eight-hour work day! All landed estates to the people! Down with the war! Long live the brotherhood of workers of the world!"

On February 26 the general political strike began to grow into an armed uprising. On this day the police opened fire on demonstrators on Nevsky Prospekt, killing more than 50. On the same day the Bolshevik Party was dealt a heavy blow—the Petrograd Committee was arrested. Its functions were taken up by the Vyborg District Party Committee. The instigators of the massacre, General Khabalov, Commander of the Petrograd military district, and Protopopov, Minister of Internal Affairs, hastened to assure Nicholas II that order had been restored in the city.

However the massacre of the workers provoked another reaction. One thousand five hundred soldiers of the Pavlovsky Life-Guard Regiment went over to the revolution. On February 27 the training detachment of the Volynsky Regiment rose in arms and was joined by soldiers of the Moscow, Semyonovsky, Izmailovsky and other regiments. By evening 60 thousand soldiers had joined the ranks of the insurgents. The popular movement grew with striking rapidity. Battles were fought in the centre of Petrograd. In the morning workers supported by soldiers took the Arsenal and the Main Artillery Department by force. During the day the prisons, the secret police department and the Finland Railway Station were seized. The Bolsheviks called for the workers and soldiers to elect deputies to the Soviet and underscored the necessity of occupying as soon as possible governmental buildings as well as the telegraph and telephone stations. By evening the entire capital with the exception of the Admiralty, sheltering the staff of the Petrograd district military command, the Winter Palace and the Peter and Paul Fortress, were in the hands of the insurgents. The Bolshevik CC Manifesto "To All Citizens of Russia" was pasted on the walls of the city, and presented a concise revolutionary programme, urging the establishment of a Provisional

Revolutionary Government of the Republic, the defence of the rights and freedoms of the people, the confiscation of landed estates, an eight-hour work day and an end to the war.

On this very day in the Taurida Palace SRs and Mensheviks—deputies to the State Duma and members of the War-Industrial Committee—proclaimed themselves the Provisional Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. At 9 p.m. before the arrival of deputies from the workers' districts the first session of the Petrograd Soviet was convened. The Menshevik Chkheidze was elected Chairman and the SR Kerensky and Menshevik Skobelev were chosen as vice-chairmen. Six Bolsheviks were included in the membership of the Executive Committee. Important decisions were made concerning control over finances, the creation of a People's Militia and the publication of the newspaper *Izvestia*. On March 1, representatives of the soldiers and sailors were added to the Soviet, which was then reconstituted as the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

Among the bourgeois political leaders confusion and fear reigned in the face of the insurgent people. On February 27 a Provisional Committee of the State Duma was formed from representatives of the bourgeois parties and groupings and it made an attempt to save the monarchy. When it became unmistakably clear that the Duma had either to join the revolution or seal its doom together with the autocracy, the Duma Chairman Rodzyanko (who by his own admission had been "made a revolutionary" against his own will) fearing that the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet would proclaim itself the state power, declared that the Provisional Committee was taking power into its own hands. The tsarist ministers were arrested. The prison doors of the Peter and Paul Fortress—the main political prison of the tsars—closed upon

Goremykin, Stürmer, Shcheglovitov, Protopopov and others.

But even after having made the decision to establish a new government the Provisional Committee carried out secret negotiations with the General Headquarters of the High Command and with Nicholas II in an attempt to preserve the constitutional monarchy. However the balance of class forces in the country left no room for compromise. Autocracy could neither suppress the revolution nor sustain control through reforms; it was totally isolated. "If we had had but one reliable regiment and one resolute general," lamented V. V. Shulgin, a leader of the monarchists, at a later date, "things might have turned out otherwise. But we had neither a regiment nor a general ... nor could we have had one."

On March 1, the power of the tsarist government was ended forever and during the night of March 8 the last Russian autocrat placed in writing his abdication of the throne. Unable to oppose the onslaught of the revolution, the monarchy fell under the blows dealt by the people.

Foreign historians and sociologists often try to convince their readers that all classes and social strata as well as all political parties (except the Bolsheviks, who allegedly disappeared from the political scene during the war years) took part in the February revolution. Denying the role of the Bolsheviks in preparations for the revolution and in the overthrow of tsarism, they either argue the victory to be the result of a spontaneous mass movement or ascribe the leadership and organisation of the movement to the liberal intelligentsia and "genuinely democratic" bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties.

Such assertions merely parrot those made at the time by the bankrupt SR and Menshevik leaders. "Not one party," wrote the Menshevik

Sukhanov, "had prepared for the great upheaval. Everyone dreamed, had presentiments, sensed...." An SR leader, V. M. Zenzinov, placed events in a somewhat different perspective: "The enemy with whom we had long waged such a cruel and bloody battle, now lay at our feet disarmed and overwhelmed."

One must not, of course, give short shrift to the immense might of revolutionary spontaneity. But several other circumstances must be kept in mind. First, the spontaneous actions of the masses in February were to a large measure readied by their preceding revolutionary experience and by the selfless work of the Bolshevik Party, which had untiringly propagated its revolutionary slogans among the workers and soldiers. As early as the close of 1915 V. I. Lenin, defining the immediate tasks of the party, wrote that "today we are again advancing towards a revolution". The Bolshevik programme reflected the interests of the broad masses and the revolutionary movement unfolded under the ideological influence of its slogans, which had become the slogans of the insurgent people.

Second, it was precisely the Bolshevik Party which represented the most organised political force in the country. Including in its ranks 24 thousand Communists, it had its leading organ, the Russian Bureau of the CC, functioning on a country-wide scale while the Mensheviks were in a state of complete ideological and organisational disorder and represented fragmented, autonomous groupings. Bolshevik party organisations and groups were active in more than 200 of the country's urban centres, on the Northern and Western fronts, on the ships of the Baltic Fleet and in many of the rear-line army units. The party organisation of the capital, where the fate of the revolution was being settled, united two thousand members and was connected with many other cities.



The party organs in Russia had established ties abroad. They received advice and directives from Lenin, encouraging them to prepare for new revolutionary battles. The tsarist secret police reported in 1916 that through the Russian Bureau of the CC "illegal literature was being transported from abroad and guiding instructions passed, albeit with large delay, from the Bolshevik leaders abroad". The secret police report for the same year states that "as far as the party of Socialist-Revolutionaries is concerned, according to the information of the police department, there is no such party in Russia". It is quite possible that the police department was making wild boasts but numerous SR sources also testify that on the eve of the February revolution the Socialist-Revolutionaries were not a monolithic, organisationally united political force. The very same Zenzinov, boasting of having "brought the enemy to his knees", forgot that he had said after making the rounds for the SR provincial committees: "We were concerned above all that the flickering flame of our party not be snuffed out entirely." It would take a heavy dose of fantasy to presume that from this flickering flame erupted the bonfire of revolution.

Third, neither the Mensheviks nor the SRs were in a state to conduct serious political work among the broad masses of working people, since they were equipped with neither a genuinely revolutionary scientific theory nor tactics. They could not take an avant-guard position because, bound by their chauvinism, they linked the struggle against the autocracy with defencism and with conciliation with the bourgeoisie. Regarding the bourgeoisie as the guiding force of the revolution they saw their primary objective in supporting the bourgeois opposition and appealed to it to seize power.

The Bolsheviks in contrast, armed with the Leninist theory of revolution and Leninist tactics,

stood resolutely on an internationalist position and struggled adamantly for the hegemony of the proletariat. While the petty-bourgeois leaders not only maintained their distance from the stormy development of revolutionary events, but even tried to restrain them, the Bolsheviks did everything possible to introduce elements of organisation and consciousness in the developing mass struggle. They were with the masses on the eve of February and in the thick of the uprising, they directly led the struggle of the insurgent workers and soldiers, ensuring victory for the February bourgeois-democratic revolution.

The leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties demonstrated their organisational capacities not on the barricades but in secret negotiations with the bourgeoisie, behind the backs of the insurgent people, which led to the establishment of dual power in the country — the outstanding feature of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia.

The February revolution drew into action, in the words of Lenin, "unprecedentedly vast numbers of ordinary citizens". Millions of people, politically dormant for a decade, smothered by oppression of tsarism and the factory owners, awoke and were drawn into politics. There were millions of small proprietors situated between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, forming a gigantic petty-bourgeois wave enveloping all and numerically flooding the ranks of the proletariat as well as spreading petty-bourgeois views far and wide among the workers.

Naturally this wave carried on its crest the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties, which were petty bourgeois in their social essence and expressed the point of view of the petty and middle proprietors as well as a segment of the workers which had succumbed to bourgeois influ-

ence. As a result the Socialist-Revolutionary Party became numerically the largest party in Russia. From the outset of the revolution its ranks were swollen with an influx of petty-bourgeois elements, attracted by social-patriotism and the amorphous programme from which each could draw that which pleased him, and further by the flabby organisational structure which opened wide the door to all who wished to be called party members. Many of these "March SRs", according to the observations of party members themselves, differed little from the Cadets. The Mensheviks received their own "March flood" though to a lesser extent.

We must also keep in mind both changes in the composition of the working class and the fact that the Mensheviks throughout the war operated legally and had their own anchor in the form of the Duma faction, whereas the Bolsheviks were underground and cruelly persecuted by tsarism.

Thus the petty-bourgeois parties gained a majority in the Soviets, the local organs of self-government, many soldiers' committees and in the leadership of a number of trade unions. Proudly calling themselves "revolutionary democrats" they used their position not to further the revolution, but, themselves refusing power, to hand it over to the bourgeoisie. The leaders of SR-Menshevik bloc in the Petrograd Soviet entered into negotiations with the leaders of the bourgeoisie and at a session of the Soviet carried out the decision to instruct the Provisional Committee of the State Duma to form a government. Fearful of frightening away the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks and SRs agreed to omit from the programme of the new government all mention of carrying out the demands of the people for the establishment of a democratic republic and an eight-hour work day, or of giving the land to the peasantry. Peace was promised only after "a victorious conclusion" of the war; meanwhile it was proposed to "honour our

obligations to our allies". All this quite suited both the Russian and foreign bourgeoisie. It was not for nothing that the American Ambassador Francis communicated joyfully to his government that the revolution was a success, and in reliable hands.

The bourgeois Provisional Government, formed by the Committee and consisting of 11 ministers, was headed by Prince Lvov, a big landowner close to the Cadets, and included Milyukov (Minister of Foreign Affairs), leader of the Cadet Party, Guchkov (War and Navy Minister), leader of the Octobrists, the Cadet Shingarev (Minister of Agriculture) and the textile magnate Konovalov (Minister of Trade and Industry). Among the Cadets and Octobrists there was also in the government, as Minister of Justice, the "socialist" Kerensky—demagogue, windbag and poseur with Bonapartist leanings.

However, the bourgeois Provisional Government did not enjoy unlimited power—it could carry out its functions only to the extent that it was supported by the Soviets. Therefore, following Milyukov's demand and pressure applied by the SR-Menshevik leadership, the Petrograd Soviet made a special declaration to the effect that the Provisional Government had been established with the participation of the Soviet and that it represented the legitimate authority to be recognised by all citizens.

So a historical injustice was committed—the revolution was accomplished by the workers and peasants but power handed to the capitalists and landowners, the Cadets and Octobrists, who themselves were amazed at this relinquishing of power by those who had every opportunity to retain it. The collusion with the Provisional Committee of the State Duma should not be considered a miscalculation or mistake on the part of the SR and Menshevik

leaders, for this step was taken quite deliberately. The SRs and Mensheviks explained this voluntary transfer of power to the bourgeoisie by the fact that the "revolutionary democracy" was not ready to take power. "Tsarism can only be replaced by bourgeois power. Trepov and Rasputin can and must be replaced only by leaders of the Duma 'Progressive bloc'," wrote the Menshevik Sukhanov. "We must maintain a policy aimed at just this line. Otherwise the overthrow will not succeed and the revolution shall perish, since the working class represents the 'real force of the class struggle but not the real force of state power'." "The victors themselves abdicated ... any other decision under the circumstances was unworkable, for the revolutionary forces were not organised at that point," Rakitnikov, one of the SR leaders, maintained omitting the fact that it was precisely the democracy organised in the Soviets which represented the only real force enjoying the support of the masses.

The core of the matter was not that it was infeasible to take power but rather that the petty-bourgeois leaders did not want to take it. Their conduct corresponded fully to Karl Marx's statement that often for the democratic representatives of the petty bourgeoisie "the blaring overture that announced the contest dies away in a pusillanimous snarl as soon as the struggle has to begin, the actors cease to take themselves *au sérieux*, and the action collapses completely, like a pricked bubble".

The dual power established in Russia represented a transition phase in the development of the revolution — a phase more advanced than that of the ordinary bourgeois-democratic revolution, but falling short of the establishment of workers' and peasants' power. In the conditions at hand only the Bolsheviks persistently and unwaveringly supported

the transfer of all power to the working people. In his first "Letter from Afar" Lenin noted that the Provisional Government consisted of representatives of the class of capitalist landowners and the bourgeoisie, whereas the main, unofficial, embryonic workers' government was that of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in Petrograd. He emphasised that since the fundamental question of revolution had been decided — power had changed hands from one class to another — the first stage could be viewed as complete. Russia now stood at the second stage, that is, the threshold of socialist revolution. He cautioned the party against a pernicious class truce, and in a telegram dated March 6, 1917, argued: "No trust in and no support of the new government: Kerensky is especially suspect...."

If the Mensheviks and SRs assumed that the revolution was complete, that "within the country there was nothing against which war should be waged", the Bolsheviks argued: "The revolution has not ended. The demands of the insurgent people in revolt have been articulated but remain unfulfilled. Only we ourselves can carry them out.... The revolution continues." The party considered that the seizure of power by the Soviets and the formation of a government responsible to these Soviets would to a large measure facilitate the victory of the workers over the bourgeoisie. The transfer of power by the leaders of the petty-bourgeois democracy to the hands of the exploiting classes, however, complicated the situation and created new difficulties for the further development of the revolution. With their assurances that they would satisfy the people's demands for peace and land and bridle the capitalists as well as give them democratic freedoms the petty-bourgeois parties were able to draw away a significant sector of the working people, who maintained an unreflecting trust in these parties and

in the Provisional Government which the latter supported.

Having analysed the situation that emerged as well as the balance of forces, Lenin came to the conclusion that the working class could win political power through peaceful means — without an armed uprising. An armed uprising against the bourgeois Provisional Government was at the given moment quite impracticable, for the masses would not have supported an appeal to overthrow this government forcibly. Lenin described his plan for the peaceful development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution in the work *The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution* — known as the *April Theses*. These Theses were endorsed in the resolutions of the April Party Conference, which defined the strategy and tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period of dual power.

Having launched on the course of the peaceful development of the revolution, the Bolsheviks did not count on the bourgeoisie voluntarily relinquishing power. However the Provisional Government had no police, no army, no omnipotent bureaucracy at a remove from the people, and if the Soviets were to proclaim themselves the sole legitimate power there could be no force to oppose them. "The Provisional Government disposes of no real power," Minister of War Guchkov characterised the situation, "and its instructions are carried out only to that degree allowed by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which has at its disposal the most important components of real power; namely the troops, railways, and the post and telegraph. It may be bluntly stated that the Provisional Government exists at the tolerance of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies." Therefore the bourgeoisie and its government, despite the burning desire to suppress the revolution and disperse the



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Soviets, could not muster the courage for this step. In Lenin's words: "What *really mattered* was that arms were in the hands of the people and that there was no coercion of the people from without. That is what opened up and ensured a peaceful path for the progress of the revolution."

The Soviets were an available form of power for the workers and peasants. They were the most massive and most democratic organisations of the working people, and all of the arguments introduced by the SRs and Mensheviks against holding sovereignty were devoid of substance. Such arguments served as a pretext for the justification of that dubious position—masquerading under "democratic" slogans—held by the petty-bourgeois parties. The Bolsheviks were working for the transfer of all power to the Soviets, despite the fact that the Mensheviks and SRs had a majority in the Soviets. The sovereignty of the SR-Menshevik Soviets would have signified a compromise between the Bolsheviks and the non-proletarian parties and the establishment of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship—significantly easing and hastening the development of the socialist revolution.

A government formed of the SR-Menshevik majority would have been accountable to the Soviets, and the Bolsheviks, not participating in this government, would have stood in opposition. Through their faction in the Soviets the Bolsheviks would have fought for the demands of the working people. In such a situation, forced to confront the people face to face and deprived of all opportunity of making empty promises, the leaders of the Mensheviks and SRs would have been forced to take a definite position—either to dissolve the bloc with the bourgeoisie or to continue old policies and clearly to expose to the workers their inability to act decisively in the workers' interests.

The Bolsheviks knew that sooner or later the masses would see through the deception and withdraw their support from the SRs and Mensheviks. However time was necessary before the non-proletarian strata of the workers would reject the policy of conciliation with the bourgeoisie and follow the working class, and it was imperative to help them make this choice. This is why winning the masses over to the side of the proletariat and turning the proletariat from the leading force of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the leading force of the socialist revolution represented one of the basic processes determining the inner core of the development of the revolution from February to October. The Bolshevik Party did not leave this process to spontaneity. It was necessary to raise the consciousness of the masses through persistent and painstaking explanatory work, to help the masses free themselves of the influence of the bourgeoisie, to clarify the real substance of the policies of the petty-bourgeois parties and to support and encourage in every way possible the revolutionary initiative of the working people.

The task facing Bolshevik propaganda was as follows: through ideological means and persuasion to urge forward both proletarian consciousness and the consciousness of the masses. The party considered it imperative to combine the struggle for the transfer of all power to the Soviets with the consolidation of its position within these Soviets. The consolidation of the Soviets through propaganda and re-elections, through systematic struggle within the Soviets for the triumph of the proletarian line with the aim of preparing the workers and soldiers for the next stage of the revolution—such was one of the major tasks of the party advanced by the April Conference.

Lenin wrote: "By seizing full power, the Soviets could ... ensure the peaceful development of

the revolution, peaceful elections of deputies by the people, and a peaceful struggle of parties inside the Soviets; they could test the programmes of the various parties in practice and power could pass peacefully from one party to another." On the basis of peaceful struggle among the parties and given free re-elections to the Soviets the peaceful transition from the bourgeois-democratic to the socialist revolution was a possibility. The working class would—through the Soviets—have to force the bourgeoisie to relinquish first political, then economic power. The implementation of this plan would have ensured the most painless transition to the new social system.

The Bolsheviks are not to be faulted that the revolution developed along a different road. But it was one of Lenin's great contributions that he elaborated the question of the possibility of the peaceful gaining of power by the working class. At a later date he wrote: "We Marxists have always been proud that we determined the expediency of any form of struggle by a precise calculation of the mass forces and class relationships. We have said that an insurrection is not always expedient; unless the prerequisites exist among the masses it is a gamble...." This statement retains its validity in the contemporary world as well, when Communist parties are forced to fight against the voluntaristic approach to armed uprising and against Leftist attempts artificially to create a "revolutionary situation" and organise armed insurrection lacking the necessary prerequisites. What it is to ignore the experience of the CPSU is amply testified to by the bitter consequences of such attempts provoked by Maoists or Trotskyite elements in certain countries.

Revolution cannot be imposed. Whoever seeks to explain revolutionary events through the export of revolution from one country to another may be refuted with the words of Lenin: "We in this

country, which has experienced two revolutions, know and realise that the progress of the revolution cannot be foretold, and that revolution cannot be called forth. We can only work for the revolution. If you work consistently, if you work devotedly, if this work is linked up with the interests of the oppressed masses, who make up the majority, revolution will come; but where, how, at what moment, from what immediate cause, cannot be foretold."

The dominant petty-bourgeois parties in the Soviets gave no indication of readiness to respond to the compromise proposed by the Bolsheviks, and the further the revolution proceeded, the greater the distance separating their policies and the interests of the people. The very first steps of the Provisional Government demonstrated its counter-revolutionary essence. It made every effort to preserve the old order, the old apparatus of state, the profit of the bourgeoisie, the landed estates—and to continue the war. Not without reason did a satirical magazine print the following dialogue:

"Say, what is that strange piece played so awkwardly by the orchestra?"

"Really, don't you know? It's the *Marseillaise*!"

"My word, it certainly doesn't sound like the *Marseillaise*."

"That's because the musicians are playing it to the tune of *God Save the Tsar*!"

Despite this fact the leaders of the Mensheviks and SRs continued to call for universal support of the Provisional Government, warning of the alleged dangers accompanying measures taken in haste which could alienate the bourgeoisie.

In the period from February to October there was not a single vital issue on which the interests of the working people and the bourgeoisie did not clash. These eight months were a time of testing in practice the programmes and political lines of each of the



parties in Russia. The results demonstrated that on all fundamental issues — peace, land, workers' control — the leaders of the petty-bourgeois parties took the side of the bourgeoisie and disregarded the people's interests.

The critical moments in the development of the revolution irrefutably demonstrated to the masses the correctness of the Bolshevik policies. On three occasions during the period of dual power the Soviets could have seized power and three times the SR-Menshevik leadership rejected the opportunity. During the April crisis, provoked by a note from Minister of Foreign Affairs, Milyukov, and concerning Russia's intention to continue the war, one word from the Petrograd Soviet would have been sufficient for the Provisional Government to surrender power to the former. This word, however, was not uttered. Moreover, the leaders of the Soviet established a coalition government of ten "capitalist ministers" and six "socialist ministers". Deceiving the masses, they saved the Provisional Government, concealing "the counter-revolutionary nature of the bourgeoisie by a glittering, spectacular facade of 'socialist' ministerialism". This was a step full of promise. Not without reason did the Cadet organ *Rech* appraise it as "the leadership dissociating themselves from the extreme Left". Now it remained only to "renounce ... not revolutionary phraseology — let the means of expression remain to the choice of anyone — but revolutionary ideology". Under the guise of a coalition, maintaining the illusion that power had been established in the country capable of giving peace and bread to the people, the bourgeoisie mustered its forces for the attempt to do away with dual power — to its own advantage.

The second crisis rose in June 1917. The June demonstration, in which approximately 500 thousand participated, was conceived by the SR-

Menshevik leadership as a demonstration of support for the Provisional Government, but actually took place under the leadership of the Bolsheviks. During these days the masses declared unambiguously: "We trust the Soviet but not those trusted by the Soviet."

During the third crisis (July 3-5, 1917), connected with the failure of the offensive on the front undertaken by Kerensky (Minister of War and Navy in the coalition government), there once again arose a situation favourable to the transfer of power to the Soviets. However the leaders of the Mensheviks and SRs tried to save the coalition with the bourgeoisie at all costs. With this in mind the Petrograd Soviet and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee (under their leadership) sanctioned the recall of reactionary troop units from the front to Petrograd. At the order of the Provisional Government the peaceful workers' demonstration was shot down. After this act the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies declared the Provisional Government to be the "saviour of the revolution" and recognised its "unlimited sovereignty". Kerensky became Prime Minister of the new coalition government.

Dual power had ended. The petty-bourgeois parties, which had, in the words of Milyukov, risen in the defence of the bourgeois revolution from the socialist revolution, were to blame that dual power ended to the advantage of the bourgeoisie. Lenin wrote: "The leaders of the Soviets and of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, headed by Tsereteli and Chernov, have completely betrayed the cause of the revolution by putting it in the hands of the counter-revolutionaries and by turning themselves, their parties and the Soviets into mere fig-leaves of the counter-revolution." With the

end of dual power the possibility for peaceful development of the revolution was also terminated. Before the Bolshevik Party, the sole party truly advancing the revolution, there stood the task of working out new tactics to fit the altered conditions, and of determining the path for subsequent movement forward.

The leaders of the Mensheviks and SRs and counter-revolutionaries did not conceal their glee. "Lenin is now a finished man," wrote the SR Svyatitsky, "his moral authority is undermined, the ideas of Bolshevism discredited, and, for the immediate future at least, can pose no danger." Even today, historians from the camp of the ideological opponents of socialism, using similar revelations by the bankrupt politicians of the past, try to maintain that after the July days the Bolshevik Party was fragmented and in disarray, "and in general disappeared from view".

However as early as July 26 the Sixth Congress of the RSDLP(B) convened with 267 delegates in attendance.

The congress was preceded by massive organisational and propaganda work. In the three weeks from the July events to the convening of the congress there took place four regional, one territorial, four provincial, and fourteen city party conferences and a congress of Social-Democrats from Latvia. In addition thirty-six city-wide party meetings at the conference level were held. Conferences and meetings took place in Petrograd and Moscow, in the Ukraine and in Siberia, in the Urals and the Caucasus. These meetings discussed the Leninist formulations set forth in his works "On Slogans", "An Answer", "The Beginning of Bonapartism", "The Lessons of the Revolution", "Constitutional Illusions", clarifying and supplementing the theses "The Political Situation" written immediately after the July events. In these works the lessons of the

July events were analysed and their meaning uncovered. Fundamental tactical questions were substantiated and the necessity of intensifying agitational and propaganda work among the masses, of uniting them and preparing them for armed uprising was underscored.

By the Sixth Congress the ranks of the party had swollen. If in April 1917 there were 80 thousand members in its 78 organisations, by the Sixth Congress the number had risen to 240 thousand united in 162 party organisations. The Petrograd organisation, in fact, numbered 32,200 members on July 1—by the Sixth Congress it had grown to 36 thousand, an increase of 3,800 in three weeks. The Ural organisations boosted their ranks by 3,930 in the month of July. The same month marked the establishment of the first independent Bolshevik organisations in Byelorussia—specifically in Minsk and Vitebsk. Thus there was a tempestuous growth of Bolshevik organisations after the July days. This upsurge was primarily accounted for by the best representatives of the working class. In Petrograd, of 500 thousand workers 41 thousand were members of the Bolshevik Party. In Moscow of 400 thousand workers 15 thousand were party members. If we look at individual organisations, the picture is even more striking. Consider the Ural factories and mines for example—at the Alapayevsky works of 6,000 workers, 1,300 were Bolsheviks; at the Kushvinsky of 1,800, the number was 883; at the Sysertsy, of 2,500—1,060.

These facts testify that the Sixth Congress was by no means that of a defeated party collecting its forces. The opponents of socialism need such arguments in order to maintain that the October Revolution was the outcome of a conspiracy of a handful of Bolsheviks, of a fortuitous combination of circumstances, and not the result of a mass movement headed by the Bolshevik Party.

The congress set forth the party tactics for the new situation. "At the present time," states a resolution adopted by the congress, "the peaceful development and painless transfer of power to the Soviets have become an impossibility, for power has already in actuality been transferred to the hands of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

"The only correct slogan at the present moment is that urging the complete liquidation of the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie." The congress steered the party towards an armed uprising. The congress indicated its firm conviction that a new, inevitable upsurge of the Russian revolution would place in power the workers and the poor peasantry.

## Chapter IV

### OCTOBER

Events proceeded just as had been foreseen by the Bolsheviks. Despite the seemingly evident triumph of reaction, V. I. Lenin in his evaluation of the July crisis demonstrated that it had put into motion the general collapse of the policy of conciliation with the bourgeoisie and hastened the turn of the masses to the Left. "The victory of the counter-revolutionaries," he wrote on July 26, 1917, "is making the people disappointed with the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties and is paving the way for the masses to adopt a policy of support for the revolutionary proletariat." The pace of the swing to the Left is illustrated by the following example. On August 14, during the elections to the lower level of the municipal governing organs held in a number of places in Moscow Province, the Bolsheviks received 27 per cent of the votes. On August 29, during elections to the next level the Bolsheviks carried 37 per cent of the votes. The SRs lost half of their voting strength in the same interval.

The July events accelerated and made more profound the decline and deterioration of the petty-bourgeois parties. Their influence among the working people fell catastrophically. Thus the circulation of the Menshevik *Workers' Newspaper* fell from 100 thousand copies in March 1917 to

10-15 thousand in August. "We are suffering blow after blow, defeat after defeat," stated the Menshevik leaders. Even they confessed that the reason of a decline of their party's prestige was that "broad segments of the population had recognised that no good had or could come of the coalition government". At a meeting held in the Petrograd Committee of SRs on August 23, 1917, representatives of 14 districts observed that the July events had increased the influence of the Bolsheviks, which was becoming preponderant by virtue of the Left mood among the workers. They stated that the Socialist-Revolutionaries were losing ground, that withdrawals from the party were motivated by dissatisfaction with the programme and above all with the tactics of the party. Many were turning to the Bolsheviks, accusing the party and the Provisional Government of a swing to the Right.

Within the petty-bourgeois parties, and particularly the SRs, the Left opposition began to grow rapidly, a fact indicating the widening rift separating the leadership and the rank and file of the petty-bourgeois parties. Lenin, observing the democratism of the SR and Menshevik masses, wrote: "...that cannot be said of their leaders, which is why we find that there is a yawning gulf between the SR and the Menshevik masses, on the one hand, and their leaders, on the other. The leaders of these masses have been gradually shedding not only their socialism, but their democratism as well." The strengthening of the Left wing of petty-bourgeois democracy indicated first, a swing of the masses to the Left, and second, that the Menshevik and SR parties rapidly approached political bankruptcy—the inevitable consequence of their reactionary policies.

Only the Bolsheviks were confidently leading the working people to socialist revolution. The latter relied upon the party's experience, which demon-

strated the anti-popular substance and prospectlessness of coalition politics as well as the futility of hoping for reforms. In the eight months after the overthrow of the autocracy not one of the basic demands of the working people put forth in the assault upon tsarism was actually fulfilled.

The peasantry expected that after the triumph of the revolution an agrarian reform would be effected, but in fact the landowners retained prominence in the countryside. Reduced to the worst levels of poverty and ruined by the war, the peasantry neither wanted to nor could agree with the arguments of the petty-bourgeois parties that it was necessary patiently to await a decision of the land question. The peasants rose up in struggle for the land, trying to implement with their own hands the promised, but unfulfilled reform. The tally of "violations" against landed estates rose in 1917 from 13 in March to 123 in April, 512 in May, and 967 in July. To suppress them the Provisional Government despatched punitive expeditions, legitimising the language of repression in its orders as the natural means for a government to deal with the peasantry. Despite this repression peasant uprisings flared up through the countryside in the autumn of 1917. Lenin regarded these uprisings as the most salient fact testifying to the loss of influence on the part of the petty-bourgeois parties and of the transfer of allegiances to the side of the Bolsheviks—the sole political party resolutely supporting the peasant movement and coming out for an immediate solution to the agrarian question.

The Menshevik Minister of Labour Skobelev promised to curb the capitalists. However, in actuality the "socialist" ministers assiduously defended the bourgeoisie and aided it in its assault against the interests of the workers.

Instead of initiating peace negotiations the Provisional Government, with the support of the SR and

Menshevik leaders of the Soviets, bent all their efforts to a prolongation of the bloody and exhausting war. On June 18, 1917, Kerensky threw the army into an offensive for which it was not prepared. This bloody adventure, devised to bolster the position of the government and suppress the growing revolutionary movement, cost Russia dearly. The German troops broke through the front, tearing a gap 300 kilometres in length and 120 kilometres in depth. In ten days the armies on the South-western front suffered casualties of roughly 60 thousand dead and wounded. Approximately 500 thousand square kilometres of territory were occupied and 25 million people were left homeless.

The country's economic situation deteriorated still further. The decline in production spread to new, more "flourishing" branches of production. Shortages of fuel, metal, and raw materials worsened. In the Donets Basin the extraction of coal declined from 150 million poods in March to 115 million poods in September 1917 and reserves on the railways dwindled to a work day supply of 4-8 days. Of 9,750 major enterprises roughly a third (3,884) were inoperative. The haulage of freight was systematically interrupted. In March-April 1917, 225 thousand less waggons of freight were hauled than in the same interval for the previous year.

The supply crisis worsened. In September 1917 Moscow, Kaluga, Kostroma, Vladimir and Novgorod provinces received only 15 per cent of the requisite supplies of foodstuffs. In Minsk Province the bread ration was reduced to three pounds of bread every two weeks. This at a time, when in the south the landowners, the rural bourgeoisie and merchants in the region of Novorossiisk alone had 347 million poods of bread, enough to feed both Moscow and Petrograd. But they had no desire to sell this bread, despite the fact that prices doubled in March-April alone.

The country was on the verge of financial bankruptcy. By the end of October 1917 the state debt had risen to an astronomical figure—49,000 million rubles, of which 11,200 million had been provided by foreign capital. Russia was engulfed by a flood of worthless paper money, called "kerenki" after Kerensky, by then the Prime Minister. In eight months 10,000 million "kerenki" rubles were issued.

The situation grew worse and worse for the working people. Prices on foodstuffs and other essentials rose steeply, climbing by 340 per cent in September and October alone. Price rises of 10-12 times were trailed by wage increases of only 2-3 times, leaving less than enough for minimal subsistence. But for the bourgeoisie profit continued to grow. Bowing to its demands, the government increased prices on deliveries of military orders. In the interval of March and April the price of coal rose by 61 per cent. The rich unashamedly siphoned off money from the state coffers. Their indebtedness to the Ministry of Finance grew by 454,400 thousand rubles in the period from March 1 to July 1. The war cost Russia 82,300 thousand rubles a day, the larger part of which went into the pockets of suppliers. The profit of the capitalists and the state officials in collusion with them amounted daily to more than 10 million rubles. The national economy, wasted by the war and by the legalised pillage of the bourgeoisie, was threatened by a catastrophe of unprecedented dimensions.

The future of the country was at stake and only the Bolshevik Party had a wide-scale programme worked out by V. I. Lenin, the implementation of which could prevent Russia from falling into the abyss to which bourgeois management was leading her. This programme provided for the enactment of measures that were imminent, could be implemented and were comprehensible to the broad masses.

The fundamental principle of the Bolshevik approach to the resolution of economic problems was the ensuring of a predominant role for the state in economic life and the drawing of the working people into the management of production and the distribution of material benefits. The primary means for struggle with economic ruin and hunger Lenin considered to be control, supervision, accounting and regulation on the part of the state, as well as thrift and correct distribution of manpower. In his work *The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It*, he emphasised that the implementation of these measures was quite feasible for the revolutionary-democratic government if it succeeded in attracting the mass of the working people to the enactment of control and did not hesitate to punish severely those capitalists who evaded this control.

One of the pivotal measures for restoring and transforming the economy was to unite all of the country's banks and establish control over the operations of this unified bank, i.e., the nationalisation of banks. This measure, which did not affect the capital of depositors, and therefore presented no insurmountable difficulties, provided the state with the opportunity of supervising and controlling all major monetary operations, of regulating the country's economic life and finally, of financing major state operations without paying huge brokerage fees for "services rendered" to the bank owners.

The indispensable prerogative of the bourgeoisie was then—and remains today—the commercial secret of trade and banking turnover, the "sacred inviolability" of trade books and bank accounts. The elimination of commercial secrecy, a quite realisable measure, would make possible the organisation of genuine and effective democratic control through unions of employees and of workers, through all the political parties.

Another urgent measure was the mandatory amalgamation in unions, or syndication, of large- and medium-size enterprises, which would facilitate production increases and would render possible a more complete utilisation of productive forces under the control of the state. Lenin proposed bringing the population together in consumers' co-operatives, introducing labour conscription for the bourgeoisie and an equitable distribution of consumer goods among the population—to be controlled by the working people.

The Leninist economic platform raised the initiative and developed the revolutionary energy of all democratic elements. It instilled the workers and peasants with confidence in their strength, showed them that they could and must take into their own hands the distribution of material wealth, and prepared them for the management of production. Further, Lenin underscored that only with the transfer of power into the hands of the working people could workers' control become a universal, all-embracing, ubiquitous, precise and conscientious account of production and distribution.

Experience convinced the masses ever more of the correctness of the Bolshevik recommendations, of the fact that they stood for the interests of the entire people, for improvements in provisioning and a liquidation of the supply crisis, for the satisfaction of the urgent needs of the workers and peasants, and that the Bolsheviks offered a cardinal programme for rescuing the country from national catastrophe, while the Mensheviks and SRs were conducting an indecisive, vacillating and, in substance, treacherous policy.

The enactment by the Soviets of measures proposed by the Bolsheviks, measures meeting the full support of the masses, would signify an immense step forward, which without coercion against the people and with the retention of full democracy,



would exclude the possibility of a return to the old system.

In the autumn of 1917, in the midst of a most acute national crisis, the Provisional Government and the petty-bourgeois parties supporting it lost the last ounce of sympathy among the masses, while the authority and influence of the Bolsheviks grew not only by the day, but by the hour. While the leaders of the Mensheviks and SRs became, as the October Revolution approached, generals without an army, the army of working people following the Bolsheviks grew and consolidated. The Kornilov revolt, the goal of which was to establish a military dictatorship in the country, added impetus to the revolutionising of the masses.

The bourgeoisie, demanding the creation of a "strong power" capable, in the words of the Cadet leader Milyukov, of carrying out a "surgical operation", and of ridding the country forever of the Bolshevik menace, advanced General Kornilov as the would-be dictator. On August 12, 1917, the so-called State Conference was convened in Moscow. Lenin most precisely described the substance of this conference when he called it the "coronation of the Bonapartists". But at the same time that the bourgeoisie greeted the future dictator with stormy ovations, 400 thousand Moscow workers went on strike in protest against the counter-revolutionary gathering. This, however, did not stop the conspirators. On August 21, Kornilov demanded the transfer to him of all civil and military power and moved his troops against the revolutionary capital.

Lenin foresaw the possibility of such a turn of events. Long before Kornilov's action he wrote that the policies of the petty-bourgeois parties were creating all the conditions for an attempt at a counter-revolutionary coup, and that the outcome would depend entirely on the fortitude and determination of the working people. On August 27, the

Central and Petrograd Bolshevik Committees and Central Council of Factory Committees, the Bolshevik factions in the Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Committee of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies issued the call: "Soldiers and Workers! In a fraternal union welded by the blood spilled in February, show the Kornilovites that it is not they who will crush the revolution, but the revolution that will smash and sweep from the earth attempts at bourgeois counter-revolution." And the response followed. No less than 60 thousand Red Guards, soldiers and sailors formed a solid wall around Petrograd, against which the waves of counter-revolution were smashed. At the Narva, Yamburg, Luga and Gatchina stations 45 troop-trains carrying Kornilov's troops were held up. Hundreds of agitators went to the rebellious troops. Their pleas found a fervid response among the soldiers, and by August 30 there was not a single military unit to be found which would agree to attack revolutionary Petrograd.

The suppression of the Kornilov uprising — without a shot fired — was an important victory for the democratic forces, and exerted strong influence on the subsequent course of the revolution. The struggle against the Kornilovites helped clear the air of illusions of conciliation and spurred the activation of the revolutionary energy of the masses as well as vitalised the activity of the Soviets. The swing to the Left of the masses significantly deepened and intensified from the time of the Kornilov revolt. However, the transfer of allegiances by the masses to the side of the proletariat and its party was the result not only of the reactionary policies of the Provisional Government but also of the immense drawing power of the Bolshevik programme, stemming from its popular nature and full correspondence to the interests and demands of the overwhelming majority of the

population. This was not a spontaneous, but a conscious swing. Relying on the new revolutionary experience of the masses, the Bolsheviks insistently brought the masses up to an understanding of party policies, and appealed to the working people by revolution to implement the slogans: "Power to the Soviets", "Peace to the Peoples", "Bread to the Hungry" and "Land to the Peasants". The Bolsheviks cast light on the prospects for revolutionary development and exposed the anti-popular substance of the political line of the leaders of the petty-bourgeois democracy.

The swing in the political mood of the masses found a vivid expression in the Bolshevisation of the Soviets. On August 31, 1917, the Petrograd Soviet adopted the Bolshevik resolution "On Power". On September 8 the Bolshevik resolution demanding the transfer of power to the Soviets was adopted by the Moscow Soviet. In quick succession similar resolutions were adopted by the Kiev, Kharkov, Kazan, Ufa, Minsk, Revel, Samara, Krasnoyarsk, Baku, Tashkent and other Soviets. In one day alone, September 1, 126 local Soviets in different regions of the country called for the seizure of power by the Soviets. In September 250 Soviets voted for the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" and at congresses in November more than 500 provincial and district Soviets voiced their support. Even the SR-Menshevik Central Executive Committee organ *Izvestia* had to admit that the RSDLP(B) had triumphed in a majority of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Moreover, many of these stood for an open and merciless struggle against the Provisional Government.

The working-class movement expanded under the slogan of the struggle for workers' control, inseparable from the struggle for Soviet power. September was ushered in with a strike of 110 thousand Ural metal-workers and miners. By the end of the month

strikes had been declared by 600 thousand railway workers on 44 of the country's railways and by 30 thousand Baku oilfield workers. In October 300 thousand textile workers in the Moscow Industrial Region went on strike. All in all, in the interval August to October (inclusive) 1917, roughly two million people took part in strikes which were all of a political nature.

The peasant war heated up. According to incomplete data, in September and October of 1917 there were more than two thousand peasant actions sweeping across Kursk, Kazan, Tula, Ryazan, Penza and other provinces. Punitive expeditions could not snuff out the flame of the peasant revolts, although in this two-month interval the Provisional Government suppressed six times more such actions than in the March-July period. "It is impossible to retain for even the briefest time these relations of servitude," wrote the peasants of the Volga region. The peasantry is "by organised means removing the fetters of bondage and slavery. Do not place any obstacles in this path". The peasant revolts were an objective indicator of the mass turn to the side of the Bolsheviks, for it was precisely the latter who appealed to the peasants to seize the land by revolutionary methods and who demanded the immediate satisfaction of the peasants' demands.

The ranks of the army were undergoing Bolshevisation. Akkerman, the representative of the 18th Army, declared at the October session of the Petrograd Soviet that the masses were turning to the Bolsheviks, since the latter stood for an immediate peace. "Recently Bolshevism has enjoyed immense popularity among the troops," reported the SR Committee of the 10th Army to its Central Committee. "The reason is simple—it is the opinion of the masses that the Bolsheviks are the only people striving for an immediate conclusion of peace." The soldiers linked the question of an end to the war with

the transfer of power to the Soviets. They demanded the removal of the Provisional Government and refused to submit to its dictates. The greatest upsurge in the revolutionary movement was observed on the Northern and Western fronts, nearest to the capital. The process of Bolshevisation moved still faster among the rear-line garrisons and reserve units, numbering around four million soldiers. By October 1917 the Bolsheviks had a "political strike force" in the army, which ensured them of a preponderance of force at the decisive points at the decisive moment.

The struggle of the oppressed peoples gathered momentum. Strikes and peasant disturbances encompassed the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic region and the Transcaucasus. In Central Asia the working people of Tashkent, gathering by the thousand in a meeting on September 12, adopted a resolution supporting the transfer of power to the Soviet. A few days later the Provisional Government restored its authority with the aid of punitive troops, but these troops backed away from a mass repression. In Finland the troops supported the people's demand for national independence. The regional committee of the army, navy and workers of Finland, led by the Bolsheviks, refused to carry out the order of the Provisional Government to withdraw the revolutionary troops from Finland. The struggle of the oppressed peoples merged with the struggle for peace and land and intensified the revolutionary crisis. The working masses in the outlying non-Russian districts, despite the opposition of the bourgeois nationalist organisations, created a united front with the Russian workers and peasants against the Provisional Government and for Soviet power and national liberation.

Such was the situation as it unfolded on the eve of the October armed insurrection. However the picture would be incomplete if we did not add a

word on the state of the petty-bourgeois parties. The turn of the masses to the Left and the collapse of coalition politics aggravated the process of disintegration and decline in these parties. They underwent an acute internal crisis. Testimony to the political bankruptcy of these parties is offered by the refusal of the masses to support their political line, mass withdrawals from these parties, and the growth, particularly with the SRs, of a Left opposition.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries did not in actuality exist as a united party. The Left wing of the SRs opposed a coalition with the bourgeoisie and supported the withdrawal of Russia from the imperialist war. It accused the Central Committee of betrayal and in actuality began to function as an independent party. The majority in many organisations threw their support to the Left SRs. For example, in Petrograd they had the support of 40 out of 45 thousand party members. In the Urals of 90 SR organisations 17 gave their full support to the Left position and 33 split. During the elections to the Constituent Assembly the Left SRs in the Baltic Fleet won 30 thousand of the 44 thousand votes cast for the SRs. In Kazan Province the comparable figures were 180,000 of the 270,000 votes cast for the SRs.

The Left SRs were not consistent in their policies, but at this point their position was closer to the proletariat than to the bourgeoisie, particularly concerning the fundamental question—that of power. "Down with the coalition! Long live the people's power and revolution!" — were the closing words of a speech by the Left SR leader Spiridonova to the Democratic Meeting, convened with the goal of consolidating the positions of the Provisional Government. "I will not undertake to campaign for the Commune and I cannot promise beforehand to fight in its ranks as every Bolshevik will do, but I must say that *if the Commune does start in spite of*

my efforts, I shall rather help its defenders than its opponents..." so Lenin depicted the position held by the supporters of Spiridonova. An action against the coalition in reality signified support for the Bolsheviks and the growth of Left SR influence strengthened the position of the revolutionary forces in the Soviets, the army and the country as a whole.

The numbers of the Menshevik Party dwindled sharply. Even according to official data its membership declined by 50 thousand from August to September 1917. The Moscow Menshevik organisation fell in membership by more than half, from 3,000 to 1,400 that autumn. The party disintegrated into a number of groups. Matters went so far that one of its leaders, Dan, declared his withdrawal from the Central Committee elected in August 1917, which, in his words, "is turning into a registrar of party strife ... and is deprived of the opportunity of not only playing the role of political leader but also of preserving party unity".

At the same time the composition of the Bolshevik Party increased after the Sixth Congress by more than 100 thousand members, or more than tenfold in comparison with the April Conference. Its ranks were swelled not only by new members with no previous party affiliation but also by former Mensheviks and SRs. In Rostov alone 900 former SR miners joined the Bolsheviks. By October the party had 350 thousand members, 60 per cent of whom were skilled and experienced workers. Even the Mensheviks were forced to admit that the "core of the Bolshevik Party was made up of the core of the working class, its most conscious, staunch and gifted elements". In the Petrograd organisation on the eve of the armed uprising there were 50 thousand members. In the Donets-Krivoi Rog Basin by the outset of October there were 30 thousand members. In Moscow and the Central Industrial

Region Bolshevik Party membership rose to 70 thousand.

The masses saw from their own experience that only the Bolsheviks were a genuinely revolutionary party—and extended their trust to it. "Comrades, we must act independently, and not wait another 100 years," Siberian soldiers wrote to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. "You yourselves know that our leaders are betraying us because they do not like our idea, and they are acting diametrically against, rather than hand in hand with us, because their interest is to defend capital rather than the working people.... Comrades, understand that our revolution will collapse, that the Socialist-Revolutionaries are a dormant party, that they will be dormant for hundreds of years to come. We must support only the Bolshevik Party, who are beating a direct path to socialism, and Lenin must be higher than all the rest." Of interest in this connection is the declaration of Spiridonova, leader of the Left SRs, which was the next largest party. She stated bluntly that her party supported the Bolsheviks "because the masses drawn out of a state of stagnation are following them".

All this bears witness to the fact that during the preparations for the October Revolution the Bolsheviks were the only force enjoying the trust and support of the masses. This was, on the one hand, the fruit of party policy and the immense work it carried on among the working people, and on the other, the result of the ideological and political bankruptcy of the petty-bourgeois parties, which had alienated themselves from the people and turned out to be on the other side of the barricades, in the camp of counter-revolution.

Thus one of the necessary conditions for the victory of the armed uprising was ensured—an armed uprising had to rely not on conspiracy nor on a party, but on the advanced class, the revolutionary

upsurge of the people. Other conditions were also present: the turning point in the history of the growing revolution had arrived, when the activity of the advanced detachments of the people is at its height and when the vacillations in the ranks of the half-hearted and irresolute friends of the revolution are strongest. The political success of the uprising was ensured. Now concern centred upon the technical, military and organisational preparations.

The Bolshevik Party was the practical organiser of the armed uprising, the plan for which was drawn up by V. I. Lenin. On October 10, 1917, took place the historic session of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(B), which after discussion of a speech given by Lenin concerning the current moment adopted a resolution stating that an "armed uprising is inevitable, the conditions for it have fully matured" and suggested that the party organisations are to be "guided by this, discuss and resolve all practical questions from this point of view". The decision for the uprising was adopted by the Moscow City Conference of Bolsheviks, the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region and other meetings, congresses and conferences.

On October 12 upon the initiative of Lenin the legal headquarters for preparing and carrying out the armed uprising—the Military Revolutionary Committee—was established under the Petrograd Soviet. It included Bolsheviks as well as Left SRs. The MRC had at its disposal 20 thousand Red Guards and 150 thousand soldiers of the Petrograd Garrison, who had proclaimed their readiness to act at its instruction. On October 15 the Petrograd Committee adopted a blueprint for the insurrection.

On October 16 the Central Committee met in extended session with representatives of the Petrograd Committee, the Military Organisation under the CC, the Bolshevik faction of the Petrograd Soviet and the factory committees. Lenin gave a



Members of the Military Revolutionary Centre of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in charge of the October uprising:

J. V. Stalin

M. S. Uritsky

Y. M. Sverdlov

A. S. Bubnov

F. E. Dzerzhinsky



speech, and a Military Revolutionary Centre was elected. Participants at the session appealed to all workers and soldiers to help in the comprehensive and intensified preparations for the armed uprising and to support the CC Centre created specifically for this purpose. They expressed their "complete certainty that the Central Committee and the Soviet would in due time point out the auspicious moment and the most appropriate mode of action".

The choice of moment was very important, for either a premature uprising or its overdelay could ensue in the defeat of the revolutionary forces. This moment arrived on October 24. On that day the Provisional Government began an assault against the revolution with the seizure of the printing presses for the Bolshevik newspapers, *Rabochy Put* and *Soldat*. On the instructions of the MRC the soldiers seized back the printing press. The Petrograd Bolshevik Committee adopted the decision to "move the entire organised revolutionary force into immediate action, without waiting until the activism of the counter-revolution reduces our chances of victory". The Petrograd MRC appealed to the population to demonstrate fortitude, staunchness, self-control and determination, and issued orders to the commissars and committees of the military units to prepare their men for action.

However the MRC did not demonstrate the necessary decisiveness and expedition. This could be used by the counter-revolutionaries to gather their forces and by the Mensheviks and SRs to entice the vacillating Left SRs to their side by demagogic means. In these circumstances an important role was played by the "Letter to Central Committee Members" sent off by Lenin on the evening of October 24, and ending with the words: "The government is tottering. It must be given the death blow at all costs.

"To delay action is fatal." Shortly after this Lenin

arrived at the Smolny to take charge of the uprising.

In conformity with the plan for the uprising bridges, the telegraph and telephone, railway stations and official government buildings were all occupied, and the Winter Palace—the residence of the Provisional Government—was blockaded. By morning, October 25, the city was in the hands of the insurgents. "The Provisional Government has been deposed," said a statement of the MRC entitled "To the Citizens of Russia", "...the cause for which the people have struggled: the immediate proposal of a democratic peace, the abolition of landed estates, workers' control over production and the establishment of a Soviet Government, this cause is ensured."

During the day the Petrograd Soviet triumphantly greeted the leader of the revolution, Lenin, and during the evening the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets was convened, ovations following the report of the seizure of the Winter Palace and the arrest of the members of the Provisional Government. In the address written by Lenin and adopted by the congress entitled "To the Workers, Soldiers and Peasants" it was said: "Backed by the will of the vast majority of the workers, soldiers and peasants, backed by the victorious insurrection of the workers and the garrison which has taken place in Petrograd the congress takes power into its own hands.... The congress decrees: all power in the localities shall pass to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies...."

The first decree adopted by the congress was the Decree on Peace, declaring that the government regarded the imperialist war as "a crime of the greatest magnitude against mankind" and expressing its determination to conclude an immediate peace "on terms equally just for all nations without exception". The congress addressed the working people of the world with an appeal to aid in achieving



"a successful conclusion of the peace". This historic document set forth the fundamental principles of the foreign policy of the Soviet state—a policy of peace and of respect for the sovereignty and independence of all countries.

The second decree was the Decree on Land which incorporated as its basis 242 peasant mandates received from the localities. Landed estates were abolished without delay and without compensation. All lands of the landowners, church, monasteries and the tsarist family were placed at the disposal of the local peasant Soviets for distribution among the peasantry on the basis of egalitarian land tenure.

The congress established the first Soviet Government—the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers)—headed by V. I. Lenin. It was composed exclusively of Bolsheviks. This was not a matter of the unwillingness of the Communists to allow any other party to participate in the government. The Mensheviks and Right SRs making up the minority left the congress. "We left, ignorant of reason or destiny," Sukhanov, the leading Menshevik figure, lamented at a later date, "merging with counter-revolutionary elements and destroying ourselves in the eyes of the masses." The Left SRs, with 179 delegates, the second largest faction (the Bolsheviks had 390 of the 625), remained at the congress. But they declined the invitation of the Bolsheviks to enter into the government. They explained their decision by the wish to "reconcile all democratic forces", that is, to find a compromise acceptable to those who had left the congress.

The Left SRs entered the Council of People's Commissars later, in December 1917, when their attempts to create a so-called homogeneous socialist government with the participation of all "socialist" parties failed. The Bolsheviks did not object to a coalition Soviet Government and took part in the negotiations undertaken by the Left SRs. The

latter's offer was rejected by the Right SRs and Mensheviks, who declared that agreement with the Bolsheviks was a "wolf-hole" and that instead of conducting negotiations, Soviet power should be overthrown. The Left SRs received seven ministerial posts in the government, including agriculture, justice and post and telegraph. In the agreement concluded with the Left SRs they were committed to carry out Soviet policies.

The congress elected an All-Russia Central Executive Committee of Soviets (VTsIK) composed of 101 deputies, including 62 Bolsheviks and 29 Left SRs. It was stipulated that the All-Russia Central Executive Committee could be supplemented by representatives of peasant Soviets and groups which had left the congress. Soon after this there took place the merger of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies with the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies and the VTsIK began to be called the VTsIK of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

From the very first days the victorious people, the Soviet Government and the Communist Party, which had become the ruling party, were confronted with extremely complex tasks. It was necessary to consolidate the victory of the revolution and to crush the opposition of the overthrown exploitative classes, to overcome the sabotage of the civil servants, and create a new, Soviet state apparatus. A new life had to be created. These tasks could be successfully met only with the backing of the broadest segments of the population inspired by the revolution to independent historical creative activity. An inexhaustible source of strength was to be found in the support of the people. "Victory will belong," wrote Lenin, "only to those who have faith in the people, those who are immersed in the life-giving spring of popular creativity." He always emphasised that socialism is the creation of the

masses themselves, that their creativity would inexorably advance new forms and methods for the governing of society, for increasing labour productivity, and for the political education and instruction of the masses.

During the first months of Soviet power all remnants of serfdom were eliminated. With the implementation of the Decree on Land the peasants received 150 million dessiatines of land confiscated from the landowners, the tsarist family and the church—as well as 300 million rubles' worth of agricultural implements formerly held by the landowners. They were freed of yearly payments of 700 million rubles for land purchase and rental. The division of the population into estates (nobility, clergy, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie) was eliminated, as were all titles and estate privileges.

The Decree "On Freedom of Conscience, on Church and Religious Societies" separated church and state and the school from the church. "Every citizen may profess any or no religion," states the Decree. "All infringements upon the right to confess any or no faith are abolished." In addition the government did not obstruct the observance of religious rites. The Synod (the supreme organ of the Orthodox Church) continued to function. Patriarch Tikhon, the head of the Russian Church, despite his anti-Soviet activities was allowed to retain his freedom. With the introduction of new laws on the family and marriage, obligatory church ceremonies were replaced by civil ceremonies. Women were given equal rights.

One document of the utmost importance was "The Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia", which proclaimed "1) The equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.

"2) The right of all nations of Russia to self-determination up to and including secession and the formation of independent states.

"3) The elimination of any and all national and national-religious privileges and restrictions.

"4) The free development of the national minorities and ethnographic groups living on the territories of Russia." The Soviet Government declared null and void all secret treaties of the tsarist government concerning the partition of Persia and Turkey, granted independence to Finland and carried out a number of other measures designed to liquidate national oppression and inequality.

It was essential to create a new state apparatus to replace the old. This task was complicated by the sabotage carried on by the old bureaucracy in the hope of throwing into disorganisation the country's economic life. Wages were withheld from workers and pensions from invalids. Factories were denied credits for the purchase of raw materials. However the organisers of this sabotage gathered in 40 million rubles. Bureaucrats in the Ministry of Supplies not only refused to work, but also hid and destroyed documents on the despatching and receiving of supplies of foodstuffs. As a result, of 271 freight loads of grain, despatched to Moscow, only 107 were actually delivered to their destinations.

The saboteurs estimated that Soviet power lacked sufficient trained personnel to manage the state apparatus and would go down in defeat. Their hopes, however, were unjustified. Workers, soldiers, sailors and low-ranking employees took the management of governmental affairs in their own hands. The military units despatched 70 former accountants to work in the State Bank. The core of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was made up of workers from the Siemens-Schuckert factory. Members of the Bolshevik Party with rich experience in the revolutionary struggle took their positions at the head of the commissariats and boards. There was the worker G. I. Petrovsky, the

former tsarist non-commissioned officer N. V. Krylenko and the ensign N. G. Markin, to name but three. At the end of November the majority of the People's Commissariats set to work. In addition a workers' and peasants' militia was established, as were new judicial organs and an organisation of a new type for the defence of the revolution—the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission for the Struggle Against Counter-revolution and Sabotage (Cheka). On the initiative of Lenin the first proletarian centre of state management of the national economy was established—the Supreme Economic Council.

In conformity with the programme set forth in the pre-October works of Lenin, "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It" and "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" the socialist transformation of the national economy was set into motion. The first step was the introduction of workers' control over production and distribution. In accordance with the "Decree on Workers' Control" approved by VTsIK workers' control was extended to all enterprises with no less than five employees and an annual turnover of no less than 10 thousand rubles. The production, marketing and storage of produce and raw materials as well as financial operations were subjected to control. Commercial secrecy was abolished. The members carrying out workers' control were elected by a general meeting of workers and other employees and provided access to all financial documents, books, records and business correspondence. It was forbidden to stop production or close down an enterprise without the approval of the workers' control organ. Its decisions were binding upon all proprietors. Workers' control was important in overcoming sabotage by the employers, in protecting material and monetary valuables from pillage and attempts to transfer this wealth abroad. It was

important in preparing the nationalisation of production.

The opposition of capitalists to the introduction of workers' control hastened the nationalisation of factories. It was no coincidence that the Likinskaya Manufactory was the first to be nationalised on the request of the workers. Its owner had closed it down in hopes of locking out four thousand workers and leaving them without employ. After this the enterprises of the Ural Mining companies were nationalised when they tried to interrupt their normal operation. At the close of 1917 and outset of 1918 approximately 25 per cent of the industrial enterprises and the entire merchant fleet and railway transport were nationalised. Bank operations were declared a state monopoly. All private banks were nationalised and merged with the State Bank. It is pertinent to observe that with the nationalisation of the banks and annulment of the loans of the tsarist and Provisional governments, the interests of the small depositor were fully protected.

Despite the difficulties of war-time, the havoc and destruction, the Soviet Government moved quickly to improve the conditions of the working people. It decreed an eight-hour working day (six hours for those under the age of 18), introduced a yearly two-week paid vacation, and initiated free medical care for the working people. The Council of People's Commissars allotted 100 million rubles to the Petrograd Soviet alone to combat unemployment, and took measures to improve the supply of essential foodstuffs to the workers as well as to ameliorate their living conditions: it imposed a ceiling on rents, freed the families of those serving in the army during the war and of low-paid workers from any rent whatsoever, and issued regulations concerning the reallocation of living space in the interests of the working people.

From the outset of the revolution the Communist

Party and the Soviet Government set about the organisation of public education on a state-wide scale. It took the necessary measures to preserve and make accessible for the working people the cultural treasures confiscated from the ruling classes. Resources were found to improve the living conditions of scholars and to finance scientific research. It is difficult to list, the more so to describe in detail, all that was done in the first months of Soviet power to transform social relations and the economy and to rebuild the state and culture. The country was literally turned upside down, it seethed from Brest to the Pacific Ocean. The ongoing events left no one indifferent. The societal foundations which had evolved over centuries were shattered. Each passing day brought something new, was replete with the enthusiasm of creative activity and of struggle for a new world.

On January 10, 1918, the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets was convened. The first joint congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and Soviets of Peasants' Deputies approved with the immense enthusiasm the policies of the VTsIK and the Council of People's Commissars and adopted the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People. This declaration summarised the results of the first two months of the existence of the Soviet Republic and legally consolidated the state foundations of the Soviet system as well as the principles of the internal and foreign policies of Soviet power. "Each line of this Declaration," states a decision of the congress, "is dictated by the working classes themselves, and all class-conscious workers, peasants and soldiers will give their last drop of blood for the enactment of the demands set forth in the programme of the Soviets."

Thus a state of a new type was built, wholly conforming to the interests of the people and the task of building a socialist society.

This state was established under the most difficult of conditions, marked by widespread destruction and hunger, counter-revolutionary uprisings and conspiracies and a continuing imperialist war. As long as the country was engaged in war with Germany, the position of the Soviet Republic could not be considered stable. The attainment of a peaceful respite, be it at the cost of burdensome concessions, was a task of the utmost urgency. However this was by no means understood by all. Not only the anti-Soviet Menshevik and Right SR parties, but also the Left SRs and a number of Communists opposed the peace. This opposition was based on the assertion that the peaceful coexistence of states with opposing social systems was impossible. In their opinion a socialist state had no right to sign a peace treaty with a capitalist state, because such an act presupposed and resulted in the establishment of "friendly" relations, to the exclusion of the revolutionary struggle.

The champions of ultra-Left extremism, failing to take into account both the realities and the inevitably heavy losses, and adventuristically playing with the fate of the country, the people and the revolution, declared that even if the German army occupied Petrograd and Moscow — this would only serve the world revolution, for the Germans "would choke on that chunk of living flesh which they wanted to swallow". In their sacrificial pose they suggested, in the words of the Left SR Kamkov, conducting a war "as long as revolutionary Russia, the working peasantry and the proletariat are not completely crushed and trampled in blood by international imperialism".

In the struggle — one that was difficult, stubborn and replete with drama — against the champions of revolutionary phraseology or a revolutionary war, which could have spelled the end of the revolution, Lenin demonstrated the necessity of concluding a

peace. The Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the Communist Party, despite the concerted efforts of the opponents of the Leninist foreign policy, voted for the conclusion of a peace treaty, and the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets ratified it. The country withdrew from the war. The first workers' state was preserved and the gains of the socialist revolution saved.

After the decision of the Congress of Soviets to conclude peace the Left SRs, lacking faith in the strength of the working people, turned sharply to the Right. They announced their withdrawal from the government, but remained in the VTsIK, in the Soviets and other Soviet organisations.

In the spring of 1918 disagreement on the supply question was added to the dispute over the issue of peace. Given the prevailing famine and the reluctance of the village bourgeoisie to sell the state its surplus grain at stable prices, the government decided to introduce a provision dictatorship—compulsory requisitions of grain surpluses and a ban on the free trade of grain. Committees of the village poor were created to carry out these policies. The Left SRs took up the defence of the kulak and opposed the imposition of the provision dictatorship, thus winning the sympathy of the bourgeoisie, who were counting on the SRs, as the only Soviet party besides the Bolsheviks—to carry out their designs. Even the leaders of the Left SRs admitted that on the ground of criticising the Bolsheviks, their party was joined by elements who counted on finding in it "support and a return to the past".

The Left SRs believed that their opposition to the peace treaty signed in Brest and to the provision policies of the government would give them a majority at the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, which in turn would give them the opportunity of seizing leadership of the country and introducing

their own political line. However these hopes were in vain. Aware that their prestige was declining precipitously, that meetings and slogans were of no avail in their attempt to arouse the people to fight against Germany, and noting how rapidly Bolshevism was growing and evolving, the Left SRs resorted to a counter-revolutionary adventure.

On July 6, 1918, while the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets was in session, and in the hope of rupturing the Brest Peace, they assassinated the German Ambassador Mirbach and began a revolt aiming at the seizure of power. However neither the population, nor the military units, nor even the Left SR organisations in Moscow—supported the insurgents. In a matter of hours the revolt was liquidated.

After the revolt the Left SR Party disintegrated. A large number of the membership left the party, many of them joining the Bolsheviks. Part of the Left SRs formed independent parties: the "Populist Communists" and "Revolutionary Communists", which supported a platform of co-operation with the Bolsheviks. Soon both these parties (the first at the close of 1918, the second in 1920) acting on the conviction that all parties except the Bolshevik Party "had lost their bearings and were bereft of their social base, without support or sympathy from the revolutionary masses", and recognising the progressive nature of the new social system—made the decision to merge with the Communist Party.

The works of some foreign historians and sociologists contain the assertion that Communists are fundamentally the opponents of co-operation with other parties, that from the very outset they exclude the possibility of alliance with any other political grouping or party independent of them. Certain writers assert that the Bolsheviks dispersed the Left SRs as soon as the latter evinced a desire to be independent. However the Bolsheviks simply

liquidated the revolt, but refrained from taking repressive measures against the Left SRs as a party. The latter collapsed as a result of its own policies. It is no coincidence that a member of the Left SR faction at the Fifth Congress of Soviets, Roslavets, called her party "the party of suicides". From this moment the Communists became the only Soviet party in the country.

The Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets unanimously adopted the first Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the first workers' state in the world. The Constitution comprised the results of the effort to build a state after the October Revolution. It consolidated the uniformity and harmoniousness of the system of Soviet power and governmental management. It synthesised and provided a legal foundation to the major principles of Soviet democracy and provided a legislative basis for the subsequent evolution of the Soviet state in the direction of socialism.

History knows of many revolutions. They prompted social development and were the locomotives of history. But it is only about the Great October Socialist Revolution that we may with full justification say that it was a fundamental turning point in the history of man.

It was at the dawn of history, rightfully called the childhood of man, that people began to ask the question: is this exploitation of the poor by the rich, the weak by the strong eternal, can the exploitation of man by man be ended, can unjust inequality be eliminated; can the world be changed, and if so, how? The centuries passed and with each new historical epoch this question was more and more prominent in the minds of the advanced thinkers in every country, and among the broad masses of the oppressed and impoverished. At first they turned to the past and concocted legends about the "golden age" of the distant past, an age of justice, plenitude

and peace, which was then replaced by the "iron age" of blood and violence. Then the first utopian socialists came to the conclusion that the "golden age" which blind legend up to that time had placed in the past, in fact was to be found in the future. But this was also a dream, for no one had to that date stated what was requisite for the creation of a new society or how exploitation and property inequality could be liquidated.

The search for a path to a society where all enjoy equal rights and are free of exploitation cost man many sacrifices. Defending the right to happiness and human dignity Spartacus' gladiators fell under the swords of the Roman legionaries and the English yeomen besieged the castles of the knighted nobility. With the words "liberté, égalité, fraternité", the Parisian sans-culottes stormed the redoubtable Bastille. For land and freedom the peasants rose up with only pitchforks and scythes during the peasant war in Germany. In the name of overthrowing the tsarist autocracy the blood of the Decembrists flowed on the Senate Square in St. Petersburg and the heroes of the People's Will mounted the scaffolds in Russia.

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels turned socialism from a utopia into a science and provided an answer to the question in the minds of the most advanced thinkers. Indeed society based on the exploitation of man by man is not eternal, it must fall. To replace it there will be a new social system which will embody the best ideals of mankind. Such a change is both inevitable and logical. It will signal a new era marking an end to the prehistory and beginning the true history of man in the highest sense of the word.

In order to change the world it was necessary to find within society itself, and not only to find but to enlighten and organise for the struggle such forces which could—and by their position must—make up a power capable of sweeping away the old and



creating the new. Such a force was found—the working class, the proletariat. This was already a step bringing the new era closer. The next major step in this direction was the birth of Leninism in Russia and the appearance of the Leninist party on the world political arena, a party destined to play a decisive role in the emergence of the new era.

Russia was a knot of imperialist contradictions. Before the Russian proletariat stood the most imposing revolutionary tasks. In Russia a revolutionary party of the working class was created capable of correctly evaluating circumstances and determined to carry on the struggle until victory was achieved. Closely connected with the masses and expressing their hopes and convictions, possessed of Marxist-Leninist theory, principled and flexible—this party was, in the words of Lenin, “the intelligence, honour, and conscience of our times”.

V. I. Lenin lived and worked in Russia. He was the true and consummate genius of revolutionary theory and practice.

These facts determined that Russia would be turned into the cradle of proletarian revolution, the first country to undertake the building of socialism and to throw open the door to the new era for all countries and nations.

The Great October Socialist Revolution not only brought freedom to the workers and peasants, resolved the nationalities problem, brought to completion Russia's overall democratic tasks, withdrew the country from a debilitating war and saved her from the threat of dismemberment and colonial enslavement—it did more than this. The revolution, and this is its most important feature, eliminated forever class exploitation and oppression of man by man in a huge country one-sixth the earth's surface and initiated the era of the creation of classless society, the era of the triumph of communism.

Not one of the preceding revolutions can be compared with the October Revolution in terms of impact on world events, and the echo produced on all continents by the volley fired by the cruiser *Aurora* signalling the storm of the Winter Palace. The French bourgeois revolution of 1789-1793 exerted great influence on events in Europe and America. However this lasted but six years, after which ensued a return to the past. Once again the royal Bourbons flourished and over Europe hung the suffocating atmosphere of the Holy Alliance. The Great October Socialist Revolution made a return to the past impossible. It shattered mass conviction in the invincibility and eternity of the exploitative system. The slogans and ideals of the October Revolution became the most popular in the world and no words were more often voiced than “October, Lenin, Bolsheviks”.

Directly influenced by the October Revolution a revolutionary upsurge swept across many European and Asian countries. The October winds shook the thrones of the monarchies and the emperors' crowns fell together with the autumn leaves. As a result of the November Revolution (1918) the Hohenzollern monarchy fell in Germany; the Austria-Hungary collapsed under the blows of revolution and the Hapsburgs joined the ranks of the unemployed monarchs. In 1919, Soviet power was established in Hungary, Bavaria and Slovakia. These governments were short-lived, crushed by counter-revolution, but the brief and heroic struggle waged by these Soviet Republics played a role in weakening the foundations of imperialism and left an ineradicable mark in the consciousness of the working people.

The October Revolution began a new period in the history of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. As Jawaharlal Nehru, the outstanding Indian political leader, wrote: “... The Soviet revolution had

advanced human society by a great leap and had lit a bright flame which could not be smothered, and ... it had laid the foundation for that new civilisation towards which the world could advance."

The chain of imperialism was breached. The October Revolution opened the era of the collapse of imperialism and the collapse of any society based on the exploitation of man by man. Under the impetus of the October Revolution a new stage was initiated in the history of the international working-class movement and of all progressive forces. The working-class movement acquired, in the Communist parties, its leader in the struggle for the victory of the socialist revolution and for the building of communist society. The victory of the October Revolution gave the working people of the entire world an awareness of their power, a clarity of goals, confidence in the future. It showed them the path to socialism and to national liberation and independence.

Not only in goals, but also in nature and methods, the October Revolution was the most humane of all the revolutions preceding it in the history of man. At the outset of the revolution Soviet power applied no broad repressive measures whatsoever as far as the leaders of the overthrown government and the former ruling classes were concerned. When General Krasnov, the first, together with the former Prime Minister Kerensky, to act in opposition to Soviet power, was captured on the Pulkovo Heights on the outskirts of Petrograd, he was released on his word of honour (which, by the way, he betrayed) that he would end his armed struggle against Soviet power. Not a single hair was harmed on the heads of the former ministers of the Provisional Government. The following incident may be found in the annals. A group of Red Guards arrived at the Peter and Paul Fortress (where the former ministers had been escorted from the Winter Palace) to speak to the

official in charge. "The incarcerated are receiving the same ration as the guards. No one in fact has enough. Why are we being so lenient on the counter-revolutionaries?" "We are revolutionaries, not bandits," replied the official in charge. The humane treatment of the ministers and cadets of officers' schools who had resisted Soviet power (the majority of them were also released on their honour) had to be admitted even by Schreder, a rabid enemy of Soviet power and former mayor of Petrograd, in an interview with an American correspondent.

Nevertheless the October Revolution is often depicted by authors abroad as an act of bloody coercion carried out by the Bolshevik Party, whose primary instrument was the use of unprecedented terror. In this context they refer to the civil war which swept the country for three years. Indeed, there was a civil war in Russia, and it was a cruel one. But, first of all, no prior revolution was free of a civil war, beginning with the revolution in the Netherlands and the English bourgeois revolution—which was accompanied by a war between Cromwell's Republican army and the supporters of the Stuart monarchy. Second, the civil war in Russia was initiated not by Soviet power nor the Bolsheviks, but by the deposed bourgeoisie and landowners, by the parties of Mensheviks, the Right SRs and the Cadets, hostile to the revolution, with the support of foreign imperialists.

## Chapter V

### THE DEFENCE OF THE REVOLUTION

The October Revolution triumphed so rapidly, decisively, and painlessly because it was a true people's revolution. It was resolutely and openly supported by the overwhelming majority of the population of Russia, for the revolution took place in the name of the basic interests of the working people and saved them from an economic, social and political oppression the likes of which had no equal in any other country in Europe. But it is self-evident that the revolution had not only adherents and defenders. It also had powerful, dangerous and implacable enemies. These were, above all, the landowners, whom the revolution had deprived of the land by distributing it to tens of millions of the peasantry. They included also the owners of large factories which were to be nationalised. There was also the numerous and greedy bureaucracy which had been deprived of its privileges and the monarchical officers' corps.

All of them were defeated in the course of the revolution, but rather than lay down their arms they decided to continue the struggle against workers' and peasants' power.

The forces of counter-revolution were, despite the danger they presented, comparatively weak. The Soviet state, relying on the support of the over-

whelming majority of the country's population, quite rapidly suppressed the opposition of the internal counter-revolutionary forces. Soviet power triumphed throughout the unbounded expanses of Russia. The Kaledin-Bogayevsky revolt on the Don was crushed. The Don Cossack Ataman Kaledin shot himself in Novocherkassk. The pretender to the role of dictator of all Russia, General Kornilov, was defeated and fatally wounded in battle near Yekaterinodar. Ataman Dutov fled to the Turgai Steppe with the remnants of his troops. Semyonov's band was driven back into Mongolia. The counter-revolutionary Ukrainian Rada was routed.

Despite this, the civil war did not subside. In fact it intensified, taking on an exceptionally stubborn and protracted character, imposing countless casualties and deprivations on the peoples of Russia. Events followed this course because the counter-revolutionary forces within Russia received direct aid from the largest states in the world which openly interfered in the internal affairs of Russia.

What prompted the imperialist powers to deny recognition to the young republic, take the side of the counter-revolutionary insurgents and finally to enter into open war against the Soviet people in order to destroy Soviet power recognised by the bulk of the country's population?

Soviet historians have the support of countless documents in their opinion that the governments of the majority of these countries were acting upon their own class interests.

During the French Revolution at the end of the 18th century, the feudal monarchies and the nobility of Europe organised coalitions and military campaigns against the French people in order to restore Louis to the throne. In 1918 the bourgeois governments were suffused with the desire to overthrow Soviet power out of solidarity with the recent political and economic rulers of Russia and out of

the fear that the Russian example would be followed by the working people of other countries. In addition, the majority of these governments pursued their own mercenary motives, hoping that after the overthrow of Soviet power Russia would be weakened and dismembered—which would open up broad opportunities for their economic and political penetration of her territories.

At the time of the October Revolution the world was divided into two hostile camps, forming the belligerents in World War I. It was already the fourth year of internecine war, draining the basic resources of Britain, France, the USA and Japan, on the one hand, and the Austro-German bloc, on the other. However, the Entente and Kaiser Germany were of one mind in their hostile attitude to revolutionary Russia.

The revolts of the internal counter-revolutionaries did not at this point threaten the very existence of the Soviet state. The people's state had at its disposal the necessary resources to crush the rebelling kulaks and the bourgeoisie. The foreign interventionists added fuel to the fire. It was their interference and their means which permitted the organisation, assembly and equipping of a more or less sizeable armed force for counter-revolution.

The interference of the foreign powers in the affairs of Soviet Russia took various forms. On the part of Austro-German imperialism it was initially expressed in the continuation of hostilities against the Soviet Republic, in disregard of the latter's numerous and persistent attempts to conclude peace. In so acting Germany and Austria-Hungary pinned down a huge Russian army on the front, and deflected enormous resources of the young Soviet Republic to be spent on military needs, a fact facilitating the internal counter-revolutionary struggle against Soviet power.

After the signing of the Brest Peace Treaty, German and Austrian imperialists occupied almost all of Byelorussia, the Ukraine, the Crimea, and part of the Don region and the Transcaucasus. In these invaded regions they liquidated Soviet power. Military provocation, incidents on the demarcation line, incursions into Soviet territory and attempts to interfere in the affairs of Soviet Russia continued into the spring and summer of 1918.

As the revolution developed foreign intervention became more pronounced and heavy-handed. From isolated acts of aid to the internal counter-revolution the West European and US governments turned to open military intervention.

On March 9, 1918, 200 British troops disembarked from the cruiser *Glory* in the northern port city of Murmansk. New and more substantial landings of British, French and American troops followed this first expedition. Intervention took place in the Far East as well. On April 5, Japanese marines under Admiral Kato landed in Vladivostok. American troops were sent to the same destination. The transport carrier *Thomas* was despatched from San Francisco with two thousand troops under General W. S. Graves; the 27th and 31st US infantry regiments were sent from Manila—all steamed directly towards Vladivostok. British troops sent from Iran seized Baku and Turkmenia.

On July 6, 1918, the Entente proclaimed Vladivostok an international zone and landed new task forces. The troops were primarily Japanese (up to 70-75 thousand) and US (10-12 thousand). Allied forces in Murmansk were bolstered.

A corps of Czechoslovak prisoners of war was engaged in the struggle with the Soviet Republic. This corps was created in 1917 of Czechs and Slovaks serving in the Austro-Hungarian army who had surrendered to the Russians during World War I. After the conclusion of the Brest Peace the Soviet

Government offered this corps the opportunity of leaving Russia for Europe through Siberia and the Far East. But the corps command in collaboration with the leaders of the Czechoslovak bourgeois nationalists and under pressure from the Entente drew the soldiers into an anti-Soviet adventure. The Czechoslovak nationalists regarded this action as a payment of sorts for the Entente's support for the creation of an independent state of Czechs and Slovaks.

By summer 1918 the corps had deployed its troops from the Volga to Vladivostok. In accordance with a pre-established plan it started a rebellion against the Soviet Republic. The immense reaches of the Central Volga region, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East were to serve as a springboard for the struggle against the Soviet Republic.

It should be added that many Czechs and Slovaks then in Russia voluntarily entered the ranks of the Red Army and sacrificingly fought side by side with Russian workers and peasants for the revolution.

Nevertheless, it is a historical fact that between May and July 1918 approximately 50 thousand officers and soldiers of the Czechoslovak corps joined the British, American, Japanese and French troops in fighting against the Soviet Republic.

The revolt of the Czechoslovak corps enormously complicated the situation of the young Republic of Soviets. In the summer of 1918 interventionists and whiteguards seized the Central Volga region, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East. The Eastern Front was thus created and from the summer of 1918 was the main front of the Republic. The organisers of the rebellion were confident that now they could crush Soviet power.

This confidence was reinforced by preparations for anti-Soviet uprisings in a number of cities of Central Russia. In early July 1918, Right SR-inspired revolts erupted in Yaroslavl, Murom, Rybinsk and

other towns. On July 6-7, the Left SRs revolted in Moscow. On July 10, the commander of the Eastern Front Muravyov, a Left SR, betrayed Soviet power by trying to seize Simbirsk and from there join the Czechoslovaks in a march on Moscow.

The intervention was not confined to sending troops to revolutionary Russia. It included the organisation of a civil war, the financing of counter-revolutionary forces and moral and financial support lavished upon its agents.

The landing of foreign troops in the North, the Far East, the Caucasus and Turkestan, as well as the revolt of the Czechoslovak corps triggered the forces of internal counter-revolution. The Cossack atamans once again revolted on the Don and in Orenburg. The so-called Voluntary Army, made up of reactionary officers, seized the Northern Caucasus. Counter-revolutionary forces were active in the North, the Volga region, in Siberia and the Urals.

Thus, enemies descended upon the young Republic from all sides. Fierce battles were fought everywhere and fronts were opened on all sides. Three-fourths of the country were seized by the enemy. The red banner of the Soviets fluttered aloft only in the comparatively small territory of Central Russia. Pressure from the interventionists and whiteguards intensified with each passing day and the ring encircling the Republic was squeezed tighter. The situation was tense in the Republic's hinterland as well. The monstrous conspiratorial machine was more and more active. Anti-Soviet uprisings increased in frequency, railroad bridges and power stations were detonated and terrorist attacks were launched. In Petrograd the outstanding Soviet leaders Volodarsky and Uritsky were assassinated. On August 30, 1918, an attempt was made on the life of Lenin. The leader of the revolution was seriously wounded by two poisoned bullets.

The activities of the underground terrorist groups, as a rule, were financed and directed by agents of the foreign powers who often served concurrently as diplomatic representatives. For example, Britain's official diplomatic representative in Moscow, Bruce Lockhart, was at the head of a far-reaching and ramified conspiracy of counter-revolutionary forces against Soviet power.

In the summer and autumn of 1918 the Soviet Republic was in an extremely difficult situation. The open military intervention of the Entente was expanding. Uprisings of kulaks and whiteguards fanned over the country. A battle front was opened in the Volga region within direct reach of the country's heartland and Moscow. Initially, isolated detachments and units of the Red Army were confronted on this front with the well-armed Czechoslovak regulars and separate detachments of whiteguards.

The situation facing the Soviet Republic was further complicated by the fact that the building-up of the armed forces of the dictatorship of the proletariat had not yet been brought to completion. It was only in the heat of battle with the insurgents and through the efforts of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government that a standing Red Army was created. In the early stages of this work instances of unparalleled courage and stamina displayed by a number of units as well as advanced class-consciousness and mass heroism were accompanied here and there by incidents revealing a lack of discipline and anarchy.

The Mensheviks and SRs proffered substantial aid to the interventionists and whiteguards at this juncture. Through their counter-revolutionary activities they paved the way to power for the Cadets and Black Hundreds, that is, for openly bourgeois, landowner and monarchist counter-revolution. They aided the enemies of Soviet power both in the

regions seized from the latter and in the hinterland of the Republic.

Under the protection of foreign bayonets the SRs and Mensheviks formed "governments" in Samara, Omsk, Yekaterinburg and other areas. The petty-bourgeois parties moved to the front of the counter-revolutionary forces. They paved the way to military dictatorship and monarchy. Calling themselves "socialists" they in actuality fought as allies of the whiteguards, landowners and capitalists in their struggle against the Soviets. The counter-revolutionary officers' corps in fact placed itself in the service of "democratic" counter-revolution.

Hunger was one of the most ferocious and dangerous enemies of the revolution. Already during World War I Russia's agriculture and transport had fallen into decline and the urban population had suffered acute food shortages. When the intervention began and the country's granaries—the Ukraine, Siberia, the greater part of the Volga region and the Northern Caucasus—fell into enemy hands, famine reached the level of a calamity. To make matters worse, that grain to be found in the villages of Central Russia was concentrated in the hands of the village rich—the kulaks. These kulaks refused to sell the grain to the state in their attempt to strangle Soviet power with famine. The armed forces of the Western powers organised a blockade of Soviet Russia, succeeding in almost totally isolating her from the outside world.

Such was the situation confronting the Soviet state once the foreign powers and internal counter-revolutionary forces had unleashed a cruel war of extermination against it. It may be said without exaggeration that the young Soviet Republic was faced with inhuman difficulties and a period of difficult trials. It seemed that its days were numbered.



Such was the conclusion not only of the enemies of the revolution but of many of its friends. How could it be otherwise? Against a backward, disorganised, debilitated and tortured country had been sent the forces of the most powerful countries in the world. Internal counter-revolutionary forces were working in tandem with these powers. But once again a seeming miracle was accomplished—revolutionary Russia did not place herself at the mercy of her enemies. Her people, and above all the heroic working class in alliance with the toiling peasantry, courageously repulsed the onslaught of the counter-revolutionaries and interventionists, and paved the way to victory.

The struggle with the interventionists and whiteguards was a protracted one—lasting from 1918 through 1920. The history of this conflict is both complex and variegated. The centre of gravity for these fierce encounters frequently shifted—from the east in the summer of 1918 to the south by the close of 1918, then once again to the east in the spring of 1919, and again to the south in the autumn of 1919; to the west during the war with Poland in 1920 and finally to the south with the defeat of General Wrangel.

How was it possible to repulse the powerful forces which had unleashed war against revolutionary Russia? There was only one way—by applying every ounce of the country's energy to the defence against the enemy onslaught. It is self-evident that this could be accomplished only given the willingness of the overwhelming majority of the people to sacrifice and suffer deprivation to save free Russia and the gains of the revolution. This determination was in evidence. The working people regarded the war underway as a just, patriotic war. They believed that it differed fundamentally from all other wars. This also explains the heroism and fortitude of the Red Army soldiers as well as the underlying causes

for the Republic's military victories and the mobilisation of all resources in the country's defence.

In the autumn of 1918 the entire Soviet country was declared a military camp. All efforts were directed at the creation of an armed force in the shortest possible time. "No revolution is worth anything unless it can defend itself," wrote Lenin.

In the spring of 1918 the army had 300 thousand soldiers; by the outset of 1919 the number had risen to approximately one million and by the end of 1920—to roughly five million.

Generals and other officers from the tsarist army were drawn into the service of the Red Army. By the end of 1918 there were 35 thousand such officers. The number of former enlisted officers fighting in the ranks of the whiteguards was not insignificant either. But the best of the old officers' corps honestly and disinterestedly served the cause of the revolution. From this milieu came such outstanding Red Army commanders as S. S. Kamenev, who became the Commander-in-Chief of the country's Armed Forces, B. M. Shaposhnikov, later occupying the post of Chief of the General Staff, A. I. Yegorov, and M. N. Tukhachevsky, both subsequently Marshals of the Soviet Union.

But, of course, the majority of commanders rose from the ranks of workers and peasants. Of those commanders who won renown, we name only a few: Mikhail Frunze—revolutionary, condemned under the tsar to death, active participant in the October Revolution, commander of the front which crushed the forces under Kolchak and Wrangel; Kliment Voroshilov, worker from the Donets region, Bolshevik underground organiser and commander of the army near Tsaritsyn; Semyon Budyonny, peasant, cavalry sergeant-major in the tsarist army, founder of the first partisan cavalry detachments in the North Caucasian steppes (which later grew into a division, corps, and then entire army) winning



S. M. Budyonny, M. V. Frunze and K. Y. Voroshilov working out a military operation plan

The partisans of the Siberian village Zimovye. 1919

The First Cavalry Army on the move

remarkable victories under his command; the former carpenter Vasily Chapayev, who demonstrated extraordinary military talent while in command of a division; Vasily Blyukher, a worker sentenced to several years' imprisonment for his participation in the revolutionary movement, division commander who successfully fought against Kolchak and Wrangel and then led the Soviet troops in the Far East.

The best Communists enlisted in the Red Army. The members of the Russian Communist Party were the first in the ranks of the fighters struggling for the Soviet homeland. They were models of fortitude, courage and selfless dedication to the cause of socialist revolution. It was said in the instructions to the Communists mobilised for the front: "Being a Communist imposes many obligations, but it brings only one privilege—that of being first to fight for the revolution." In 1920, half of all party members—300 thousand strong—were in the ranks of the army. More than 50 thousand Communists gave their lives on the field of battle. The most outstanding and hardened in the revolutionary struggle were appointed military commissars, bearing, together with the commanders, all responsibility for the execution of combat orders. By virtue of the selfless efforts of Communists difficulties on the path of creating the Red Army were overcome. It became a regular and tightly disciplined army.

In the summer of 1918 the heaviest fighting took place in the Central Volga region. It was from this point that the Czechoslovak and whiteguard detachments were trying to break through to the country's central regions. The fighting in this region took on decisive importance.

By autumn armies from the Soviet Eastern Front launched an offensive and after fierce combat liberated Kazan, Samara (Kuibyshev) and Simbirsk (Ulyanovsk). The enemy was driven back from the

Volga and this vital artery of the country was liberated throughout its entire length. At the end of 1918, as the World War ended and the Brest Peace was annulled, the situation improved somewhat for the Soviet Republic. In the territories liberated of German troops—the Ukraine, the Baltic region, Byelorussia—the people once again established Soviet power.

The conclusion of World War I had its negative consequences for the Soviet Republic as well. The Entente nations gained the opportunity of intensifying anti-Soviet intervention. Direct routes to Russia's ports were opened through the Mediterranean and Black seas. On the night of November 16, 1918, British and French military craft entered the Black Sea and headed directly for Russian shores. With the protection of battleships, French, British and Greek soldiers landed in Odessa, Sevastopol, Batumi and other ports of the Ukraine, the Crimea and the Caucasus. By the beginning of February 1919 there were roughly 27 thousand French, Polish, Serbian and other soldiers in Odessa alone. Obeying the commands of the Entente, Greece also sent sizeable forces to the Ukraine: on March 15 its troops there numbered more than 12 thousand. In turn Rumania began to transport its troops to the Ukraine. All in all the number of foreign troops in the Ukraine, according to the data of the interventionists, reached 130 thousand, excluding the whiteguards.

From the middle of January 1919 the French General d'Anselme took on joint command of the White armies in Southern Russia and the interventionist forces. These forces intended to move jointly with the insurgent Don Cossacks and Ukrainian counter-revolutionary units towards the country's centre.

The most serious threat to the Republic now came from the South. The Central Committee of the

Communist Party sent the best Communists there along with substantial reinforcements. In late 1918 and early 1919 the Don was liberated after bloody and arduous battle.

Meantime the workers and peasants of the Ukraine were inflicting decisive defeats on the forces of counter-revolution. In early February 1919, Ukrainian Soviet regiments led by the legendary Nikolai Shchors and Vasily Bozhenko liberated Kiev. Foreign troops also suffered a number of defeats. In a battle in the vicinity of the Berezovka Station (near Odessa) the Red Army men fearlessly launched an attack against the tanks which were making their first appearance in Russia. Heroism proved to be stronger than metal—the Red Army men emerged victorious.

Revolutionary action began among the foreign troops. The soldiers were reluctant to fight in the name of counter-revolutionary goals quite alien to them. A revolt broke out among the sailors of a French squadron. Red flags were hoisted on the ships *Jean Bart* and *France*. The interventionist detachments were forced to withdraw from the Ukraine and the Crimea in the spring of 1919.

Though defeated in their attempts to strangle Soviet Russia on their own, the Entente imperialists did not abandon their designs. Instead they decided to use internal counter-revolutionary troops as the main strike force. The high military command of the Entente intended to launch a general offensive with its main thrust directed concentrically at the heart of Russia—Moscow. The plan stipulated that the intervention should be carried out by the combined military efforts of all participants in the armed struggle.

The first to assume the offensive was the former Admiral Kolchak, who had become the military dictator of Siberia and assembled a sizeable army provided with foreign weapons and outfitted in

foreign uniforms. In 1919, the USA, Britain, France and Japan provided Kolchak with 700 thousand rifles, 3,650 machine-guns and much other weaponry. At the same time interventionist troops and whiteguards moved into action in the Caucasus, Turkestan, the north, near Petrograd and in a number of other places. All told, by spring 1919 the counter-revolutionary forces numbered roughly one million men.

By the beginning of April Kolchak's troops approached the Volga. Once again the Eastern Front was the pivot. At the suggestion of the Party Central Committee, every party organisation sent from 10 to 20 per cent of its membership to the front, and up to 50 per cent to the front-line areas. Kolchak's attack was halted. By the close of 1919 his troops were crushed.

While fierce battles with Kolchak were still underway, the army under General Denikin launched its attack from the south. Denikin was supported by Yudenich near Petrograd as well as by numerous other enemy forces throughout the country. Denikin's army was heavily armed and equipped through the money lavished by foreign states. Winston Churchill, then the British Secretary for War, called Denikin's army "my own". By the autumn of 1919 the forces of Denikin, having seized Voronezh, Kursk, Orel, represented a direct threat to Moscow. This in fact was the most large-scale and most dangerous assault undertaken by the enemies of the Republic. Lenin wrote a letter to all party organisations entitled "All Out for the Fight Against Denikin!" The letter contained a concrete programme for the effort against Denikin. Troop-trains with reinforcements were sent to the Southern Front. In the latter half of October Soviet troops moved to the offensive. Day after day passed in strenuous battle. Many cities and villages exchanged hands several times. Finally Soviet regiments

pushed their way to the Black Sea and dispersed the enemy.

Surrounded by fronts on all sides, locked in a tight blockade and deprived of raw material, fuel and grain regions, the Soviet Republic carried on a desperate armed struggle.

The foreign interventionists conducted a policy of openly plundering and laying waste to the regions they seized. With their blessing the whiteguard bands committed acts of violence and bestiality, mass terror and reprisal against tens and hundreds of thousands of completely innocent people. The commander of the American forces in Siberia, General Graves, was forced to admit that: "... the United States could not escape responsibility for the conditions, because the atrocities committed against the people would not have been possible if Allied troops had not been in Siberia."

Over immense expanses of the country, seized by foreign interventionists and internal counter-revolutionaries, the people took to arms. The flame of partisan warfare burst forth everywhere. Hundreds of thousands of peasants, workers and craftsmen from Siberia, the Far East, the Northern Caucasus and the Ukraine took to the forests and mountains to fight the enemy. And these common folk, despite the terror, hardships and deprivations, did not lay down arms until the last foreign soldier had quit Russia and the troops of the White generals, admirals and atamans had been crushed.

In the spring of 1920 the troops of bourgeois-landlord Poland attacked Soviet Russia. The Soviet Government, true to its peaceful policy, several times proposed to the Polish Government that peace negotiations begin. It stated several times that it unconditionally recognised the independence and sovereignty of the Polish Republic and desired to establish peaceful and cordial relations between the peoples of Poland and Russia. Searching for peace

the Soviet Government made a number of territorial concessions. But the Polish head of state, Josef Pilsudski, rejected all Soviet offers. Moreover, Polish ruling circles nurtured plans for the creation—at the expense of Soviet territory—of a greater Poland extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Enjoying absolute numerical superiority and due to the fact that the basic forces of the Red Army were tied up in the south, completing the battle against Denikin, the White Poles tore through the front and began to move rapidly to the heart of the Ukraine. They were supported by the Petlurovites and Wrangel's army.

The battle on the Western Front continued throughout the summer. Both sides saw gains and reverses. Finally Poland's leaders saw the futility of further engagements. In October 1920 an armistice was signed. Poland withdrew a number of its territorial claims but retained the areas of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia.

In November 1920 Soviet troops commanded by Frunze liberated all of the Southern Ukraine from whiteguard forces. In early November Soviet troops heroically stormed the Perekop fortifications and swept the Crimea free of the whiteguards.

Thus ended the major battles of the civil war. The young Soviet Republic, despite the overwhelming preponderance enjoyed by the enemy in material resources, emerged victorious in the defence of its independence and free existence.

Victory cost the Soviet state dearly. The military intervention and civil war had brought much misery and destruction upon the Soviet people. The losses suffered by the national economy amounted to roughly 50,000 million gold rubles. Industrial production fell to 4-20 per cent of the level of pre-revolutionary Russia. Especially hard hit were the fuel, metallurgical, machine-building industries

and rail and water transport. Agricultural production declined by almost 50 per cent. Population losses on the front and in the rear, from hunger, disease and whiteguard and interventionist terror, reached eight million lives. The Red Army lost roughly one million in casualties.

The foreign interventionists and the leaders of the whiteguards were to blame for the mass starvation and epidemics which snuffed out the lives of hundreds of thousands and millions of old men, women and children and for the fact that the economy was reduced to a state of shambles.

The renowned writer H. G. Wells, who visited Russia in those days and was struck by the sheer scale of the calamity, wrote: "It was not communism that plunged this huge, creaking bankrupt empire into six years of exhausting war. It was European imperialism ... and inflicted upon it an atrocious blockade."

Despite the starvation and suffering, the enormous deprivations and ruin which descended upon the people, the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia bent all their efforts in defence of the people's power and of the gains of the October Revolution.

The results of the civil war provide much food for thought. A study of the period reveals in particular the inanity of the calumnious argument advanced by enemies of the Soviet Union which states that the Soviet Government seized power despite the will of the people and similarly retained power without popular support, and finally that the populace as a whole was indifferent to the struggle between Whites and Reds.

Indeed how could a government shorn of popular support withstand several years of difficult and stubborn struggle with the superior forces of intervention and counter-revolution? How could a power based on compulsion survive and emerge victorious when three-fourths of the country had

been seized by the enemy and when this enemy, so it seemed, was inexorably marching upon Moscow?

The period of the civil war and intervention resulted in the collapse of all counter-revolutionary parties in Russia. Such parties calling themselves "revolutionary", "democratic" and even "socialist", as the SRs and Mensheviks, anarchists and nationalists, were not forbidden administratively. They published their own newspapers, assembled in public gatherings, etc. But the fact remains that these parties, in the recent past so numerically strong, in these years perished politically, lost their membership and turned into small clusters of unprincipled political inveiglers.

The Communist Party was the only mass party closely connected with and leading the masses. The point is that all parties with the exception of the Communists exposed themselves in the eyes of the people as counter-revolutionary, and took the path of anti-Soviet struggle. They openly served Denikin and Kolchak—those representatives of the most black monarchistic reaction. They betrayed the interests of Russia, collaborating with the foreign occupational forces and creating puppet "governments" under the protection of the latter's bayonets. Side by side with the interventionists, they shot down the country's heroic patriots. They made an attempt on the life of the leader of the people and the revolution—Lenin.

It was only the Communist Party that defended the freedom and independence of Russia. Communists, not sparing their own lives, were the first to attack, and shared with the people all the hardships and deprivations of those years. Only the Communist Party showed the people the path—a difficult one but the only one available—to freedom and happiness.

The peoples of Russia had to make a choice during the period of the October Revolution and the




years of civil war. They chose once and forever in favour of the Communist Party.

Given the desperate fighting and the blockade the life of the workers and peasants was trying—there were acute shortages of foodstuffs, clothing and other essentials. However even in these circumstances the Soviet state implemented a number of important socio-economic measures aimed at improving the life of the working people. The world's first labour legislation guaranteeing the rights of the workers was initiated. The government adopted a labour law code establishing an eight-hour working day, annual paid vacations, disability payments, etc. During these years the old governmental machine serving the interests of the exploiters was dismembered. Taking its place was a people's government with truly democratic governing organs—the Soviets—vested with all power, both at the centre and in the localities. All working people took part in elections to both local and central organs of power.

Immense changes took place in the sphere of culture. The great achievements of culture, science and technology were made the property of the people. Education was made free of charge and instruction was in the native language. The terrible legacy of the past—illiteracy—was tackled with a will. Free medical care was established. A network of nurseries, baby food distribution centres and kindergartens was first established, then expanded.

The working people of Russia saw and experienced the great changes underway in the country. They were aware that they had become the masters of their own state. The workers demonstrated a high level of social consciousness and selflessness in their work. For the first time in history the workers began to regard labour not as a bitter, hateful task necessary in order to earn one's piece of bread, but



Lenin addresses the Vseovobuch (Universal Military Training) troops in Red Square, Moscow, May 25, 1919

as a social necessity. They looked upon work through the eyes of the conscious builders of a new society.

It was precisely during these years that Communist subbotniks (voluntary overtime work for the good of society) became widespread. In the spring of 1919 Communist railroad workers from the Moscow Sorting Yard Station, eager to help the country in the difficult struggle against Kolchak, decided not to go home after work on Saturday (*subbota* in Russian) but rather to organise overtime repair work on the locomotives. This effort soon became a mass movement. In Moscow alone, for example, in May 1920 more than one million people took part in subbotniks. During these subbotniks the leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet state worked side by side with workers, employees and Red Army men. On May 1, 1920, for example, Lenin, participating in a subbotnik, strained away at heavy logs, and the head of state, the Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, M. I. Kalinin, took to a workbench in a factory. Lenin called these subbotniks the actual beginning of communism.

## Chapter VI

### THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

On December 15, 1920, *Pravda* published an announcement by the field headquarters of the Military Revolutionary Council\* that with the conclusion of military action on the fronts the release of daily summaries of battle operations was to cease. This marked the beginning of the long-awaited peace. It did not indicate that all military activities had ended or that the entire country had been liberated from the interventionists and whiteguards. The Far East still remained in the hands of the Japanese invaders and remnants of the whiteguard armies were still in operation in separate outlying districts. However this was not of decisive importance. What was most important was that the peace had been won and that peaceful socialist construction had been placed on the agenda.

Lenin wrote in 1921: "...We have a right to be and are proud that to us has fallen the good fortune to *begin* the building of a Soviet state, and thereby to *usher in* a new era in world history, the era of the rule of a *new* class, a class which is oppressed in every capitalist country, but which everywhere is marching forward towards a new life, towards

\* Military Revolutionary Council—the organ heading the Armed Forces and working out operational strategy for the defence of the Soviet state.

victory over the bourgeoisie, towards the dictatorship of the proletariat, towards the emancipation of mankind from the yoke of capital and from imperialist wars." But it was necessary to begin this effort in extraordinarily difficult and complicated circumstances.

In 1921 the Soviet Republic occupied a territory of 21,700 thousand sq km, a loss of 600 thousand sq km from 1913. It had conceded, as a result of the temporary victory of the counter-revolutionaries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The occupation of Bessarabia by Rumania was still in force. Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia had gone to Poland. The loss in population had been 28,900 thousand people as compared with 1913. In 1921 the country's population numbered 136,800 thousand people.

Colossal losses were suffered by the national economy, which was in a state of extreme decline. By virtue of the shortages of fuel and raw materials two-thirds of all industrial enterprises were non-functioning, and the remainder worked well below capacity. Industrial production had declined seven-fold as compared with 1913. Heavy industry was hit the hardest, its production stood at 12.8 per cent of the pre-war figure.

In some branches of industry production levels were behind those reached at the turn of the century. Iron smelting was at a level 22 times lower than in 1901, coal extraction was less than in 1899, oil extraction stood at the 1890 level. In a number of regions the situation was even more depressing. In the Ukraine industrial output was ten times lower than prior to the war. The country's basic coal region, the Donets Basin, was producing less than one-fifth of its pre-war coal output, and but one two-hundredth of its iron output. The Krivoi Rog iron ore mines had been flooded and work halted in the copper and manganese mines of the

Transcaucasus. The cotton-processing factories of Central Asia stood silent.

Rail and water transport facilities had been badly damaged. Movement had been halted on 31 rail lines as of early 1921, 1,700 kilometres of rail had been destroyed, almost all the locomotives and one-fourth of all railway cars had been put out of commission. The trains crept along, overflowing with passengers, stopping every other minute, often waiting for passengers either to bring water in buckets for the boilers or to fetch wood. A week was spent on a journey which earlier had required one day.

Sown area in the country declined by 25 per cent, gross agricultural output by 33 per cent, and commodity output—by 75 per cent. Ploughs and seeders were in short supply. The number of draught animals dropped precipitously and tractors were still unknown in the countryside. In Central Asia the irrigation was abandoned and the production of cotton fell sharply, in Azerbaijan it was halted completely.

Enormous difficulties were encountered in providing the population with foodstuffs and other essentials. Footwear, clothing, fuel, soap, and medicaments were all in short supply. Towns were abandoned. In Moscow the population declined by more than 600 thousand, in Petrograd, by more than one million. The cities were left without light, city transport had come to a halt, and many homes were without heat.

The difficult situation with supplies was complicated by the crop failure which hit six provinces in 1920. The state proffered aid; however the effects for other provinces were painful, since they also lacked significant reserves of grain.

Rampant inflation plagued the country. In the spring of 1922, 100 thousand rubles in paper money equalled one pre-war kopek. Thus it is not surprising

that in certain localities money exchange was replaced by natural exchange. Salt, for example, served as money in Kazan Province—200 grams of salt being the cost of seed storage in the public granary.

The size of the working class dwindled, first from losses on the front, and second, because some workers, under the pressure of hunger and need, fled the city for the countryside. In 1921 industrial workers amounted to just over 1 per cent of the population, or 1,400 thousand men and women.

The working class selflessly defended the gains of the revolution from encroachments by the interventionists and internal counter-revolutionaries. The peasantry also lent its support to Soviet power during the years of civil war, for it had gained from it both land and freedom from the oppression of the landowners. However the hardships of spring 1921 provoked a political crisis in the country. The crisis stemmed from the growing peasant dissatisfaction with "war communism", the policy under which the state requisitioned grain surpluses for distribution among the population. The peasantry understood the necessity for this policy during war and bowed to it. With the transition from war to peace this policy became a brake on the development of the productive forces of agriculture, and the peasantry expressed its impatience with it.

The enemies of Soviet power, including the remnants of the counter-revolutionary Menshevik and SR parties, endeavoured to take advantage of the difficulties which had arisen.

After the defeat of the interventionists and the whiteguards the leaders of the petty-bourgeois parties decided that there remained no tactical considerations to hinder them from waging an unrestricted struggle against Soviet power. An SR conference held at the end of 1920 declared that the time was drawing to a close when they felt bound to

the resolution according to which the party, though not obliged to support the Soviet regime, would at least temporarily refrain from armed struggle with it, allegedly to avoid providing unwilling support to reaction. In a resolution adopted at the outset of 1921, it was already stated that "the question of overthrowing the Communist Party is with all the iron strength of necessity being placed on the agenda". The Menshevik Central Committee recommended the activation of anti-Soviet activities in a directive to its local organisations in the autumn of 1920. The SRs and Mensheviks created the Administrative Centre for a Non-Party Democratic Group abroad for the organisation of conspiracies and revolts against Soviet power and for the pursuit of espionage directed by foreign intelligence. This centre was funded by the bourgeois governments and White emigrant organisations.

A wealth of material concerning the activities of the petty-bourgeois parties in this period convincingly demonstrates that this was not a matter of isolated actions. The SR Party tried to centralise all expressions of dissatisfaction in the country. It worked energetically to prepare for general uprising against Soviet power. The Mensheviks, though by their own words against the forcible overthrow of Soviet power, tried to give a planned and organised nature to anti-Soviet demonstrations.

Taking advantage of the hunger, destruction and peasant discontent, the petty-bourgeois parties organised a "minor civil war"—a series of anti-Soviet revolts—in 1920-1922. In so doing the SRs and Mensheviks once again came to the fore of counter-revolution, and after the defeat of the plans to overthrow Soviet power with interventionist and white-guard forces international imperialism and internal reaction placed all their hopes on these parties.

During the years of intervention and civil war the enemies of Soviet power operated under the

monarchist flag of a "united and indivisible Russia", or under bourgeois slogans like "All Power to the Constituent Assembly". But now the situation changed. It would have been senseless to propose counter-revolutionary monarchist slogans in the wake of Kolchak and Denikin. No one would have followed the banner with the two-headed eagle except a cluster of whiteguard officers and landowners. The "Constituent Assembly" slogan had also forfeited the trust of the masses. These slogans could have found no significant support among any segment of the population. It was necessary to come up with new slogans and tactics.

The new orientation of counter-revolution found its most precise expression in the slogans of the Kronstadt revolt, which broke out in the city-fortress on February 28, 1921. Its ideological inspirers and practical leaders were SRs and whiteguards, drawing their resources from Paris and London, themselves avoiding the risk of direct action against Soviet power. They concealed their true intentions with sham democratic slogans. They proclaimed that they were acting in defence of the Soviets, but of "Soviets without Communists" and for the restoration of democratic freedoms—and above of all the freedom to trade.

The slogans "Soviets without Communists" and "Power to the Soviets, but not to the parties" soon became common to all counter-revolution. They were supported by the remnants of the whiteguards and the Cadets. It became clear to the leaders of the bourgeoisie that in Russia the political arena afforded space only to the socialist parties. Hence the bourgeois political leaders, and in particular Milyukov, were prepared to support whomever necessary, and even to adopt the slogans of the Soviet system, if only they could take advantage of the popularity of the Soviets to carry out a "shift of power" from the Bolsheviks. So they eagerly

conceded leadership to the SRs and Mensheviks, quite well knowing that they would serve merely as a step to the full restoration of a capitalist system and bourgeois power.

The Kronstadt revolt was crushed by the Red Army. Its leaders fled abroad while the soldiers and sailors deceived by them surrendered. This revolt was not the only counter-revolutionary adventure of the petty-bourgeois parties. The SRs were the organisers and leaders of a mass revolt in Tambov Province, called, after its leader Antonov, the Antonovshchina. They stood at the head of a kulak uprising in Western Siberia and a number of other, smaller actions. It was no accident that these activities were named after their leaders and main participants as well as by their methods of action—SR-kulak political banditry. They were distinguished by their terrible atrocities. The bands set fire to the buildings housing the Soviets, plundered and looted co-operatives, destroyed communication lines, derailed food trains, interfered with the procurement and delivery of fuel, hampered the peasants from carrying out their work in the fields, hanged and shot Communists, Soviet employees, co-operative workers, members of agricultural artels, workers and peasants.

This banditry inflicted large losses on the economy. In the first half of 1921 alone 20 million poods of grain were pillaged. In a number of provinces the situation was simply catastrophic as a result of raids and requisitions. In Tyumen Province sown acreage declined by 25 per cent, in Tambov Province the number of peasants without livestock rose by 33 per cent, losses of agricultural implements in Saratov Province amounted to 19 million rubles. Many workers, peasants, Communists and Soviet employees were the victims of this bandit terror. In the Volga region several thousand workers were shot down, in Tambov Province 2,000 Commu-

nists and Soviet employees, in Buzuluk 50 railway employees. This list of victims could be extended.

The Soviet regime struggled resolutely against this banditry, both with the help of the Red Army and through explanatory and propagandistic work among the masses.

The decisive prerequisite for the eradication of banditry and the overcoming of the economic and political crisis as well as the restoration of the national economy—was the transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP). The Tenth Party Congress of March 1921 adopted, following Lenin's speech on the topic, the historic decision to introduce a tax in kind. The essence of the decision was that the peasants, after paying the pre-established tax in kind, had the right to dispose freely of their own output through sale, trade, etc. Earlier, with the surplus requisitioning system, they had had to yield to the state the bulk of their output. The tax in kind stimulated the expansion of agricultural production, and consolidated the economic link between town and countryside. Moreover, the tax in kind was significantly lower than the norms set by the requisitions.

The abolition of surplus requisitioning cut the ground from under the feet of the SR-Menshevik counter-revolutionaries. Those peasants who had been adventitiously and against their own interests drawn into the struggle against Soviet power, regarded this decision as an indication of the strivings of the Soviet Government and Communist Party to bring an end to the ruin and to improve the peasant economy.

NEP consisted not only in the replacement of surplus requisitioning by a tax in kind but in a number of other measures too. The New Economic Policy envisaged the introduction of free trade and the development of market exchange between industry and agriculture. Private enterprise was

tolerated. Small-scale and even medium-size state enterprises could be rented out to private individuals. NEP required distribution according to labour performed and the perfection of a wage system.

The transition to NEP was complicated by the fact that in 1921 the country's most important grain-growing regions—the Volga region, the Northern Caucasus, Southern Ukraine—were struck by unprecedented droughts and crop failure. Famine covered a territory larger in size than all of France. It extended 800 kilometres from north to south and 350 kilometres from west to east and affected a population of 25 million. The struggle with famine and its after-effects became a common effort for the entire people. Workers earmarked a portion of their salary and of their food ration to be contributed to the relief fund for the famine-stricken. The peasants organised collections of foodstuffs and seeds for the afflicted regions. Worker and peasant families took under their care children from the regions where famine stalked. Catering centres were opened for the starving and were supplied and operated not only by the state but by public organisations and particularly by the trade unions. Thousands of medical personnel were rushed to the affected regions to combat the outbreak of epidemics.

International organisations and progressive leaders in many countries came to the aid of the Soviet people, who will never forget the noble efforts of the world-famous intrepid polar explorer, Fridtjof Nansen. The organisation headed by him in his capacity as High Commissioner for the League of Nations transported roughly five million poods of foodstuffs to Soviet Russia. Anatole France turned over the money he received as recipient of the Nobel Prize to the relief fund for the starving. The working people of countless countries selflessly offered their help to the Soviet Union.



But there were others as well. The Supreme Council of the Entente formed an International Relief Commission for Russia headed by the former French Ambassador to Russia, Joseph Noulens. This was the very same Noulens who together with the Englishman Lockhart had organised an anti-government conspiracy in Moscow in 1918, participated in the preparing of a counter-revolutionary uprising in Yaroslavl, given financial aid to the notorious terrorist Savinkov and advocated a hunger blockade of Soviet Russia. Under his leadership the commission proposed, instead of aid to the suffering, "a study of the economic resources of Soviet Russia", that is, the collection of intelligence data concerning the country's economic potential.

Much aid was given by the American Relief Administration (ARA). In accordance with an agreement with the Soviet Government, this commission sent 25 million poods of foodstuffs to Russia. At the same time its leader Herbert Hoover tried to take advantage of the difficult situation in the country to support counter-revolutionary and anti-Soviet forces. The British working people demanded the shipment of produce to Russia, but Lord Curzon saw in starvation ripe opportunities for new joint efforts with the aim of overthrowing the Soviet Government.

Subsequently Hoover wrote that it was precisely the 60 million dollars contributed by the USA which broke the back of the terrible famine. Without denying the scale of the aid given by the ARA, it should be noted nevertheless that such a statement exaggerates the impact of this aid. The famine was broken primarily through the internal efforts of the Soviet state. Fifty-five million poods of seed were rushed by the Soviet Government to the stricken provinces, 10 million poods of foodstuffs were despatched by public organisations, etc.

The very first year of NEP brought visible results

in the effort to restore the national economy. In 1922 for the first time in a number of years, 2,200 million poods of grain were harvested, almost 50 per cent more than in 1921. Industry, and in particular the consumer sector, was successfully restored. In the summer of 1921 there were only six cotton fabric enterprises in operation, while in December there were forty-four. Output in this branch in 1922 rose to 244 per cent that of 1921, for linen the comparable figure was 273 per cent. Output of soap, kerosene, sugar climbed rapidly. Improvements were registered in the provisioning of the population with essential goods.

The fuel balance improved markedly. Metallurgical and machine-building factories stepped up their operations. In 1922 industrial production rose 42 per cent over that of 1921, though it still stood at 20 per cent the pre-war level. Rail transportation was restored throughout the country. Wages were improved for the basic categories of workers and employees. Construction was initiated on the powerful (for that time) Volkhov and Shatura power stations, the first steps in the State Plan for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO). This was the first national economic plan to be confirmed by the Eighth Congress of Soviets in 1920.

These were the first returns on NEP, clearly demonstrating the correctness of the course adopted by the Communist Party with the goal of restoring and expanding the country's economy. These results also indicated that politically NEP had fully vindicated itself and had strengthened the economic foundation of the political alliance of the working class and the peasantry. It justified Lenin's conclusion in a speech given to the plenary meeting of the Moscow Soviet — his last public appearance — that "NEP Russia will become socialist Russia".

However the transition to NEP had its negative side. The revitalisation of private trade and private

enterprise led to a resurgence of capitalist elements and the appearance of a new social stratum, the NEP bourgeoisie, or so-called "Nepmen". The development of private capitalist relations and a certain growth of bourgeois elements promoted the spread of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology and the intensification of the class struggle not only in the economy but also in the sphere of ideology.

Emigrant circles abroad were activated, interpreting NEP as a step backwards in the direction of capitalism and a retreat by Soviet power from its positions. In Prague in July 1921 an almanac was published entitled *Smena vekh* (Change of Landmarks), and in Paris a journal was published under the same name, which was then taken up by a widespread movement among emigrant circles.

What change of landmarks, what political re-orientation was meant? "Socialism must be bourgeois," declared one of the ideologists of the *Smena vekh* movement, B. P. Struve. But if NEP was a return to capitalism, if Russia, as the *Smenovekhovites* asserted, was essentially being transformed into a bourgeois country, then it followed that this process was to be promoted and a shift from struggle against to co-operation with Soviet power must be enacted, at the same time working for the removal of all restrictions and the establishment of complete freedom for private enterprise. "I am for supporting the Soviet Government because it has taken to the road leading to the establishment of the normal bourgeois order," said a former Cadet leader, N. V. Ustryalov, who had actively supported the intervention. This was probably the most concise expression of the credo of *Smenovekhovism*.

Support for the restoration of capitalism brought together the *Smenovekhovites* and the SRs and Mensheviks. Thus in the *Draft Economic Programme* drawn up by the SR ideologist V. Chernov in

1921, one of the central points was the demand to return control over nationalised enterprises into the hands of their former owners. Inside Russia the ideas promoted by the *Smenovekhovites* gained support among the *Nepmen* and were diffused by the bourgeois intelligentsia press organs: the journals *Rossiia* and *Novaya Rossiia*, and, in a more extreme form, by the journal of the Russian Technological Society *Ekonomist*.

But the *Smena vekh* movement also had its objectively progressive side. "It has rallied and is rallying," stated a resolution of the Twelfth All-Russia Conference of the Communist Party, "those groups of emigrants and Russian intellectuals who 'have become reconciled' with Soviet power and are ready to work with it for the rebirth of the country." Therefore, while combating against the spread of restorationist ideas, the party and government considered it possible to support those groups which wished to co-operate with Soviet power. There were quite a number of such groups. In 1922 the outstanding Soviet novelist Alexei Tolstoy, a member of the *Smena vekh* group *Nakanune* (On the Eve), returned to Russia. A year later another member of this group, Y. V. Klyuchnikov, a former professor at Moscow University and Minister of Foreign Affairs in Kolchak's "government", as well as contributor to the original *Smena vekh* almanac — returned home. In 1922 he was included, at the suggestion of Lenin, in the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference as an expert.

The Soviet Government also endeavoured to win the co-operation of those members of the petty-bourgeois parties who had declined to participate in anti-Soviet policies. A resolution of the Twelfth Party Conference pointed to the necessity of, on the one hand, applying repression against the enemies of Soviet power, and on the other, of aiding the crystallisation of those currents and groups which

manifested a true desire to move to co-operation with Soviet Russia. The disappearance from the political arena during this period of all other political parties was by no means the result of repression and coercion on the part of the Bolsheviks, as historians abroad often assert. Rather it was the outcome of their own policies which led to total political bankruptcy and organisational defeat for these parties.

The hopes entertained by the leaders of the petty-bourgeois parties that they would succeed in prompting the working people to massive anti-Soviet actions were completely dashed. Convinced by experience of the correctness of the policies of the Soviet Government, the people gave it ever increasing support. In these circumstances more and more SRs and Mensheviks, among whom there still remained the last disinterested defenders of capitalism, now saw through the counter-revolutionary essence of their leadership policies and deserted their respective parties. The predominant situation in these parties was well illustrated by a letter from Penza Province to the SR Central Committee: "The remnants of the Penza provincial committee regard it as their sad obligation to inform you of the difficult situation prevailing in the Penza organisation." On November 15, 1922, a provincial conference was to take place but "not one delegate attended the conference. So it never was convened".

In March 1923 the Thirteenth and last Bund (Jewish Workers' League) conference, earlier a branch of the Menshevik Party, decided to merge with the RCP (B). By the end of 1922 10 of the 24 members elected to its Central Committee in May 1918, left the party. Many of them joined the Communist Party, among them the subsequently renowned Soviet diplomat I. M. Maisky, the outstanding economist, and later Academician, S. G. Strumilin, and others.

In the summer of 1922 open trial proceedings were conducted against 34 members of the Central Committee and other organs of the Right Socialist-Revolutionary Party. They were accused of terrorist acts, subversion, conspiracy, espionage, fomenting uprisings and maintaining contacts with foreign interventionists. One of the prosecutors, People's Commissar of Education A. V. Lunacharsky, wrote at the time that Soviet power will never hesitate to apply the strictest measures against such "despoilers". However it was even more important "having cast a clear light on the SR Party, to help both those honest people within its ranks and those who could sympathise with it or, under certain favourable conditions, be influenced by it—see its true nature".

It is interesting to note the sentences meted out by the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal. Having sentenced 15 of the accused to death before the firing squad and 17 to prison terms ranging from 2 to 10 years, it asked the All-Russia Central Executive Committee to pardon 10, including three of those sentenced to death, for it believed that they had "erred in good conscience ... believing that they were fighting for the interests of the revolution" and fell into the enemy camp "through tragic force of circumstance". The All-Russia Central Executive Committee honoured the petition and confirmed the verdict but revoked the death sentences. It stated that if the Socialist-Revolutionary Party would halt its conspiratorial, terrorist and espionage activities, its leaders' lives would be spared. These proceedings struck a severe blow at the anti-Soviet underground. It seriously weakened the prestige of the SR Party; many of its members severed all ties with it.

In 1922 conferences of former SRs were held in the Urals, in Siberia, the Ukraine and elsewhere, concluding with the convening of an All-Russia

Congress in March 1923. The congress noted the full disintegration of the party, recognised the bankruptcy of its programme, divested its Central Committee of all authority and appealed to the former SRs to join the RCP(B) as the only party expressing the true interests of the working people.

In Georgia in 1921 the Menshevik Party had 80 thousand members, by 1922 the number had dropped to 15 thousand. In July 1923 an all-Georgia congress of Mensheviks was convened, at which were present 11,235 members or 90 per cent of its membership prior to 1917. The congress proclaimed the liquidation of the Menshevik Party and appealed to all workers to unite around the Communist Party and Soviet power. The same resolution was adopted in early 1924 by a congress of Ukrainian Mensheviks.

Thus, having ended up on the other side of the barricade, in the camp of counter-revolution, the petty-bourgeois parties lost all support among the masses, suffered defeat, disintegrated and fell into demise. In the USSR there remained but one political party — the Communist Party. "We have all been won over by Soviet power," wrote one of the organisers of anti-Soviet conspiracies, B. Savinkov, in 1924. "Won over as Whites, as greens, as non-party, as SRs, Cadets and Mensheviks. Won over in Moscow, in Byelorussia, the Caucasus, the Ukraine and Siberia. Seven years have passed, we are scattered, we are living corpses, while Soviet power is gaining strength from hour to hour."

An act of the utmost import in consolidating Soviet power and the development of the Soviet state system was the formation of the Soviet Union state. By the end of the civil war there existed six Soviet socialist republics in the country — the Russian (RSFSR), Ukrainian (UkrSSR), Byelorussian (BSSR), Azerbaijan, Armenian and Georgian. A number of regions in Eastern Siberia and the Far

East were united in the democratic Far Eastern Republic (DVR) — a buffer state created to ward off conflicts between the RSFSR and Japan. The Bukhara and Khorezm People's Republics, having arisen after the overthrow of the monarchies on the territories of the Bukhara Emirate and Khiva Khanate, maintained close ties with the Soviet republics.

Relations between the republics were established on a treaty basis. During the years of civil war a military political alliance took shape, with a joint military command, transport network, common legislation on vital issues (the applicability of the laws of the RSFSR on the territories of the other republics was confirmed in corresponding decrees by their respective organs of power), a unified monetary system and a common foreign policy, when the RSFSR, during negotiations with other countries and the conclusion of treaties, guaranteed the protection of the interests of the other republics, or as at the Genoa Conference, when it was empowered to carry on negotiations and sign legal documents in the name of these republics.

During the period of peaceful construction the inadequacies of these forms of statehood and alliance became evident. Events persistently demanded the creation of a unified management of the national economy, a unified planning system and closer co-ordination in governmental management. Both from the point of view of the development of the economy and from that of the resolution of the nationalities question, the deficiencies of treaty relations were more and more salient. The task of restoring the national economy, of building socialism and of defending the country from external aggression demanded a more tightly-knit union of economic, political and military resources.

At the outset of 1922 Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan united in the federative union of the Transcaucasian republics. In December of the same

year they formed the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (ZSFSR), an act marking one of the most important stages in the formation of the USSR. At the close of 1922 the last Japanese soldier left Vladivostok as the People's Army entered the city. A popular gathering proclaimed the establishment in the DVR of Soviet power and requested inclusion in the RSFSR—a request that was honoured.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government worked on the question of the forms of unification of the republics. The most rational and highly precise form was elaborated by Lenin. Rejecting the plan for "autonomy", at the basis of which rested the principle of distributing the competence of the higher state organs of the RSFSR to the corresponding organs in the other republics, Lenin suggested the creation of a voluntary union of independent republics, including the RSFSR, in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each to enjoy full and equal rights, including that of seceding from the Union. This plan proceeded from the principle of maximal consideration for the sovereignty and equal rights of nations.

Lenin's plan was received and acclaimed by the working people of all republics, and in the beginning of December 1922, the text of the *Basic Points of the Constitution of the USSR* was sent for discussion to the central organs of the independent Soviet republics. This document formed the basis for the resolutions on the formation of the USSR adopted in December 1922 by the congresses of Soviets of the UkrSSR, BSSR, ZSFSR and RSFSR. On December 29, 1922, a conference of delegates elected by the congresses of Soviets of the republics to the First All-Union Congress of Soviets was convened. The conference discussed and approved the drafts of the Declaration and Agreement on the Formation of the USSR. On December 30, the First All-Union

Congress of Soviets was convened. Lenin was enthusiastically elected honorary chairman by the delegates. The 2,214 delegates unanimously confirmed the Declaration and Agreement on the Formation of the USSR and instructed the Central Executive Committees of the Union republics to consider both of the documents and to voice their opinions to the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the USSR, which was to present the final text for confirmation to the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets.

Thus was created the first multi-national state in the world free of oppressed or dominant nations.

"We are here laying the cornerstone for a truly fraternal community," said the Chairman of the CEC of the USSR, Kalinin, in his concluding speech to the congress. "Thousands of years have passed with the best minds agonising over the theoretical problem in the search for forms which would give nations the opportunity to live in peace and friendship without hostility or mutual strife. Only today we are making the first moves in that direction."

In early 1924 the congresses of Soviets of the Union republics ratified the Constitution of the USSR and the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets added its final approval.

According to the Constitution, the highest organ of state power in the interval between congresses was the two-chamber Central Executive Committee of the USSR. The chambers—the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities—were to enjoy equal powers. The Constitution defined the scope of the questions falling within the jurisdiction of the all-Union organs of power: foreign policy and foreign trade relations, the defence of the country, basic problems of planning and management of the national economy, the monetary and credit system, the Union state budget, the basic principles of land

tenure and definition of the fundamentals of legislation on the judicial system and judicial procedure, and the fundamentals of civil and criminal legislation. A special chapter "On the Sovereign Rights of the Union Republics and on Union Citizenship" established that each Union republic independently exercised state authority, that each reserved the right to secede from the Union, and that the territory of a republic could not be altered without its consent.

Soon the number of Union republics grew. In Central Asia there existed the Turkmenian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, included in the RSFSR, and the Bukhara and Khorezm People's Republics. However the boundaries of the three republics did not coincide with the ethnographic borders of the peoples populating them. For example, two-thirds of the Uzbeks lived on the territory of Turkestan, but at the same time accounted for less than one-half of its population. In October 1923, the Fourth All-Khorezm Kurultai proclaimed the Khorezm Republic to be socialist and expressed the wish to be incorporated in the USSR. A year later a similar resolution was adopted by the Assembly of People's Representatives of Bukhara. As a result of the demarcation of the territories of these three national republics there were now formed the Uzbek and Turkmenian Soviet Socialist Republics and the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within Uzbekistan.

The formation of the USSR was a fitting outgrowth of the first five years of the existence of Soviet power, a great achievement in the theory and practice of national state-building. It occupies a prominent place in terms of its political significance and socio-economic consequences.

NEP bore fruit. The pace of restoration of the national economy quickened. The working class demonstrated outstanding heroism. Throughout the

land communist subbotniks and voskresniks (Sundays) were observed, during which the working people worked without pay to restore the rail lines and rolling stock, open-hearth furnaces and coal mines, city transport and housing. Hundreds of thousands of people took part. The first shock brigades were formed at the factories and demonstrated exemplary heroism at work. Labour productivity rose. In 1922 it already amounted to 51.5 per cent the pre-war level (compared to 29.1 per cent in 1921), and at certain enterprises reached the 1913 level. In early 1921 the Tula Armaments Factory was the first recipient of the Order of the Red Banner of Labour. The first bearers of the Order were: engine-operator T. M. Cherikov; the organiser of the production of zinc-white, earlier imported from abroad, the worker A. K. Pichugin; the geologist and future Academician with a world-wide reputation, I. M. Gubkin; the peasant Menchukov from Byelorussia, and others.

Simultaneous effort was made to modernise industry and step up technological progress. In 1922 at the Petrograd Krasny Putilovets Factory, the manufacture of the installations for the Volkhov Hydroelectric Power Station was initiated. The first Soviet automobiles, tractors, airplanes were manufactured, and the first powerful radio broadcasting station was designed and constructed.

The plans of the foreign imperialists to maintain an economic blockade of the country failed. The Genoa Conference (April 1922), in which 34 states participated, rejected the programme of peaceful co-operation proposed by the Soviet delegation and advanced its own terms, amounting to a capitulation of the USSR. However, the plans to isolate the Soviet Land were wrecked by the conclusion, while this conference was in session, of the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany. In accordance with this agreement Germany dropped its claims on debts



incurred by the tsarist government and recognised the nationalisation of the property of German citizens. The USSR, in turn, declined its share of reparations as stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles. The Rapallo Treaty was a major victory for Soviet diplomacy and was one of the first steps in gaining recognition for the USSR by the capitalist countries.

The achievements listed above by no means indicate that all internal and external difficulties had been overcome. In 1923 sown acreage rose by 12 million hectares over 1922. But after a bumper crop prices on agricultural produce plummeted, while those on manufactured goods rose. This was the so-called "scissors" phenomenon. Matters stood as follows: grain prices were 33 per cent lower than before the war and textile goods three times more expensive. A "marketing crisis" arose. Thus, the production of agricultural machinery was at only 20 per cent the pre-war level, and marketed output stood at 25 per cent. The number of workers engaged in industry reached the pre-war figure, but there were more than one million unemployed in the country.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government took measures to restore the economy. Specifically, prices of industrial goods were reduced, trade was improved and the position of the ruble was strengthened. The outcome was a stabilisation of prices and liquidation of the "price scissors".

A number of powers continued their attempts to foist their own political line on the USSR. On May 8, 1923, the British Government announced the so-called Curzon ultimatum. Two days later V. V. Vorovsky, the USSR representative at the Lausanne Conference in Switzerland and outstanding figure in the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, was assassinated. But these acts

brought no success to those who opposed the establishment of normal relations with the USSR. The murder of Vorovsky provoked a wave of indignation throughout the world. British business circles expressed their dissatisfaction with the foreign policies of their government, forcing the Prime Minister Andrew Bonar Law to resign. In February 1924, Britain established diplomatic relations with the USSR. By the outset of 1925 the USA was the only remaining country not having established legal ties with the Soviet Union.

On January 21, 1924 the country suffered a tremendous loss, the death of Lenin. The man, whom Bernard Shaw had in 1921 called the only statesman in Europe who had the talent, character and knowledge to fit his position of responsibility, had died. Ten years later Shaw was to say: "...You must not think that Lenin belongs to the past because he is now dead.... If the future is with Lenin then we can all be happy, but if the world goes on in the old way, then I shall leave it a very sad man." Leon Feuchtwanger called Lenin an outstanding humanist. Observing that the "humanist" regards freedom as the opportunity to publicly censure one's government, he emphasised that the true Leninist humanism considers that he is free who is free of the fear of unemployment and of an old age spent in hunger and free of fear for the fate of one's children.

Lenin's death shook the entire Soviet people. The international proletariat paid homage to his memory with a five-minute work stoppage during the burial ceremony. Progressive working people in the USSR responded to the death of their leader with mass enlistments in the Communist Party—more than 240 thousand workers became members.

In his last works, representing his political behests to the party and the people, Lenin developed an imposing plan for the building of socialism in the USSR.

After his death the country continued successfully to bring this programme in life. By 1925 the restoration of the national economy had been on the whole completed. Industrial production was at 75 per cent the pre-war level. Electrical energy output stood at 3,220 million kilowatt-hours, compared to 1,945 million kilowatt-hours in 1913. More than 80 per cent of all output was accounted for by the socialist sector. The first Soviet tractors and caterpillars made their appearance: by the close of 1925, 700 had been produced. On November 7, 1924, the first 10 trucks of Soviet manufacture were released by the AMO Factory. Work was proceeding on the manufacture of light bulbs, and the first new Kazantsev brake was designed to replace the Westinghouse made overseas. Capital input and accumulation rose in industry. In a four-year interval it rose fourfold—from 241 to 970 million rubles. The number of workers rose to 90.8 per cent of the 1914 figure, wages to 94 per cent, and the working day dropped by two hours—from 9.6 to 7.6 hours.

Agriculture was being developed. By 1925 sown acreage had risen to 99.3 per cent the pre-war level. In stock-breeding the 1916 figures were surpassed. Technical crops made the most marked gains—cotton output rose eightfold and the sugar-beet crop threefold.

While in 1922 there existed 22 thousand agricultural co-operatives, in 1925 there were 55 thousand, bringing together more than 6,600 thousand peasant households. The number of agricultural artels rose from 14 to 22 thousand, and that of collective-farm households approached the 300 thousand mark.

Such was the progress in implementing the Leninist plan for the industrialisation of the country and organisation of co-operatives in the countryside.

Marked successes were registered in the sphere of science and culture. The number of elementary and secondary schools surged forward. By 1926 the number of pupils reached nine million. Progress was particularly rapid in the national republics. Illiteracy was on the decline. In 1926 51.1 per cent of the population were literate—compared to 32 per cent in 1920. Institutes of higher education were rapidly proliferating. In 1925 there were 145 in operation, 40 of which had been opened after the revolution. The first higher educational institutions were opened in a number of Union republics such as Byelorussia and Uzbekistan. A completely new type of educational institution was created—the workers' faculties, which prepared worker and peasant youth for enrolment in the higher educational institutions. If in 1921 the workers' faculties graduated 120 students, in 1925 the number had risen to 8,300, while the number of enrolled stood at 60 thousand. A new Soviet intelligentsia was being born.

The period of reconstruction was marked by the development of scientific institutions and research projects. The activities of the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI) were expanded. Here the designer A. I. Tupolev completed work on the remarkable ANT-2 in which the pilot M. M. Gromov flew from Moscow to Peking in 1925, an outstanding feat for the time. Radio engineering progressed at a rapid pace. The renowned atomic energy specialist, the late I. V. Kurchatov, and the Nobel Prize recipient N. N. Semyonov began their scientific activities in this period.

Soviet literature and art made great strides forward. The outstanding pleiad of Soviet writers of Vladimir Mayakovsky, Sergei Yesenin, Alexei Tolstoy, Konstantin Fedin, Dmitry Furmanov and Alexander Fadeyev was headed by Maxim Gorky. By 1925 Soviet studios produced 150 films. New theatres were opened, and the first Soviet plays

were performed, describing life in the young Land of Soviets. Glière wrote the first Soviet ballet, *The Red Poppy*, which was performed throughout the world. The young D. Shostakovich's First Symphony was performed.

Fully armed, the country moved into a new period in its history.

## Chapter VII

### THE FIRST AND MOST DIFFICULT STEP

Many industrial enterprises underwent modernisation during the restoration of the national economy. They produced up-to-date machinery and electrical equipment. Quality-wise, the development of production in the restoration period—given nearly identical quantitative levels—was incomparably better. However Soviet Russia's economy still remained insufficiently developed. The country was still agrarian, with a low level of industrial development and low labour productivity.

On a technological and production basis of this sort there could be no question of building socialism in the name of which the workers and peasants of Russia had toppled the power of the landowners and capitalists in October 1917, and had defended the gains of the revolution in cruel and desperate battle with internal counter-revolution and foreign intervention, overcoming all the difficulties of the first post-war years. Lenin wrote: "A large-scale machine industry capable of reorganising agriculture is the only material basis that is possible for socialism."

The new Russia was faced with the task of overcoming in the briefest of historical intervals the gap between the advanced political system and the

backward economy, which had borne before the revolution an overriding agrarian character. It was necessary to create a modern—and first and foremost, heavy—industry, transform poverty-stricken and destitute Russia into an advanced power. The fate of the revolution hinged upon this task.

It was necessary to determine the basic directions to be pursued in the building of a new, socialist economy. History knew of no similar experience. The Soviet people, the Communist Party had to travel an uncharted path, to pave the road themselves. It was imperative to find methods and forms of managing a socialist economy and of clarifying the basic links in the development of industry, the proper pace of industrial construction. There were a variety of opinions on each of these questions. Even within the leadership of the Communist Party there existed a difference of opinions on these issues. The line of the overwhelming majority of the Party Central Committee was opposed by Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and a handful of their supporters.

In December 1925, the best representatives of the party, gathered for the Fourteenth Party Congress, adopted historic resolutions establishing the course for the socialist industrialisation of the country.

The congress resolutions underscored that socialist industrialisation indicated, above all, the development of heavy industry, and, in first order, of the engineering industry. It meant the production of the means of production, which would provide for the re-equipping of the entire economy on the basis of advanced machine technology. It would ensure the victory of the socialist forms of the economy and the technological and economic independence of the country. It would strengthen the country's defence capacity. In order to carry out the

industrialisation of the country old plant facilities had to be modernised and new ones built. Entire branches of modern industry had to be created from scratch. The execution of such imposing tasks demanded immense resources and huge capital investment. The capitalist powers had created large-scale heavy industry both on resources accumulated within the country through the exploitation of the working people, and on resources drawn from without—through the plundering of colonies or vanquished countries.

The Soviet country could not take advantage of such sources of accumulation, since such action was incompatible with the nature of a socialist state. The Soviet Union could not avail itself of foreign loans either, for such a path would threaten it with the loss of economic independence.

There remained one path to the resolution of the problem of accumulation—funds had to be generated by the country's own efforts and its internal resources. Such resources were to be found in the expropriation of the landowners and capitalists, and the transfer of the land, factories, banks and railways to the domain of public property. The annulment of tsarist Russia's debts freed the country from the payment of thousands of millions of rubles to foreign capitalists. State socialist ownership of the factories, transport, the land, and banks, a monopoly over foreign trade, concentration of the bulk of internal trade in the hands of state and co-operative organisations, the planned development of the national economy, the unremitting growth of labour productivity—all of this ensured the socialist state of dependable sources of accumulation.

All major capitalist powers began industrialisation with the growth of the light industries, gradually switching over to the development of the heavy industries. The USSR could not follow this pattern.

History could not spare the Soviet people the necessary time for this. The complex international situation required a rapid pace of socialist industrialisation. The threat of attack against the Soviet Union was both real and immediate. Russia's backwardness prompted reactionary circles in the West to aggressive actions against her. Thus it was necessary to begin with heavy industry and to develop it at an accelerated pace.

Capitalist industrialisation had been accompanied by the ruin and economic demise of large numbers of small commodity producers (peasants, artisans). Socialist industrialisation from the outset was a concern of the masses themselves, who by their labour and creative initiative supported the plans of the Communist Party.

The Trotskyites and Zinovievites opposed the general line of the party on the socialist industrialisation of the country. In a fierce struggle the party totally defeated the capitulators and oppositionists and defended the Leninist policy.

The successful implementation of the gigantic tasks posed by the industrialisation of the country required massive effort and certain sacrifices. For a time it was necessary to withhold from large-scale investment in the consumer goods enterprises, to direct every kopek to the construction of power stations and metallurgical factories, railways and mines. The working people of the USSR accepted these sacrifices, knowing that it was only through the creation of a powerful industry that the true well-being of the Soviet people could be ensured.

Carrying out the decisions of the Fourteenth Party Congress the Soviet people made significant progress in the development of the national economy. By 1927 many branches of industry had surpassed by far the pre-war levels. Much attention was devoted to the development of the means of production,

specifically, metallurgy and machine-building. In 1926/1927 the country's production of steam locomotives, internal combustion engines and machine-tools exceeded by far the pre-war figures. The Krasny Putilovets Factory began tractor production. In 1928 the volume of industrial production in the USSR stood at 132 per cent compared to 1923.

Progress in industry allowed significant increments in capital investment. In 1926/1927 such inputs had already reached levels substantial for the time—1,000 million rubles—which enhanced the opportunity for the widescale construction of new plant. Subsequent years recorded further and substantial gains in industry, notably heavy industry and machine-building. The construction of new electric power stations in accordance with the Leninist plan for the electrification of the country (GOELRO) proceeded apace. A year after the Fourteenth Party Congress, at the close of 1926, the first major hydroelectric power station in the USSR on the Volkhov, and the Shterovo station in the Donets Basin, swung into operation.

In 1927 construction of the Turkestan-Siberia Railway was launched, to extend a length of 1,500 kilometres and connect the grain regions of Western Siberia with Central Asia. In the summer of the same year in the barren outskirts of the city of Tsaritsyn (later renamed Stalingrad, then Volgograd) the building was begun of the first tractor factory in the USSR. In the Ukraine, the Urals and Siberia preparations were made for the construction of three huge metallurgical complexes.

The initial experience of industrialisation demonstrated that it was insufficient to plan by the month or the year. The programme for the technological reconstruction of industry and other branches of the economy, for large-scale construction could not be confined within the framework of a yearly

plan. The compass extended over a range of several years. Long-range planning had to be introduced.

The Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party adopted a resolution to draw up the First Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR. On the basis of the instructions given by the congress the State Planning Committee of the USSR worked out two variant plans: a minimal and an optimal. After a thorough discussion the Sixteenth Party Conference in April 1929 confirmed the basic indicators for the optimal variant of the Five-Year Plan. Gathering in May 1929, the Fifth Congress of Soviets—the highest organ of state power—adopted the First Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy—giving it the force of law.

The total volume of capital input was set at 64,600 million rubles for the five-year interval 1928-1933, compared to a 26,500 million ruble input for the years 1923/1924-1927/1928. Further, the bulk of this capital input was directed at the development of heavy industry. The volume of industrial output for the five-year period was to expand by 180 per cent. Production of the means of production was to grow by 230 per cent, and the production of consumer goods by 150 per cent. The plan envisaged the smelting of iron at 10 million tons per year and coal extraction at an annual level of up to 75 million tons, oil at up to 22 million tons annually.

The Five-Year Plan specified the construction of tractor factories in the Urals and the Volga region, an agricultural implements factory in Rostov, a heavy machine-building factory in Sverdlovsk, a chemical combine in Berezniki, major metallurgical combines in the Urals, Siberia, the Ukraine, and a number of other enterprises. The construction of electric power plants was given high priority, including the Dnieper and Svir hydroelectric power

stations and a thermal electric power plant in the Donets Basin.

During the interval covered by the Five-Year Plan it was proposed to implement important measures leading to the socialist reconstruction of agriculture. Specifically, sown acreage in the socialised sector was to reach 26 million hectares. The socialist sector was to account for no less than 43 per cent of the commodity output of grain by 1933.

The Five-Year Plan envisioned a major effort to raise the cultural level of the masses. Universal education was to be implemented, illiteracy liquidated, and the number of schools and cultural institutions increased. Professional and technical education was to be stimulated. Broad plans for the development of science, and the training of qualified specialists and scientific personnel were drawn up.

The First Five-Year Plan set as its goal the building of the foundations of the country's socialist economy and the consolidation of the position of socialism in the USSR.

Throughout the Soviet Union industrial construction went into full swing. Inspired by the party and filled with faith in the correctness of its policies and economic plans, Soviet people demonstrated marvels of labour heroism. The country was turned into a huge construction site. Industrial complexes appeared in the country's outlying districts. In the unpopulated steppes of the Southern Urals thousands of construction workers built a metallurgical combine. On the far shores of the Amur, in the impassable taiga, a city of youth sprung up—Komsomolsk-on-the-Amur.

This was a time of truly heroic feats. People experienced the power of free and creative labour, the might of collective effort. Everything was suddenly possible: the reclamation of the wastelands, the draining of swamplands, the construction of mammoth projects, the erection of new cities.



Millions of people left their homes and familiar places to participate in the gigantic construction projects of socialism. Canvas tents and mud dugouts became the temporary homes of these enthusiasts. Despite all difficulties new factories, settlements and cities were built in record time. Roughly three years were necessary to build the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine in Gornaya Shoriya in Siberia, with a production capacity of three million tons of steel annually. The gigantic Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine was built in two years. The list of such achievements could be extended endlessly.

In March 1929, the workers of the Leningrad Krasny Vyborzhets Factory appealed through *Pravda* to all enterprises in the Soviet Union to commence socialist emulation for reducing the cost of production. This initiative was joined by many of the country's enterprises. The Moscow workers challenged their compatriots in Kharkov and the Urals to compete. The Leningrad enterprises competed with those in Tula and Moscow. Soon socialist emulation swept across the entire country.

The Communist Party supported the initiative of the country's advanced workers and collectives. The Sixteenth All-Union Party Conference appealed to all workers and peasants to organise emulation in all spheres of socialist labour.

The party appeal was met warmly by the working people. In the short interval of a few months socialist emulation became a powerful mass movement among the working class. Joining the emulation movement the workers of factories overfulfilled the established plans and promoted their own more demanding plans. The shock brigades were the basic form taken by emulation. During the socialist emulation at the close of 1929 there arose the slogan: "Five-Year Plan in Four Years!"

These were not empty words. The results of the first year of the Five-Year Plan indicated that it

would not only be fulfilled but also fulfilled ahead of time. During the first two years output in heavy industry rose by more than 60 per cent. For the first time in the country's history gross output in industry surpassed that of agriculture. The country was being transformed from an agricultural into an industrial power.

The initial progress in carrying out the plan to industrialise the country and the rapid growth of socialist industry brought into sharp relief the need to accelerate the pace of the socialist transformation of agriculture.

Industrial development resting on the public, socialist ownership of the means of production consolidated the position of socialism in the national economy and facilitated the squeezing out of capitalist elements. At the same time, agriculture, the basic occupation of a large proportion of the country's population, remained as before the domain of the smallholding peasantry with fragmented plots, based on the private ownership of the means of production.

There emerged in consequence a sharp disparity between the development of advanced socialist industry, on the one hand, and a backward smallholding peasant economy, on the other. In 1925/1926 industrial output rose by 42.2 per cent, agricultural output by 19.2 per cent. In 1926/1927 the corresponding figures were 18.2 per cent and 4.1 per cent.

This gap grew as time passed, increasing the danger of a disruption of the balance between agriculture and industry. The rapid growth of industry brought in its wake a burgeoning urban population and increased the demand for agricultural raw materials and produce.

As a result of the implementation of the Leninist Decree on Land the class composition of the



Peasants registering in a collective farm

Ceremonies marking the commissioning of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station (Dneproges). 1932



peasantry had markedly changed. The large landed estates formerly belonging to the landowners and monasteries now passed into the hands of the toiling peasantry.

While before the October Revolution the middle and poor peasantry held roughly 60 million hectares of land and the kulaks 40 million, by 1927 the situation had changed radically. The holdings of the kulaks had declined by 90 per cent, now amounting to only four million hectares. At the same time the land in possession of the poor and middle peasantry had significantly increased, amounting in 1927 to 136 million hectares. The countryside was now largely the domain of the middle peasant. The number of poor households declined sharply. Measures taken by the Soviet Government led to major improvements in the lot of the peasantry.

The fragmentation of peasant households proceeded rapidly in the countryside. In the first ten years of Soviet power the number of peasant households rose from 16 to 25 million. As an offshoot the peasants' land allotments diminished and the production of grain and other agriculture produce declined in individual households.

In pre-revolutionary Russia the kulaks and landowners had been the primary suppliers of grain. Possessing extensive holdings of sown acreage, they had sold more than 80 per cent of their grain output and provided almost 70 per cent of the grain market in Russia. The liquidation of landed estates and the decrease of the number of kulak holdings altered the balance of grain production in the country. Now the poor and middle peasants were the basic producers of grain. They accounted for 74 per cent of the marketable grain. However the poor and middle households could sell only slightly more than one-tenth (11 per cent) of their grain harvest. The remainder was swallowed up by domestic consumption. Thus they could not provide enough produce or

raw material to meet the needs of the urban population and to keep pace with a growing industry. Collective and state farms had a high level of marketability (47 per cent), but there were few such farms. By 1928 they accounted for only 7 per cent of the gross output of grain marketed in the country. Thus, despite the growth of sown acreage and increments in the total volume of grain output, in 1927 the volume of marketed grain was half that of the pre-revolutionary level.

Certain difficulties arose in providing the country's population with bread. These difficulties were further complicated by the fact that the kulaks, possessing reserves of grain, hoarded these reserves and would not sell this grain to the state.

Complex contradictions arose in the economy, demanding immediate solution. Of utmost importance was a correct resolution to the problem of the relationship between large-scale socialised industry and the small-scale, fragmented peasant economy.

The October Revolution gave the peasantry land and freed it of enslavement by the landowners. However the peasantry continued to live and work in individual plots. Some grew poor and were ultimately ruined, while a small group of kulaks grew rich at their expense, although Soviet power had imposed severe restrictions on the kulaks. This indicated that the countryside had preserved private capitalist relationships, and thereby a base for the restoration of capitalism.

Among the most advanced and mature sector of the toiling peasantry the conviction grew that it was impossible to maintain the old ways any longer, that the waste of human effort and labour connected with a smallholding peasant economy could be tolerated no longer. Lenin predicted that labour productivity would be doubled or tripled, that human effort would be reduced two or threefold if

the transition were made from the dispersed dwarf holding to the socialised ownership of land. Only the transition from the small peasant economy to large-scale collectivised agriculture based on a machine technology could elevate the tens of millions of peasants from their age-old poverty.

The abysmal poverty and destitution of the peasantry before the revolution inexorably pushed it towards fundamental changes in the old system of land relations. A certain sector of the peasantry even then saw the escape from their unenviable situation in the joining of efforts, in the creation of collectivised units. Such units emerged in a wide variety of forms even in the years immediately following the October Revolution.

In 1918 there were registered more than 1,500 agricultural collectives—communes, artels, and co-operatives for the joint working of the land. Subsequently their number grew, but the necessary material conditions had not yet been created in the country for a broad socialist transformation of agriculture. Moreover, the bulk of the peasantry was not yet prepared for such a transformation. In order that the entire peasantry be drawn into the building of socialism, time and patient efforts at explanation were imperative to aid the peasant in recognising and understanding the advantages of large-scale collectivised over small-scale and individual farming.

The Soviet state took measures to facilitate the transition from private to collective ownership in the countryside. It was active in the organisation of supply-and-market co-operatives, the elementary forms of producers' co-operatives. Co-operatives for the joint cultivation of the land caught on particularly rapidly. Through his own experience the peasant came to understand the advantages of collectivised farming.

Soviet industry launched on the production of

tractors, combines, agricultural implements and machinery. It took more than 10 years to create the necessary material and technological conditions for the industrialisation of the country and the socialist transformation of agriculture.

The mass explanatory work carried out by the Communist Party and the Soviet state among the toiling peasantry, who clearly and definitively spoke in favour of the socialist co-operatives and for a new social and economic order in the countryside, bore fruit. The peasantry demanded that curbs be imposed on the kulak, who was mercilessly exploiting the village poor, hoarding grain, and trying to create difficulties in the effort to supply the cities with grain and other agricultural produce.

The Fifteenth Party Congress, convening in late 1927, devoted particular attention to the subsequent path to be pursued in the development of agriculture. The congress resolved to intensify the establishment of co-operatives and collective farms. The basic forms of collectivisation were laid out. The conditions for the mass collective-farm movement had fully ripened, but the growth rate did not correspond to the new conditions in the countryside. An all-out effort was imperative to accelerate the collectivisation of agriculture and the transition from the smallholding privately owned peasant farm to large-scale socialist agriculture, based on modern technology. The decisions of the Fifteenth Party Congress were guided by the co-operative plan drawn up by Lenin and aiming at the drawing of millions of peasants to the building of socialism in the countryside through the co-operative.

The Right opportunist group of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy spoke out against the general line of the party and the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress on the intensification of the pace of collectivisation. They demanded that the plan worked out and developed by the Fifteenth Party

Congress to build collective and state farms be rejected. Under the slogan "Enrich yourselves" the Right capitulators justified and encouraged the growth of the kulak farms. Bukharin tried to provide a foundation for the "peaceful growing over of the kulak into socialism". The Right opportunists advanced the "theory" of the dying-out of the class struggle in the country.

In substance they rejected the possibility of building socialism in the USSR and pushed the party towards concessions to the capitalist elements in the city and countryside. The party conducted a determined ideological struggle with this Right danger, for without the defeat of the Right deviation it would have been impossible to carry out either the industrialisation of the country or the socialist reconstruction of agriculture.

The massive collective-farm movement unfolded in the autumn of 1929. In the last three months of that year 2,400 thousand peasant households joined collective farms, a figure double that of the entire twelve-year period following the revolution. The peasantry understood the overall need for and his personal economic interest in the liquidation of the petty-commodity economy and the creation of a new socio-economic order in the countryside. While up to mid-1929 primarily poor peasants and hired labourers joined the collective farms, in the latter half of the year there was an influx of middle peasants, the backbone of the agricultural population. Thus from this point the collective-farm movement took on a mass character, creating the conditions for the successful enactment of full collectivisation not only of separate villages but of entire regions.

The mass enrolment of middle peasants in collective farms and the decisive turn of the middle peasant masses to socialism altered the relationship of class forces in the country. The preconditions

were formed for the complete rejection of the grain produced on the kulak farms. The collective and state farms provided the country with a growing supply of grain, meat and other produce. Even in 1929 the socialist sector of agriculture put more grain on the market than had the kulak sector in the preceding years. This paved the way for a change in Communist Party policy towards the kulaks. While before it consisted in restrictions against and the ousting of the kulaks, now, by the end of 1929, the party advanced the slogan of liquidating the kulaks as a class on the basis of full collectivisation. This party policy received the full support of the toiling peasantry, who actively participated in the expropriation of the kulak households. The property and agricultural implements confiscated from the kulaks were turned over to the collective farms.

The collectivisation process proceeded with certain difficulties. The kulaks offered stiff resistance. The class struggle in the countryside reached a climax. A sector of the peasantry wavered somewhat. Kulak influence, intimidation and blackmail made its mark. Age-old traditions also played a role—it was difficult to part with one's plot of land and horse. The unknown future was a source of fright.

The machine and tractor stations (MTS) exerted a major influence in the reconstruction of agriculture. In the initial stages the state farms helped the poor peasant households and the newly created collective farms in the cultivation of the land with tractors and the rendering of other technical aid. Then certain state farms began to establish special tractor columns for this set purpose. The Shevchenko State Farm (Odessa Region of the Ukrainian SSR) was one of the first to establish such a column in 1927. By the autumn of 1928 there were 13 tractor columns in the country's major grain-producing

regions. The experience gained by the tractor columns made possible the creation of the machine and tractor stations. The first MTS was established in November 1928 from the tractor column of the Shevchenko State Farm. In 1929-1930 machine and tractor stations were founded on a mass scale.

The MTS were a bulwark in the socialist reconstruction of agriculture and a powerful lever of organisational and economic influence for the Soviet state on the collective farms and the development of agricultural production. In the country's basic grain-producing regions the tractor fleet increased 1.5-2 times from October 1929 through October 1930. In autumn 1929 there were over 35 thousand tractors in operation in the country, of these 12 thousand on collective farms. During the first three years of the Five-Year Plan (1929-1931) an additional 50 thousand tractors were produced by the country's factories, and some 60 thousand more purchased abroad.

The tractor, once a rare sight, now became a ubiquitous presence in the countryside. Inventories of agricultural machinery and implements rose to a level several times higher than that of the pre-revolutionary period. The material and technological base of agriculture corresponding to the socialist mode of production was in the main created during the course of collectivisation. This comprised the uniqueness of the transformation of agriculture along socialist lines: the process of reconstructing the productive forces and relations of production proceeded concurrently.

The scale at which collective farms were set up in 1929 exceeded all expectations. In entire districts and regions the movement for full collectivisation grew and expanded. More than 10 million peasant households joined collective farms in January and February 1930.

A major role in the subsequent development of the collective-farm movement was played by the resolution of the CC of the party adopted on January 5, 1930, and entitled "On the Rate of Collectivisation and Measures by the State to Aid the Setting up of Collective Farms". The resolution set the end of the Five-Year Plan as the date for the completion of collectivisation. The provisional dates for the completion of collectivisation took into account the specific conditions governing one or another district and the different levels of preparedness for collectivisation in the various territories, regions and national republics. As the experience of establishing collective farms demonstrated, a more rapid pace was possible in such grain-producing regions as the Northern Caucasus, the Central and Lower Volga regions. The resolution set the spring of 1931 as the date for the completion of collectivisation in these regions. In other grain-producing regions (the Ukraine, the Central Black-Earth zone, Kazakhstan and others) the terminal date was extended a year — roughly to the spring of 1932.

The consolidation of the collective-farm system proceeded in complicated circumstances. The difficulties involved were engendered by both objective and subjective factors. The establishment of collective farms was accompanied by a desperate class struggle. The opposition of the kulaks was given fuel by the tense international situation. At the same time the threat of a possible military intervention on the part of the imperialist powers demanded of the Soviet people the utmost effort in consolidating the country's defences. As a result there was little room left for investing resources for increasing the output of agricultural machinery.

The insufficient material and technological base acted as a drag on the establishment of a collective-farm economy. Further, the Soviet people were the first to undertake the building of socialism, there

was no precedent for the co-operation of agriculture on such a large scale. The difficulties in re-establishing agriculture along socialist lines were exacerbated by mistakes committed in the initial stage of collectivisation. In a number of regions local functionaries were sometimes remiss in their actions, and trampled on the principle of voluntary membership in the collective farms. Instead of pursuing the peasants in the advantages of collective farms, they applied administrative measures. Enemies of Soviet power and, above all, the kulaks, took advantage of the errors committed by local organs and spread false rumours in an effort to discredit the very idea of collectivisation and to stir up anti-Soviet actions among the peasantry.

At the close of February 1930, the Communist Party Central Committee passed a resolution directed at rectifying the mistakes committed in the establishment of collective farms in the national republics of Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and in the RSFSR, and on March 14, 1930, the Party CC enacted a further resolution entitled "On the Struggle Against Distortions in the Party Line in the Collective-Farm Movement". The latter resolution resolutely demanded an end to compulsory methods of collectivisation, further promotion of the work of drawing the peasantry into the collective farms on a voluntary basis and the consolidation of the existing collective farms.

At the same time Stalin's article on the inadmissibility of compulsory collectivisation entitled "Dizzy with Success" was published.

The Soviet state rendered substantial financial aid to the collective farms and granted them seed loans. The measures undertaken facilitated the consolidation of progress already made in collectivisation. During the first half of 1930 the per cent of collectivised households in the country rose from 21.6 (January 1, 1930) to 23.6 (May 1, 1930).



By the end of the First Five-Year Plan collectivisation had been completed on the whole. By the middle of 1932 collective farms encompassed more than 60 per cent of all peasant households and almost 70 per cent of all acreage sown by the peasantry.

The industrialisation of the country and the collectivisation of agriculture as well as the resolution of the fundamental tasks of the First Five-Year Plan were accomplished in the midst of a complex international situation.

"We need peace for the victorious building of socialism, to carry out our great plans for the industrialisation of the country," said an address by the Party CC to the nation on June 1, 1927. However the international climate became more and more heated. Having overcome the post-war economic crisis, the capitalist world could not liquidate the general contradictions which were disturbing the stabilised situation. The post-war arrangement did not correspond to the new balance of strength between the imperialist powers, and matters were moving towards a new dividing up of the world. The rulers of the Western states looked upon the progress achieved in the building of socialism as a threat to the capitalist system. They wanted to destroy the USSR and seize the bottomless Russian market, thereby finding an egress from their difficulties.

The British bourgeoisie in alliance with French, Rumanian, and Polish capitalists instigated an anti-Soviet campaign. In May 1927 the London police carried out a raid on the Soviet trade representation and ARCOS—the Soviet joint-stock company for trade between Britain and the USSR. On May 27, the British Government broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR. Shortly after this the Soviet Ambassador to Poland, Pyotr Voykov, was assassinated in Warsaw. Foreign espionage

agents carried out a number of subversive and terrorist acts in the USSR. The capitalist countries began an economic boycott of the USSR.

However the attempt to organise a united anti-Soviet front met with failure. The Soviet Union persisted in its policy of peace and amicable relations with its neighbours. In 1925-1927 treaties of non-aggression and neutrality were signed with Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran. An analogous treaty was concluded between Germany and the USSR. This agreement created the basis for the development of economic ties between the two countries. During the initial years of industrialisation the USSR obtained much industrial plant from abroad. This was natural—the budding Soviet industry was not yet in a position to fully meet the country's growing demands. Approximately one-fourth of imports to the Soviet Union in the period 1925-1927 originated in Germany.

Endeavouring to relax international tensions, in 1928 the USSR added its name to the Kellogg Pact repudiating war. The pact had been signed by the governments of the USA, Britain, France, Germany and other countries. The Soviet Union signed this pact although it considered it unsatisfactory, since the formula "prohibition of war" was both vague and indefinite. In 1932 non-aggression pacts were concluded between the USSR and Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and France. In 1933-1934 normal diplomatic relations were established with the USA, Spain, Czechoslovakia and Rumania.

By the end of 1932 the First Five-Year Plan was fulfilled ahead of schedule—after four years and three months. The Soviet Union had virtually trebled the industrial output compared to that of tsarist Russia. Fifteen hundred major industrial enterprises had been constructed throughout the country. A large-scale, and technologically modern industry had been created. Modern enterprises



The first tractor from the Stalingrad Tractor Factory coming off the assembly line. June 17, 1930

Initiators of the movement for higher labour productivity during the Second Five-Year Plan:

M. Demchenko

A. Stakhanov

The opening of the Turkestan-Siberia Railway



unknown in pre-revolutionary Russia sprung up in the most important sectors of industrial production, such, for example, as the aviation, tractor-building, automobile, chemical and machine-tool industries. Tractors and automobiles, airplanes and machine-tools, agricultural machinery and mineral fertilisers—all were now produced by Soviet factories.

The engineering industry progressed at a particularly rapid rate. During the First Five-Year Plan its output rose fourfold. The production of a number of types of machines and equipment climbed astronomically: metal-cutting tools by 10 times, lorries by 35 times, tractors by 39 times, etc.

In Gorky and Moscow major automobile factories swung into operation; in Kharkov, Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk—tractor factories; in Saratov, Rostov and Tashkent—agricultural machine-building enterprises; in Sverdlovsk—a heavy machine-building plant; in Moscow—a ball-bearings factory. This by no means exhausts the list of the largest heavy engineering works built during the First Five-Year Plan. It should be added that many of the old machine-building works such as the Putilov, Dynamo, Elektrosila factories were fundamentally rebuilt. Often such an operation was equivalent to the construction of an entirely new enterprise.

Major progress was achieved in the electrification of the country. The Leninist plan for electrification (GOELRO) worked out at the close of 1920 and projecting the construction over a 10-15-year interval of 30 electric power stations with a generating capacity of 1,700 thousand kw was overfulfilled by 1931. By the close of 1932 the overall capacity of the regional electric power stations exceeded 2,600 thousand kw.

During the First Five-Year Plan the production capacity of heavy industry was augmented. Iron smelting, coal and oil extraction rose. Some 179 new

mines and over 1,200 oil wells were brought into operation. The first lines of the Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk and Kerch metallurgical plants, the Zaporozhye Electric-Steel Plant and the Chelyabinsk Ferroalloy Factory were launched. The Donets Basin and Ural metallurgical enterprises were rebuilt and substantially expanded.

Major progress was also achieved in the development of all other branches of industry.

The rapid growth of socialist industry fundamentally altered the country's economy. Industrial gross output now was predominant in the national economy. By the end of the Five-Year Plan its relative weight in the economy was 70.7 per cent compared to 48 per cent in 1927/1928. Thus, the Soviet Union had been transformed from a backward agrarian to an advanced industrial power. The erection of new factories and plants, mines and pits went forth not only in the centre of the country but also in the non-Russian outlying districts. In fact here the tempo of industrial construction was even more rapid than in the old industrial regions of the USSR.

The profile of these formerly backward districts was radically altered. In the Transcaucasian republics the oil industry was successfully developed, and new non-ferrous metals, machine-building and coal industry enterprises sprung up. An entire network of hydroelectric power stations was established.

Rapid development characterised the mining, chemical, coal, machine-building, oil and textile industries as well as the non-ferrous metals industry in the Central Asian republics. Industrial construction on a large scale was undertaken in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the autonomous republics and regions of the Russian Federation.

In the course of the industrialisation of the republics an indigenous working class emerged there. Millions of people were drawn to knowledge

and mastered industrial professions. During the First Five-Year Plan agriculture was radically changed as well. A system of collective farms was created in the countryside. On the basis of full collectivisation the last and most numerous exploitative class—the kulaks—was eliminated.

As a result of the socialist transformations the Soviet Union was transformed from a country of smallholding peasant households into one boasting the largest-scale agriculture in the world. The collective and state farms bringing together more than 60 per cent of the peasantry were outfitted with the most up-to-date techniques.

The industrialisation of the country and collectivisation of agriculture did away with capitalist elements and ensured the successful establishment of the foundation for the socialist economy. The results of the First Five-Year Plan convincingly demonstrated that it was both possible and feasible to build socialism in one country.

## Chapter VIII

### ON THE EVE OF THE GREAT ORDEAL

The successful fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan opened new vistas in the building of socialism. Ever more complex economic and political problems were placed on the agenda. It was imperative to consolidate the positions gained, to iron out the kinks in the newly built and remodelled factories, to bring to perfection mastery over the techniques created by the will and work of the Soviet people. It is readily understandable that the immense production capacities developed during the Five-Year Plan could not be fully assimilated in a short period. Plants were not used to full capacity because of the shortage of trained personnel and absence of experienced leadership in the new circumstances.

The problem of mastering new techniques was especially salient in agriculture, where the general cultural level of the workers was lower than in industry, and the technical knowhow of the personnel a scarce factor.

By the outset of the Second Five-Year Plan serious lags were observed in certain important branches of industry. The enemies of the Soviet state hastened to evaluate such phenomena as indicating the failure of the socialist course. Trotsky spoke out in the emigrant press with a declaration of

the need for the USSR to halt new construction and undertake a "major overhaul".

However difficulties could not shake the confidence of the Soviet people in the realistic nature of the plans that were charted. Having thoroughly analysed the nature of the emergent difficulties the Communist Party and the Soviet Government worked out measures to overcome them.

A prominent place in the new Five-Year Plan was taken up by such questions as perfecting leadership methods in all branches of the economy, of completing the technological reconstruction of plant facilities and of spurring further gains in all sectors of industry and agriculture. The working masses took an active part in the elaboration and preparation of the plan. Conferences of scholars, engineers and leading industrial workers were summoned to substantiate and render more precise various aspects of the Second Five-Year Plan. The co-ordination of plan indicators and the verification of their scientific accuracy were considerably more thorough than was the case with the First Five-Year Plan.

The completion of the technological reconstruction of the entire national economy was determined as the fundamental economic task of the Second Five-Year Plan. The primary condition for the successful fulfilment of this goal was the mastery of new techniques and production methods. All of Soviet industry was to be given the most up-to-date scientific and technological base. The share of the instruments of production to be operationalised in the economy during the years of the plan was to amount to 50-60 per cent of those already in operation.

The problem of the rate of development was given special attention. The initial plan variants reflected a striving to force the pace. The targets set for the smelting of ferrous metals and the output of other

industrial goods were exaggerated. After thorough analysis the basic plan indicators were brought into conformity with feasible parameters and with the demand for the balanced development of the national economy.

Since during the First Five-Year Plan period the Soviet Union had been forced to concentrate on the accelerated development of heavy industry (Group A) with a relatively small rate of development in the light and food industries (Group B), the Second Five-Year Plan stipulated stepping up the pace of consumer goods output. While in Group A the average annual increase in output was set at 14.5 per cent, for Group B the corresponding figure was to be 18.5 per cent. The output of consumer goods was to be expanded, and heavy industry was to participate in this effort. All this provided the opportunity to overcome the excessive gap in the level of development of the heavy and light industries and to achieve an upgrading of the people's standard of living.

The Five-Year Plan approved by the Seventeenth Party Congress offered proof of the broad opportunities before the country for the completion of the socialist transformations. The volume of industrial production was to more than double in five years.

High growth indices were set for the ferrous and non-ferrous metals industries, for the congress noted that overcoming the gap in this sector was of overriding importance. Coal and oil extraction as well as the output of locomotives and freight cars were to be significantly boosted. The chemical industry was extensively developed. Electrical energy output was to rise by 180 per cent. To meet the demands of the plan it would be necessary to boost labour productivity in industry by approximately 63 per cent and to reduce production net cost by 26 per cent.

The new Five-Year Plan concentrated its efforts on the rational allocation of productive forces, taking into account both the interests of the socialist economy as a whole and the necessity of accelerating the economic upsurge of the Union republics. On the basis of the development of the old industrial centres new ones were established for promoting industrialisation of the country's eastern regions (the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia, Bashkiria, Kazakhstan and Central Asia). Approximately one-half of all capital investment was earmarked for the development of heavy industry in these regions. The relative weight of the eastern regions in the overall production of pig iron was to be increased from one-fourth (1932) to one-third. Roughly the same growth was to mark coal extraction in this area. The congress decided to step up work on the creation of an oil producing centre between the Urals and the Volga.

The congress took note of the necessity of completing during the interval of the Second Five-Year Plan the collectivisation and technical revamping of all sectors of agriculture. The number of MTS was to be increased to six thousand in 1937. All collective farms were to be given access to MTS services. The tractor fleet was to grow by 3.7 times and the number of combines to be increased to 100 thousand. On this basis, the output of agricultural produce was to double.

The preparation of qualified personnel and technical specialists was a *sine qua non* of the technological revamping of all branches of the economy and of a rise in labour productivity. The Second Five-Year Plan included a sweeping programme for enhancing the material and cultural level of the workers and peasants. On the basis of high growth rates in labour productivity and national income real wages were to double during the interval of the plan and outlays on daily services for workers and employees, on social

insurance and education, were to rise more than twofold.

In the sphere of public education it was proposed not only fully to liquidate illiteracy and semi-literacy among the adult able-bodied population, but also to institute a seven-year programme of universal compulsory polytechnical instruction. This concerned the countryside above all, since a seven-year educational programme had already to a large measure been implemented in the cities during the previous five-year plan. Outlays on health care were to rise fourfold. Rural hospital facilities were to be given particular attention.

The Soviet people enthusiastically set about the implementation of the Second Five-Year Plan. The socialist emulation initiated for the fulfilment of the plan targets ahead of time was closely connected with the mastery of new techniques and the more thorough and effective application of these techniques.

The movement by leading workers to increase labour productivity and master new techniques received the name Stakhanovite movement after a Donets Basin coal-hewer from the Tsentralnaya-Irmino mine, Alexei Stakhanov, who during his shift on August 31, 1935, cut out 102 tons of coal, exceeding the norm by 14 times. The miners M. Dyukanov, N. Izotov and others followed in the footsteps of Stakhanov. The initiative of the Donets Basin miners was caught up by workers in other industrial centres and branches. A smith in the Gorky Auto Factory, A. Busygin; a Donets Basin machinist, P. Krivonos; a shoemaker in the Lenin-grad Skorokhod Factory, N. Smetanin; the textile workers Y. and M. Vinogradova and thousands of other workers sharply increased labour productivity through organisational improvements and the mastery of new techniques. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government encouraged this re-



markable show of initiative by these production innovators, which soon turned into a mass movement.

The upsurge of socialist emulation in industry soon caught on among those engaged in agriculture. Among the initiators of the struggle for higher crop yields, improvements in livestock-breeding and for the optimal mastery of agricultural techniques were the Ukrainian beet-growers M. Demchenko and M. Gnatenko, the Kuban combine operator K. Borin, the team leader of a women's tractor unit, P. Angelina, and many others.

The progress of these outstanding figures in the farm economy was also closely connected with improvements in the technical side of agriculture and with a boost in the material well-being of the collective farmers. Specialised occupations, quite unknown in the old, pre-collective-farm village, now made their appearance. By the close of the Second Five-Year Plan there were working in the countryside one million tractor operators, more than 200 thousand combine-operators and over 100 thousand drivers, technicians and service personnel.

The mass Stakhanovite movement convincingly demonstrated that the Soviet Union had produced a new generation of working people, both conscious and literate as well as capable of resolving difficult and demanding tasks.

The Soviet people through their selfless and competent labour succeeded in carrying out the Second Five-Year Plan by April 1, 1937—in four years and three months.

What were the basic results of this concerted effort by the Soviet people during the Second Five-Year Plan?

The Soviet Union became a major industrial power, first in Europe and second in the world in terms of volume of industrial output.

Four thousand five hundred new factories were brought into operation. The volume of industrial production rose 4.5 times, with 80 per cent of this output received from new or entirely rebuilt enterprises. Dozens of blast and open-hearth furnaces, some 150 mines, new machine-building and chemical plants, electric power stations and canals were operationalised. The new factories were large-scale enterprises equipped with modern installations. An advanced multi-sectored structure of industrial production took shape in the Soviet Union, and ensured a solid base for uninterrupted growth. This was a structure characteristic of an advanced industrial power.

The progress in industrial development ensured the country's economic independence. Soviet industry was now in a state to produce all machinery, including the most complex, to meet the needs of the economy. Imports of machinery in 1937 amounted to only 0.9 per cent of all new machines.

Substantial headway was made in the rebuilding of the transport network for the far-flung country. New railways were laid and large hydrotechnical projects completed—the White Sea-Baltic (1933) and Moscow-Volga (1937) canals. A major step was taken in the opening of the Northern Sea Route from Murmansk to Vladivostok through the Arctic Ocean.

During the Second Five-Year Plan the Soviet people turned an important page in history by completing far-reaching social and economic changes in the countryside, resulting in the consolidation of the collective-farm system. The USSR was transformed into a country of large-scale agriculture. The establishment of producers' co-operatives of peasant households was in the main accomplished. In the summer of the last year of the Five-Year Plan 93 per cent of all peasant households in the USSR, holding 99.1 per cent of all

sown acreage, were included in the co-operative network.

During the Second Five-Year Plan period the Soviet Government bent its efforts to consolidate the material and technological basis of the collective-farm system. By the close of 1937 the MTS had a fleet of 365,800 tractors, roughly 129 thousand harvester combines and 60,300 lorries. The MTS were operating on 91.2 per cent of the sown area of the collective farms (compared to 58.7 per cent in 1933). The number of machines in the state agricultural enterprises—sovkhozes—rose substantially. There were now 85 thousand tractors, 26,600 harvester combines and 30,600 automobiles in the possession of these state farms. The transition by agriculture to a new technological base was now in the whole accomplished.

The material and production base of the collective farms was greatly expanded. Their capital investments trebled as compared with the First Five-Year Plan period.

The measures taken to improve the organisational and technical facilities of the collective and state farms and to consolidate them economically and politically ensured the fulfilment of the targets of the five-year plan for the output of a number of agricultural products. Gross agricultural production in 1937 was one-third higher than in 1913.

Thus, as early as the Second Five-Year Plan the fledgling system of socialist agriculture registered outputs higher than had the peasant petty commodity economy. The production of industrial crops made striking gains.

Massive resources and immense effort on the part of the people were required to build a modern industry, transform agriculture along socialist lines, turn a backward country into a major industrial power overnight and bolster its defence capacities. With true awareness of its tasks and responsibilities

the Soviet people endured the temporary sacrifices and limitations. But even in these years serious economic success already yielded tangible benefits for the people. The national income of the USSR more than doubled, the wage fund for workers and employees grew 2.5 times, and the collective-farm monetary income more than trebled.

The upsurge in agriculture and light industry put an end to the rationing of bread and other products in 1934-1935. The centralised rationed distribution was replaced by wide-scale Soviet state trade. This led to broad improvements in the country's economy and a more adequate satisfaction of the requirements of the working people. The Soviet Government systematically lowered prices on consumer goods. In 1937 the wages of the lower paid categories of industrial and transport workers and employees were upgraded. As the years passed the social fund steadily grew, to be expended on education, health care, the maintenance of children's institutions, resorts and sanatoria, and on the communal and city budgets.

New cities such as Magnitogorsk, Komsomolsk, Kirovsk sprung up and expanded during the Second Five-Year Plan. Urban renewal projects were implemented in many old cities—and notably in Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union. In 1935 in this city the first two subway lines were opened. Residential construction proceeded on a large scale and new, well-planned workers' settlements were built. Life improved steadily for the Soviet citizen.

The socialist transformation of society would have been inconceivable without profound changes in the spiritual life of the people, changes which Lenin defined as the cultural revolution.

In the sphere of culture Soviet power inherited a dismal situation from the days of tsarism. The gap between the achievements of civilisation and the

cultural level of the people had reached monstrous proportions. In pre-revolutionary Russia only one-fifth of the population could read and write. Almost 80 per cent of the citizenry were illiterate. For a population of 160 million there were only 124 thousand schools and 14 thousand libraries.

From the outset the Soviet authorities took resolute steps to overcome this cultural backwardness. First in order of priorities was the eradication of illiteracy and the ensuring of educational opportunities for the entire younger generation. The government shouldered all the basic expenditures required to carry out this enormous and costly task. The progressive sector of the intelligentsia offered substantial aid on a voluntary basis. During the first three years of Soviet power (1917-1920) seven million people were taught how to read and write. However decisive progress in the liquidation of illiteracy was to be achieved only with the introduction of the five-year plans.

With the beginning of the 1930s elementary education was declared compulsory. All instruction in the educational system was to be given free of cost. During the Second Five-Year Plan period a seven-year course of universal and compulsory instruction was implemented in the cities and to a large extent in the countryside. In the interval 1933-1937 alone 3,670 new schools were built in the cities and workers' settlements. More than 15 thousand schools were opened in rural regions. Over a million teachers were engaged in the Soviet school system. According to the 1939 census 90 per cent of the population were literate. The task of eradicating illiteracy had been virtually solved. The overwhelming majority of the population had access to knowledge and could actively participate in the country's political and public life.

A major advance in the cultural revolution was the creation of a Soviet socialist intelligentsia. Three

streams fed this process. First, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government took broad measures to attract to its side and re-educate segments of the old bourgeois intelligentsia during the building of socialism. Second, the best representatives of the working class were encouraged to take up positions of responsibility in the network of governmental institutions as well as engineering and technical posts. Third, Soviet higher educational establishments and special secondary schools were opened and specialists trained.

In the main the process of forming a Soviet intelligentsia was completed during the Second Five-Year Plan period. The bulk of tsarist Russia's intelligentsia of the old school had with finality taken up the position of the working class and socialism and actively joined in the economic and cultural tasks of building socialism. The broad opportunities for applying one's knowledge and talents, the enthusiasm of the people, the concern and attentive attitude of the party and the government turned the former bourgeois scholars and specialists into advocates of a firm alliance between science and the masses.

Such outstanding scholars and engineers as N. Zelinsky, N. Kurnakov, A. Favorsky, I. Alexandrov, G. Graftio, Y. Paton, I. Gubkin, I. Bardin, A. Vinter and many others became leaders of construction projects, enterprises and institutes.

Alongside these old cadres men and women of working-class and peasant origin joined the Soviet intelligentsia in ever growing numbers. The basic source of training for the new intelligentsia was the Soviet higher school. Before the revolution only 16 cities had institutes of higher learning, but by 1939 the number of such cities had grown to 140. There were 700 higher educational establishments of different types with an enrolment of 542 thousand in 1937. During the Second Five-Year Plan period

institutions of higher learning and secondary specialised schools graduated approximately one million specialists. Women made up 43.1 per cent of the enrolment in the institutions of higher learning.

At the outset of 1937 the Soviet intelligentsia numbered about 10 million men and women, of whom 80 per cent were working people, drawn to mental labour during the Soviet period. "Our culture," observed the renowned Soviet writer Gorky, "is being built by a remarkably gifted people—former hired labourers, workers of both sexes, past masters of their job already. They represent the flesh and blood of their own class." Graduates of Soviet higher educational establishments such as N. Dubinin, I. Kurchatov, S. Korolev, A. Kolmogorov, M. Keldysh, L. Landau, A. Nesmeyanov, S. Sobolev, I. Petrovsky, I. Tevosyan and many others became outstanding scholars, designers and engineers.

Science made substantial gains. The network of scientific-research institutions grew as their material base was reinforced and organisational forms streamlined. The Academy of Sciences substantially broadened its activities. New Academy institutes were established and the number of their personnel reached 10 thousand during the second half of the 1930s (compared to 1,055 in 1925). By the close of the Second Five-Year Plan there were some 1,800 research institutions in the country. The army of scientific personnel swelled to roughly 100 thousand members.

As Soviet science rapidly progressed it swung sharply to move closer to practice and the tasks involved in economic and cultural construction. Soviet physics was successfully engaged in work on problems of major theoretical and practical importance. As early as the 1930s it turned its attention to the most important areas of modern physics (the

study of the atom, cosmic rays). Chemistry focused on problems concerned with industry and agriculture. Geology made major contributions to the study and exploitation of the country's natural resources. Biology, mathematics and other sciences made major strides forward.

The social sciences (philosophy, law, history) did not lag behind the progress made in the natural and technical sciences.

Notable changes took place in literature and art during the second half of the 1930s. Such changes were characterised, above all, by the ideological maturation of the creative intelligentsia, the consolidation of its forces, and its growing role in society. New themes, reflecting the processes underlying the revolutionary transformation of society, became more prominent in art and literature.

Soviet literature was enriched by a number of new works such as the *Life of Klim Samgin* by Maxim Gorky, *The Ordeal* and *Peter I* by Alexei Tolstoy, *And Quiet Flows the Don* by Mikhail Sholokhov, *How the Steel Was Tempered* by Nikolai Ostrovsky.

Soviet theatre made major advances, infused by the work of such producers as Stanislavsky, Nemirovich-Danchenko, Zavadsky, Okhlopkov and others, and by such actors as Moskvina, Kachalov, Khmelev, Tarasova, Yablochkina, Pashennaya. The leading lights of the Soviet screen: Sergei Eisenstein, Pudovkin, Romm and the Vasilyev brothers produced a number of films remarkable for their ideological content and striking artistic merit. We note *Potjomkin*, *Chapayev*, *Lenin in October*, *Baltic Deputy*, *We From Kronstadt*, among these.

The fine arts experienced a major upsurge. Significant works were produced in the fields of monumental and portrait sculpture. Historical canvases and book illustrations of note were created. Music too had its outstanding figures—Shos-

takovich, Prokofyev, Kabalevsky, Dunayevsky, Shaporin, and Myaskovsky.

Amateur artistic endeavours on the part of the working people kept pace with the development of professional art. Amateur groups performed in cultural centres, clubs, factories and collective farms. There were annual competitions of amateur groups. The victory of socialism opened up broad vistas for creative activity and for an upsurge in multi-national Soviet literature and art.

During the cultural revolution there took place fundamental changes in the way of life of the urban and rural population. Such a fundamental reorientation was made possible by changes in work conditions and in the nature of work itself, by upgrading the standard of living, improvements in housing conditions and health care, by the creation of a wide network of cultural institutions (clubs, reading-rooms, libraries, museums, cinemas and theatres) and the encouragement of amateur groups, and by the sponsorship of physical culture and sports activities.

The victory of socialism fundamentally resolved the question of women's emancipation. Women now enjoyed equal rights with men, and participated on an equal level in social production. In 1937 approximately 10 million women were engaged in all branches of the economy. They composed 40 per cent of the industrial labour force, and a large proportion of the Soviet intelligentsia. This led to progressive changes in the structure of the family.

The decisive progress in the cultural revolution and the cultural advances made by the population were a component part of the establishment and victory of socialism.

The revolutionary break with the old social relations fundamentally altered the life of the Soviet people and created the preconditions for the formation of the new man with a new world outlook and

moral code. Everywhere, in all activities directed at the building of socialism the people demonstrated heroism and courage as well as a high level of consciousness.

The entire world watched with bated breath the heroic feat of the crew of the Soviet ship *Chelyuskin* which in 1934 broke up in the ice of the Chukotka Sea. One hundred and four crew members were stranded on an ice-floe. For two months they lived and worked in a camp on the ice, every day facing potentially fatal dangers. In April 1934 all of the crew members were lifted from the ice by plane and flown home. On April 16, 1934, a resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR established the honorary title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the highest level of excellence. The first recipients of this title were the seven pilots who had taken part in the rescue operations which saved the *Chelyuskin* crew.

An entire series of heroic feats by Soviet people followed this deed that amazed the world. Among the pilots who participated in the *Chelyuskin* rescue operation was M. V. Vodopyanov. Hero of the Soviet Union Vodopyanov was the commander of the first aircraft to land on the ice near the North Pole (in May 1937). Soviet planes dropped an expedition—made up of I. Papanin, Y. Fedorov, P. Shirshov and E. Krenkel—on the ice, to draft in the polar sea for a stretch of nine months. The expedition had scarcely settled in on the ice when over it winged a Soviet plane piloted by Chkalov, Baidukov and Belyakov on the first non-stop flight from Moscow to the USA.

How many times during those years was the world astonished! How often one heard the exclamations: "Amazing! Unbelievable!" The heroic feats of Gromov and his crew, of Fedoseyenko, Vasenko and Usyskin, the first to fly in the stratosphere to a height of 22 kilometres, of the women pilots

Grizodubova, Osipenko, Raskova, who flew from Moscow to the Far East, of the crew of the *Georgi Sedov* who fought against the icy wilderness for two years—these deeds demonstrated to the whole world the nature of the new socialist man.

In 1936-1937 a stage of the utmost importance in the history of the Communist Party and the entire Soviet Union was brought to completion. As a result of a twenty-year effort marked by creative activity and unrelenting struggle with the forces and traditions of the old world socialist society had been essentially built in the Soviet Union. The transitional period from capitalism to socialism initiated by the Great October Revolution was consummated by the triumph of socialism in the USSR.

The creation of a large-scale socialist system of production exercising complete domination signified that the causes giving rise to exploitation had been completely eradicated in the Soviet Union. There were no more capitalists, landowners or kulaks. There remained in the USSR the working class, the collective-farm peasantry and the people's intelligentsia. But even they underwent fundamental changes as a result of the victory of socialism.

The working class in the USSR was no longer a proletariat in the proper sense of the word—that is, a class of the dispossessed. The working class was the leading class in society, its guiding force. Fully liberated from exploitation, the working class of the Soviet Union had grown numerically and significantly enhanced its level of political, ideological, cultural and technological awareness.

The peasantry, with the victory of collectivisation in the USSR, was transformed from a class of small holders into a new socialist class, also free of all forms of exploitation. The former poor and middle peasants and hired labourers, having joined the collective farms, now formed the kolkhoz peasantry. It was not a miserly strip of land but rather a

large-scale mechanised collective economy which governed the labour and way of life of this class. The kolkhoz peasantry made up 58 per cent of the population of the Soviet Union; individual holders only 6 per cent.

The character of the intelligentsia was fundamentally altered. Having emerged in the main from the people and maintaining firm bonds with the people, the intelligentsia together with the workers and peasantry had only interests in common. This was a truly people's intelligentsia.

The victory of socialism also signified fundamental changes in the profile of all the peoples making up the Soviet multi-national state. The USSR represented a community of socialist nations joined by common interests and the ideology of proletarian internationalism and socialism.

The decisive victories of socialism and the creation of a new social system required legislative consolidation. The Constitution of the RSFSR (1918) and the Constitution of the USSR (1924) had reflected the balance of forces in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism and did not conform with the new victories of the Soviet people. The Seventh All-Union Congress of Soviets in 1935 resolved to re-examine the Constitution. A constitutional commission was elected. This commission prepared the draft of a new constitution which was published on June 12, 1936. Nation-wide discussion of this draft lasted for five and a half months, with over half of the country's adult population taking part. From day to day in the press and at meetings Soviet people expressed their opinions and introduced corrections and proposals. In all, almost two million corrections, supplements and proposals were submitted.

On December 5, 1936, the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the USSR unanimously approved the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of



the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Constitution gave form to and consolidated the economic and political foundations of the Soviet state as a socialist state of workers and peasants.

The economic foundation of the USSR, according to the Constitution, is the socialist system of economy and socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production. All power in the USSR is vested in the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

When the first Constitution had been adopted there still remained in the country remnants of the exploitative classes. Therefore that Constitution disfranchised those people employing hired labour, former whiteguards and the clergy. Thus suffrage was not universal. For the same reasons elections were not secret nor direct, but rather open and indirect. At that time the bulk of the peasantry cultivated individual plots and lacked the necessary level of consciousness. Therefore the electoral system was designed to offer the working class a larger number of positions of authority. The elections were, consequently, unequal.

Now the time had arrived to remove these restrictive measures and implement a consistent democratism in the electoral system—universal, equal and direct by secret ballot—to apply equally for men and women, who in the USSR enjoy the same rights in all spheres of production and public activity.

The Constitution guaranteed all citizens of the USSR the right to work, to rest and leisure, to education, to material support in old age and also in case of sickness or disability. The freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly was also guaranteed by law.

The victory of socialism in the USSR demonstrated that the Leninist programme for the building

of a new society was scientifically grounded. The leading force ensuring the victory of socialism in the USSR was the Communist Party which in all its actions drew support from the indissoluble union of the working class and the peasantry.

The full-scale building of socialism took place in a complex international setting. The thunderclouds of war were thickening over the world.

The acceleration of war preparations in Germany, Italy and Japan intensified the threat to peace and to the security of nations. The build-up of military strength was particularly intensive in Germany. On October 19, 1933, Germany withdrew from the League of Nations, participation in which had somehow or the other fettered the actions of the nazis. The military articles of the Versailles Peace Treaty were violated, scorned as mere paper. In March 1935 the Hitlerite Government officially introduced universal military conscription to expedite the creation of a standing army of 500 thousand men. This government made no effort to conceal its pursuit of the arms race in the effort to establish the most formidable war machine in the world.

While nazi Germany was the foremost military threat in Europe, the same role was taken up by Japanese militarism in the Far East. Having occupied the North-eastern regions of China, Japan then began preparations for new military adventures. Its plans included a major expansion at the expense of China and other Asian countries. However, Japanese militarists regarded the Soviet Union as their major enemy.

Expansionist plans were also nurtured by fascist Italy. Mussolini's government dreamt of turning the Mediterranean Sea into an "Italian lake", of the rebirth of Italy and expansion to the frontiers of the Roman Empire at its height. Among its immediate goals was the seizure of territories in East Africa, and, above all, in Ethiopia (Abyssinia).

Thus Hitlerite Germany, fascist Italy and militaristic Japan openly expressed their territorial claims, which threatened the independence of the peoples of Europe and Asia.

These states justified their aggressive policies with the necessity of "fighting with world communism". Hitler convinced the ambassadors of the foreign powers that he was prepared to guarantee the boundaries of all Germany's neighbouring states with the exception of the USSR. His promises to turn his weapons East, against the Soviet Union, hypnotised the governments of the Western nations, which were counting on using nazi Germany as a strike force against socialism and the workers' movement in the European countries. Consequently no effective measures were undertaken to bridle the aggressor.

Portents of war confronted the world. Throughout the world people followed events with trepidation and demonstrated against war and the aggressive policies of the fascist states. The ruling circles of the West European countries could not wholly ignore the demands of the masses, accordingly British and French political leaders proclaimed as the goal of foreign policy the avoidance of war through appeasement of the aggressor. But in substance such a policy, as subsequent events were to show, only encouraged the aggressive urges of the fascist states.

In these complex international circumstances the Soviet Government stepped forth as the initiator in the creation of a system of collective security intended as a reliable defence against aggression.

On September 15, 1934, 30 members of the League of Nations invited the Soviet Union to join the League. The Soviet Government responded affirmatively. Three days later an overwhelming majority in the Assembly of the League accepted

the USSR and offered it, as a Great Power, a permanent seat in the Council. The Soviet Union strove to turn this international organisation into a factor for the consolidation of peace.

The Soviet Government demonstrated its willingness to co-operate with other states in the effort to restrain the fascist aggressors. In 1935 the USSR concluded Treaties of Mutual Aid with France and Czechoslovakia. These agreements established the preconditions for the creation of a viable system of international collective security, for checking aggression in Central and Eastern Europe.

The world situation continued to grow tenser. In October 1935 the Italian army invaded Ethiopia without a declaration of war. In March 1936 nazi Germany sent its troops into the demilitarised Rhine region.

In summer the German and Italian governments interfered in the internal affairs of Spain by offering support to the Franco-led fascist uprising against the Republican Government of the Popular Front. Soon this interference took the form of open armed intervention. This was a "trial run" before the outbreak of full-scale war. The Spanish Republic spilled its blood under the blows of the German and Italian interventionists. However the Western powers maintained a position of "non-interference" in Spanish affairs. As a result the legitimate Spanish Republican Government was overthrown and power seized by a fascist clique.

The joint intervention in Spain prompted the formation of a German-Italian bloc. On October 25, 1936, a military-political alliance between Germany and Italy was concluded in Berlin, known as the Berlin-Rome Axis. A month later the German and Japanese imperialists concluded the notorious "anti-Comintern pact". Under the flag of struggle against world communism the aggressive bloc pursued its goal of crushing the forces of peace and democracy

as well as establishing world dominance. At a later date Italy joined the "anti-Comintern pact".

Thus, a consequence of the "appeasement" policy of the Western powers was the creation of a tense international situation, fraught with the danger of a new world war.

The policies pursued by Britain, France and the United States of America resulted in the carrying out by the fascist states, with complete impunity, of one aggressive act after another. In 1938 the Hitlerites occupied Austria and incorporated her within the German Empire. This was followed by the scandalous Munich. Encouraging fascist aggression in Europe, the French and British governments resorted to a deal with the aggressors. In October 1938 Chamberlain and Daladier, the Prime Ministers of Britain and France respectively, agreed with Hitler and Mussolini at Munich upon the partition of Czechoslovakia and the transfer of part of her territories to Germany. The Munich agreement completely freed the hands of the aggressors, creating a very tense situation on the Western frontiers of the Soviet Union. Only worsening matters were the openly anti-Soviet policies pursued by the governments of bourgeois-landowner Poland and boyar Rumania, the two largest states on the Western frontier of the Soviet Union.

In the East the situation was also strained. Militarist Japan continued to expand the aggressive war in China. Taking advantage of the tense situation in Europe, the Japanese military clique initiated a number of provocative acts against the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1938 a large Japanese military force invaded the territory of the Soviet Union near Lake Khasan, but was defeated after a number of deadly battles. However this did not teach the Japanese military clique a lesson. In May 1939 a major Japanese force invaded the territories of the Mongolian People's Republic. The

Japanese Command intended to occupy the MPR and use it as a strike base against the Soviet Union, simultaneously cutting off the Trans-Siberian Railway. Faithful to its obligations, the Soviet Union immediately rushed to the aid of the Mongolian People's Republic. Bitter fighting broke out in the region of the Khalkhin-Gol River and the Buir-Nur Lake. Each side sent in sizeable forces, including tank units. Fighting continued until August 1939, when the Soviet and Mongolian forces succeeded in driving the units of the Kwantung Army beyond the borders of the MPR.

From 1939 the aggressive fascist states made no bones of their intent to unleash war. In the spring of that year the Hitlerites flouted the Munich agreement by occupying Czechoslovakia. In March 1939 they wrested the port of Klaipeda and a sizeable amount of territory adjoining it from Lithuania. In April 1939 fascist Italy attacked and occupied Albania. The fascist ringleaders regarded these aggressive actions against the European states as preparatory measures for a blow against the Soviet Union.

As the threat of war loomed more and more ominously, the Soviet Union was consistent and resolute in its defence of peace. The efforts of Soviet foreign policy were directed at warding off war, bridling the aggressors and establishing an international system of collective security. The Soviet Union did all in its power to bring together the democratic forces of the peaceful states in their struggle against the danger of war.

The Soviet Union actively aided the Republican Government and the people of Spain in their fight against the Italian and German aggressors. When as a result of the Munich pact the Western allies gave away Czechoslovakia to be plundered by the Nazi invaders the Soviet Union offered direct military aid to that country in its struggle against Germany. The

Soviet Government was prepared to provide military support even if France revoked her treaty obligations. But the ruling circles in Czechoslovakia rejected the aid of the Soviet Union and condemned the country to fascist enslavement.

Under pressure from domestic public opinion, discontented with the policy of encouraging aggression, the governments of Britain and France resorted to diplomatic manoeuvres, declaring that they were not prepared to co-operate with the Soviet Union. The latter expressed its willingness to begin negotiations towards the conclusion of a mutual aid treaty and the determination of specific measures to ward off aggression. It delegated its most authoritative representatives to conduct such negotiations. The Soviet delegation included Voroshilov—People's Commissar of Defence and member of the Politbureau of the Party Central Committee, Zhdanov—Secretary of the Party Central Committee, Shaposhnikov—Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. The governments of Britain and France, while formally agreeing to such negotiations, did everything in their power to disrupt them. The members of the Anglo-French military delegation embarked for the Soviet Union by sea on an antiquated ship. It had already been learned in Moscow that the delegation did not possess the authority to conclude the corresponding agreement. Further, it was made known during the negotiations that the governments of Britain and France were determined to receive from the USSR unilateral guarantees without themselves providing any essential commitments to the Soviet Union.

The progress of these negotiations convincingly demonstrated that the governments of Britain and France had no intent of concluding a serious agreement with the Soviet Union. At the same time the British Government began secret talks with Germany, ascribing great importance to them. The

previously signed Anglo-German and Franco-German declarations were, in substance, non-aggression pacts between Britain, France and Germany. It was clear that the governments of Britain and France were trying to come to an arrangement with Germany and prod her into a war with the Soviet Union.

Given the circumstances, the Soviet Government was forced to take measures to avoid international isolation and to ensure its security.

Earlier it had several times declined German proposals to negotiate the signing of a non-aggression treaty, hoping rather to reach an agreement with Britain and France and provide for an effective system of collective security in Europe. However the blatant reluctance of the governments of these countries to conclude treaties of mutual aid with the USSR, coupled with their efforts to come to an agreement with Germany at the expense of the Soviet Union, forced the Soviet Government to accept the German proposal. On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression pact was concluded between the USSR and Germany in Moscow.

The Soviet Government was quite aware of the perfidiousness of the nazis and the fragility of the pact, but it also recognised that in the circumstances there was no other way of avoiding war in what were obviously unfavourable conditions. This was a wise step calculated on gaining time and postponing conflict with nazi Germany.

The designs of the Western politicians had gone awry. On September 1, 1939, the nazi troops swept across the Polish Western borders. Britain and France were forced to declare war against Germany. World War II began with a clash between the capitalist powers rather than with an attack against the USSR as the Western politicians had desired.

Within two weeks the Polish forces were defeated. The government fled Warsaw and the nazi

armies continued to drive to the East. The Soviet Union could not permit the seizure of Western Ukraine and of Western Byelorussia, the people of which had been forcibly separated from their blood-brothers in the USSR. The Soviet Union could not allow the approach of the nazis to the vitally important nerve centres of the country. On September 17, 1939, the Red Army, on the orders of its Command, entered Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, blocking the path of the aggressors.

While a "phoney war" proceeded in the West, the USSR created an "Eastern front" against nazism, a front stretching from the Baltic to the shores of the Black Sea. The peoples of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Western Ukraine, Western Byelorussia, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina voluntarily joined the USSR.

The Soviet Union did not spare its efforts or resources to enhance the country's defensive capacities. It was necessary to temporarily extend the working day from 6-7 hours to 8 hours.

In 1935-1937 a sweeping programme for the accelerated development of a modern artillery, tank, air and navy force was worked out and put into operation. Recognising the threat of a new world war by virtue of the growing menace of fascist aggression, the Soviet Union was obliged to allocate substantial resources to the production of modern military equipment, the establishment of the necessary reserves of troops and supplies, the increased fortification of its frontier regions and the organisational and technical measures in the army and navy. By 1935 Soviet military aviation had grown fourfold over 1931, the number of medium tanks had increased 8-fold, of submarines 5-fold and of patrol boats—11-fold. During the second half of the Five-Year Plan the defence might of the country was further strengthened. Due to the worsening of

the international situation, budget expenses allocated to the Commissariat of Defence were increased to 17,500 million rubles in 1937, instead of the originally planned 4,300 million rubles. Consequently a portion of those resources originally earmarked for light industry was transferred to meet the needs of the defence industry.

The production capacity of the defence industry rose sharply in the interval 1938-1941. During 1939 output in this sector increased by nearly 50 per cent and in 1940 by more than 33 per cent. The mobilisation of supplies and state reserves was stepped up during this period. By the summer of 1941 the Soviet Union had at its disposal a powerful military-industrial base, capable of meeting the needs of the army and navy in the event of war.

Under the threat of aggression against the USSR, the deployment of all branches of the armed services was begun in 1939 and the structure of the armed forces improved. The number of infantry divisions alone more than doubled by 1941. By the middle of 1941 the army and navy had grown to more than five million troops, an increase of 180 per cent as compared with 1939. Although certain questions connected with the country's defence were not fully solved during these years, on the whole the Soviet state now had available the powerful military force necessary for the defence of the country.

## Chapter IX

### THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

As the dawn broke on June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany treacherously and without warning attacked the Soviet Union. The country was confronted with the gravest threat. In the war that had broken out the fate of the Soviet state was at stake—would the peoples of the Soviet Union remain free or be enslaved.

The war began under conditions extremely favourable for the enemy. He had thoroughly prepared for the invasion and held a number of important advantages. The entire might of the Nazi military machine: 190 divisions, including 35 Panzer and motorised, supported by a powerful air force, was hurled against the Soviet Union. Hitler mobilised for the effort 5,500 thousand officers and soldiers, almost 5 thousand aircraft, 2,800 tanks (excluding light tanks) and more than 48 thousand guns and mortars. The enormous invasion army had two years of battle experience in operations in Europe. It had taken only 19 days for the Nazi army to seize Holland and Belgium. Slightly more than 40 days were required to force the capitulation of France and rout the British expeditionary army. Almost all of Europe had been enslaved by the Nazi aggressors.

Long before the assault against the USSR Nazi Germany had put her economy on a war footing. Through the merciless exploitation of the occupied countries the Nazis utilised the industrial potential of nearly all of Europe to provide their army with military equipment, supplies and munitions. The material resources seized by the Nazis by 1941 amounted to the equivalent of 9,000 million pounds sterling, a figure twice that of the annual gross national income of Germany before the war. The Nazis could free substantial human reserves to swell the ranks of the army at the expense of the forcible conscription of workers in the conquered countries to work in German military enterprises. More than 10 million workers were removed from the European countries to Germany.

These factors turned Nazi Germany into the militarily most powerful country in the capitalist world and instilled the Hitlerites with confidence in their ability to defeat the Soviet Union with a powerful blitzkrieg invasion. At a conference in Berghof of June 31, 1940, Hitler declared: "The sooner Russia is crushed, the better. Attack achieves its purpose only if the Russian state can be shattered to its roots with one blow." The idea of blitzkrieg, or "lightning war", formed the core of the plan of attack against the Soviet Union. This plan, worked out by the General Staff and given the name Operation Barbarossa, was signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940.

The enemy intended, through the rapid seizure of the country's industrial and agricultural regions, to paralyse the economy and undermine the military and industrial potential of the USSR. The Nazis counted on the instability of the Soviet system and hoped that the initial successes of their army would bring in succession a rupture of the union of the working class and peasantry and of the bonds of friendship among the peoples of the USSR as well as



destroy the authority enjoyed by the Communist Party with the people. Placing their bets on the brevity of the military campaign in Russia, they were convinced that the Soviet Union would stand alone in this war.

Confident of the rapid achievement of their goals in Russia, the nazi leaders laid out further plans for the winning of world dominance. The official diary of the High Command of the German Armed Forces includes a note dated February 17, 1941: "After the conclusion of the Eastern campaign we must work through a plan for the seizure of Afghanistan and the organisation of an invasion of India." Other documents contained concrete plans for the seizure in the autumn of 1941 of Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and the Suez Canal.

The treacherous invasion by nazi Germany stirred up the entire Soviet people. The perfidiousness, cruelty, barbarity and inhumanity of the enemy neither frightened nor demoralised the people. They were ready to answer blow with blow. Recognising their patriotic duty and not waiting to be called up they voluntarily requested to be sent to the front at the first opportunity in the ranks of the standing army. One of the active forms of participation in the armed struggle was the people's volunteer corps. Its ranks were swelled by enlistees who were not subject to conscription but wanted to fight the enemy. Together with the workers and collective farmers in the people's volunteer corps the intelligentsia and student youth were also widely represented. In 1941 the people's volunteer corps gave the front 24 divisions with more than two million soldiers.

The sudden attack by the nazis placed the country in most difficult circumstances. The nazi troops, having in the direction of their main thrusts a preponderance of 3-5:1 in manpower and of 3:1 in guns and mortars as well as absolute superiority in

tanks and aircraft, overcame the stubborn resistance of the Soviet Army to penetrate deep into Soviet territory. During the first and most difficult months of the war the Soviet people had suffered both failure and defeat.

The advances of the enemy did not yet indicate that the resistance of the Soviet troops had been broken. Many units courageously repulsed the attacks of the enemy troops. Launching counter-thrusts in the border regions of Byelorussia and the Ukraine, tank units continued to operate along the line of the South-western Front until June 29. Desperate battles were waged on land and in the air. The unequal struggle with the advancing enemy did not destroy the militant spirit of the Soviet troops. The enemy gained control of the air and every Soviet pilot knew that he would have to combat several aircraft simultaneously. Often, having used up his entire supply of ammunition, the Soviet pilot rammed the enemy. Damaged by an enemy shell, a crew under N. Gastello crashed their flaming plane into a column of German tanks and blew up together with this column. Such examples of heroism could be related endlessly.

Many units remaining behind enemy lines continued to struggle with the foe. The garrison of the Brest Fortress under Major P. Gavrillov, Captain I. Zubachev, Commissar Y. Fomin won eternal praise for their heroism. These courageous defenders of Brest pinned down an enemy division for an entire month. Resistance ended only when not a single surviving soldier remained. The defence of Liepaja (Libava) lasted ten days, that of the Rava-Russky fortified region almost a week. Peremyshl was taken by the enemy only after a number of bitter battles.

The losses suffered by the Soviet troops reduced the fighting strength on the front lines. Faced with the overwhelming superiority of the foe, they retreated. But the fortitude of the Soviet soldiers

and their willingness to stand up against the enemy had not been broken.

The multi-million nazi German army had never before encountered a force capable of withstanding its assaults. Its blows had smashed one West European state after another. It seemed that nothing could stop the fascist military machine. But the Soviet people and their army did.

The forced retreat of the Soviet troops was accompanied by heavy battles along the entire length of the Soviet-German front. This exhausted the enemy and sapped the strength of his army, which suffered heavy losses in both manpower and weaponry. The pace of advance was slowed down.

For the first time the enemy experienced the force of resistance put up by a country defending itself. In July Soviet troops succeeded in inflicting serious defeats upon the enemy in a number of sectors. As an offshot in August the nazi Command lacked the men and resources for a simultaneous offensive on all strategic directions. The Soviet Command continued to build up the strength of its defences and to draw up reserves from the rear of the country.

The retreating Soviet forces had suffered heavy casualties. The Soviet Union had lost strategic economic regions, and the danger was more and more menacing. But the pace of the nazi offensive was consistently decelerating. When the fascist troops reached Smolensk they were met by new Soviet armies which had moved up from the rear. The battle at Smolensk marked the beginning of the protracted and bloody mauling away of the nazi divisions.

The desperate battle in the vicinity of Smolensk in which Soviet troops initiated a number of powerful counter-thrusts continued from July until the end of September 1941. The German Field-Marshal von Bock, Commander of Army Group Centre, lost

more than 100 thousand of his best soldiers at Smolensk.

The fascist troops, encountering stubborn resistance in the area of Luga, were unable to force the defences in the Leningrad direction, and met a strong counter-attack in the area of Lake Ilmen. To respond to this blow the nazi Command was forced to rush up troops from the central line of advance. It was forced to delay the advance on Leningrad by a month. Later, having forced their way to the city itself, the German forces could nevertheless not link up with the Finnish units. The unprecedented defence of Leningrad lasted 900 days. The population of the city bravely endured the terrible deprivations caused by the blockade, and ignored the continuous bombardments of artillery and air attacks to continue their work and supply the front with weaponry and ammunition. One hundred and sixty thousand Leningraders enlisted in the people's volunteer corps. The nazis could not in the end take Leningrad.

The defence of Kiev, the capital of the Soviet Ukraine, lasted more than two months. From August 10 to October 16, 1941, Soviet troops defended Odessa. Approximately 110 thousand officers and soldiers and large amounts of arms and equipment were lost by the foe in the battles for this city. The nazis suffered even heavier losses in their capture of Sevastopol, whose defenders stood their ground for 250 days.

It was at Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, Sevastopol, in the fields near Smolensk that the Soviet soldiers disrupted the adventuristic plans for a "lightning war". The nazi generals were now confronted with the real eventuality of a winter campaign for which the German troops were not prepared.

In the highly difficult conditions marking the first weeks of war the Central Committee of the Communist Party was the true organiser and

inspirer of the struggle against the fascist aggressors. The courage, unrelenting will and keen insight displayed by the Central Committee spurred the army on in its unexampled resistance to the superior forces of the enemy. It cemented the titanic efforts of the people in the organisation of defence, mustering of reserves for the front, in the consolidation of the rear and in the step-up of military production.

It seemed that the situation was hopeless. This arduous war demanded immediate increments in the production of metals, arms, ammunition and other materiel and the rapid mobilisation of the country's entire economic potential. This all after the Nazi aggressors had succeeded in occupying the country's highly developed industrial and agricultural regions—the major military and industrial base of the Soviet Union! Before the war these regions produced 60-70 per cent of the country's iron, steel, and ferrous metals, as well as a large proportion of its weapons, arms and ammunition. This territory produced up to 40 per cent of the country's grain, 40 per cent of its beef and 60 per cent of its pork.

The Party Central Committee understood the gravity and perilousness of the situation, but, having carefully weighed the various possibilities, it confidently told the people that it did not consider the country's position hopeless. On August 16, 1941, the Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government adopted a military and economic plan for the fourth quarter of 1941 and for 1942. The plan included a sweeping programme for the development of all sectors of military production in the east of the country, for the removal to that region of a large group of industrial enterprises and for the evacuation to the rear of livestock, machinery and grain reserves.

This plan reflected striking audacity and unwavering confidence in the coming victory over the enemy

as well as limitless faith in the strength, fortitude, courage and reason of the Soviet people. It dealt with everything with precision and scrupulousness. The immense scale of reconstruction and the brief interval allowed for its fulfilment were expressed in the dry columns of figures, in laconic instructions and measures which were to be the guideline for millions of working people and hundreds of thousands of public, state and party organisations.

The transfer of industrial enterprises from the western regions of the USSR to the Urals and Siberia, where hundreds of major industrial units had already been operationalised before the war, was carried out according to a highly detailed plan. The rolling-mills from Dnepropetrovsk, the aluminium and manganese factories from Zaporozhye, the machine-tool factory from Kiev, the turbine-construction and electrical engineering works from Kharkov, as well as the Kharkov Tractor Factory, the Zaporozhye Agricultural Machinery Works and the defence enterprises and unique installation of the hydropower station on the Dnieper—were all relocated to the East in the predetermined period. In three months more than 1,360 major enterprises were evacuated to the country's eastern regions. More than 1,500 thousand waggon coaches were required to transport workers, engineers and technicians as well as material valuables. The evacuation proceeded on the front and in regions close to the front, under the uninterrupted air attacks of the enemy. In the first five war months hostile aircraft carried out more than 6,000 sorties against the roads leading to the front and dropped 46,000 bombs on railway junctions, stations, bridges and echelons.

Recalling this heroic epoch, L. I. Brezhnev said:

"Actually, an entire industrial country was transported thousands of kilometres away. There, on uninhabited sites, often in the open air, machines

and lathes were put into operation, immediately after they had been taken off the flat-cars."

By the close of 1941 the relocated enterprises were producing more than in the pre-war period. The capacity of the defence industry grew rapidly and the output of quality steel, rolled metal and electric power climbed steadily. The first years of war demonstrated in all clarity the vital strength and superiority of the socialist economy.

The enormous casualties suffered by the nazi troops during the fighting on the Soviet-German front forced the German Command to reduce the offensive front and to move to the defensive in a number of sectors.

Hitler set as the main goal the capture of Moscow. The offensive in the direction of Moscow was regarded as the central and decisive one. The nazis believed that with the capture of Moscow they would win the capitulation of the Soviet Union. Precisely for this reason the nazi Command concentrated the main strike force of its armies on the Moscow offensive. Almost 80 divisions—more than one million soldiers, 14,500 guns and mortars and 1,700 tanks—made up the strike force hurled against Moscow. By the end of September all preparations had been completed. The operation was given the code-name Typhoon. Field-Marshal von Bock was vested with command over the troops destined for the capital. The conqueror of Paris was to be the conqueror of Moscow.

In an address to the troops on October 2, 1941, Hitler said: "In three and a half months the preliminaries have been completed for crushing the enemy with a powerful blow before the onset of winter. All preparations within the realm of human effort have been finished .... Today begins the last and decisive battle of the year." The nazi Command did not doubt that Typhoon would smash the Soviet lines and bring Germany victory.

To be sure, such hopes had been entertained by the nazi generals after the capture of Minsk and Smolensk as well. But events on the front forced these hopes to be transferred to the seizure of Kiev. But once again, Kiev was taken and the front did not collapse. Instead, resistance intensified. Again the time for the surrender of the Soviet Union was delayed. Operation Typhoon would finally bring victory. This would serve as a signal for Japan to mount an attack against the Soviet Union. The former had concentrated her troops on the Far Eastern frontier of the Soviet Union. The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin was assured by Hitler that Moscow would fall by October 12, 1941. The nazi generals promised their exhausted soldiers a long rest period in the comfort of Moscow apartments and Hitler boasted that on November 7—the revolutionary holiday of the peoples of the USSR celebrating the victory of the October Revolution—a nazi parade would be held in Red Square. In the autumn the nazis mounted their offensive, designed to squeeze Moscow in a giant pincers.

Progressive people throughout the world anxiously followed the Battle of Moscow. Would the nazis succeed in capturing the capital of the USSR? Were Hitler's armies really invincible as the nazi leaders boasted?

The Soviet troops ascribed great significance to this battle. They fought with unprecedented heroism for every foot of land and inflicted heavy losses on the foe.

The traditional festive gathering of November 6 and the Armed Forces parade in Red Square on November 7 served as an expression of the confidence of the Soviet leaders in the fate of their capital. During the parade Stalin addressed the marchers from the tribune of the Lenin Mausoleum: "The whole world is looking to you as the force capable of destroying the plundering hordes of

German invaders. The enslaved peoples of Europe who have fallen under the yoke of the German invaders look to you as their liberators. A great liberating mission has fallen to your lot. Be worthy of this mission! The war you are waging is a war of liberation, a just war." The troops participating in the parade moved directly to the front from Red Square. The decisive battles for the Soviet capital took shape.

The Soviet troops fought with unparalleled courage, dedication and tenacity. The phrase: "Russia is great, but there is no room for retreat — behind us is Moscow", gained currency. In fact, there was no retreat. The Soviet troops on the outskirts of Moscow were like a huge steel spring compressed to its limits. At that moment when the nazi army spent itself and was given the order to move to the defensive, when the nazi generals assumed that the Soviet forces lacked the strength to undertake a major operation, in Moscow an order was issued for the Western Front to counter-attack. The nazis were hurled back to the initial point of the offensive with losses of up to 500,000.

During December 1941 a major shift in the balance of forces on the front was achieved. The myth of the "invincibility" of the nazi army had been buried with finality in the snows in the outskirts of Moscow. The Battle of Moscow exerted a broad impact on the entire course of the war.

Under the blows of the Soviet troops the nazis were pushed far to the West. The front was breached along a wide stretch. In addition to the offensive near Moscow, Rostov and Tikhvin, Soviet troops in the winter of 1941-1942 carried out successful military actions in the Crimea and on the Southern and South-western fronts.

By the end of February 1942 Soviet forces had in places advanced 400 kilometers to the West and completely liberated Moscow and Tula regions as

well as a number of districts in Leningrad, Smolensk and Orlov regions.

The defeat of the nazi German troops near Moscow completely disrupted the plans for a "lightning war".

The Soviet victory bolstered the morale of the Soviet Army and inspired the troops with a firm confidence in the inevitability of a final victory over the enemy.

This victory had a great impact on the national liberation movement in the European countries under nazi occupation.

The Soviet Union did not remain in isolation in its struggle with nazi Germany. The interests of all freedom-loving peoples required a united effort in the struggle against fascist aggression. Hitler had set world dominance as his goal. All of mankind was threatened by this plague of brown shirts.

Thus, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the governments of Britain and the USA proclaimed that their countries would offer support to the USSR. This marked the beginning of the anti-Hitler coalition for a common struggle against fascist aggression. The Soviet Union had persistently worked for such a coalition in the period preceding World War II.

Between September 29 and October 1, 1941, a conference was held in Moscow of representatives of the US, British and Soviet governments. This conference worked out and adopted a plan for Anglo-American deliveries to the Soviet Union. The USSR in turn agreed to provide the USA and Britain with the necessary strategic raw materials.

The Allies delivered machinery and certain types of armaments to the Soviet Union. The Soviet people appreciate the aid rendered them during the trying war years by the peoples of the USA, Britain and Canada. It should be observed, however, that Lend-Lease aid did not exceed 4 per

cent of the war production of the USSR in this period.

The Soviet people cherish the memory of the feats of British and American sailors, who, with the support of the Soviet navy and aircraft, warding off attacks by enemy raiders, submarines and bombers, broke through to the Northern ports of the USSR and delivered military supplies. In the fierce battle for the external communication lines in the Barents and the North seas, Soviet ships and aircraft successfully co-operated with the forces of the Allied British Navy. While the Soviet Union shed its blood in the struggle with the enemy—an enemy threatening all of progressive mankind—the US and British governments had the opportunity to muster their forces, build up an invasion army and strike a blow at the nazis. The leaders of the USSR understood that the Allies needed a certain amount of time for the mobilisation of these forces. But the Soviet people counted on reciprocal understanding of the need to minimise this time by virtue of the arduous and bloody conflict on the Soviet-German front. During the negotiations among the Allies agreement was reached on the necessity of the creation of a Second Front in Europe in 1942.

Rebounding from the defeat near Moscow the fascist ringleaders decided to achieve victory over the Soviet Union by the rout of its armies in the south and the seizure of the southern fertile and oil-producing regions. Directive Number 41, signed by Hitler in April 1942, instructed his troops "utterly to destroy the forces remaining at the disposal of the Soviets and to deprive them to the extent possible of the most important military and economic centres". The nazis counted on seizing the Caucasus and cutting off the supply of Baku oil to the Soviet Union, on pushing to the Volga and subsequently mounting an offensive to the north-east for deep flanking movement round Moscow.

With the outset of spring 1942 a precarious military situation confronted the Soviet Union. The fact is that in 1942 there was no other country in the world carrying on such a wide military effort against the nazis. The Soviet troops fought against the fascist army in what amounted to a one-against-one combat. In this most difficult period of the war the Soviet Union single-handedly carried on the military and economic conflict with the enemy also because the US and British governments, despite their pledges, stymied the opening of a Second Front against nazi Germany in the West.

Because of the absence of a Second Front in Europe the nazi Command was able by the summer of 1942 to transfer substantial forces from Western Europe to the Soviet-German front. By this time there were 237 enemy divisions (excluding aircraft) concentrated against the Soviet troops. In North Africa, by contrast, there were 4 German and 11 Italian divisions in action against the British troops. Clearly the Allied operations in Africa had but local significance and resulted in no radical changes in the balance of forces between the sides. The nazi army still held predominance over the Soviet forces in terms of tanks and aircraft. This permitted the German Command to begin a new major offensive in the summer of 1942 in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. The enemy troops came out to Voronezh, forced the Don, and broke through to the Volga and the Caucasus. Stiff fighting erupted in the area of Stalingrad, which the nazis planned to take on the march.

Despite significant numerical superiority the nazis could not force their way into the city. At the approaches to Stalingrad Soviet troops stemmed the onslaught of the enemy and thus time was gained to build up the city's defences. The Soviet Military Command took measures to cover the lines of advance to Stalingrad. At the far entries to the city,



on the Don and at its big bend three reserve armies were deployed—the 63rd, 62nd and 64th.

At the cost of heavy casualties and taking advantage of their superiority in manpower and materiel, the fascist troops succeeded in forcing entry into the city in mid-September, where street-fighting became the order of the day. For 140 days and nights combat raged in the city itself. Despite fantastic casualties, the enemy only gained 3-5 kilometres in this period. In the middle of September a letter was found on the body of a German officer. It read: "We have but one kilometre left to reach the Volga, but we are unable to make it, the struggle for this kilometre is lasting longer than the war for all of France."

Stalingrad became a fortress-city, it became a front. A volunteer corps of workers fought side by side with the soldiers in its defence. With unbelievable cruelty the fascist soldiers threw grenades into the cellars of residential buildings where women, children and old people were living. In the captured districts the Hitlerites shot and hanged the remaining residents. They systematically and methodically destroyed the city by air attacks, artillery bombardments and incendiaries.

The city continued to fight although from appearances it was hard to believe that there remained anything alive within its confines. Indeed it was unbelievable. For every square kilometre occupied by Soviet troops an average of 100 thousand shells, mines and bombs were expended during the fighting. Iron simply melted in this inferno, but the Soviet people held firm to the end.

The former Nazi general, Kurt von Tippelskirch, was forced to admit that the Battle of Stalingrad became the virtual symbol of the struggle between the two opposing worlds. And so it was. The world of aggression and slavery collided with the world of communist ideals. The Soviet people, the Soviet

soldiers understood that their fate hung in the balance. All Soviet people were united by the three sacred words, the password and symbol of the day—Volga, Homeland, Victory.

The heroic city did not yield. The enemy failed in his goal. His offensive capacity was exhausted. In the desperate fighting around Stalingrad from June to November 1942 the foe had lost up to 700,000 officers and soldiers, more than 2,000 guns, over 1,000 tanks and 1,400 planes.

The Soviet Supreme Command, having evaluated the balance of forces between Nazi Germany and the USSR and the prevailing circumstances along the entire Soviet-German front, had as early as the autumn of 1942 produced a plan for a crushing counter-offensive near Stalingrad. On September 12-13 a meeting was assembled by the Chairman of the State Defence Committee, Stalin, in which the Deputy Supreme Commander, Zhukov, called back from the front near Stalingrad, and the Chief of the General Staff, Vasilevsky, participated. The meeting considered the one overriding question—the situation at Stalingrad and in the Northern Caucasus. It was decided to mount a major strategic operation aimed at encircling and defeating the enemy forces which had broken through to Stalingrad. November was set as the tentative date for carrying out this operation. Over the next two months a detailed plan for the Stalingrad offensive was worked out and strategic preparatory measures implemented.

On November 19, 1942, the troops of the South-western and Don fronts, after a heavy artillery softening up, pierced the enemy defences. Motorised units rushed into the breach and rolled on in a south-westerly direction.

On November 20, 1942, the Stalingrad Front moved to the offensive. The thrust on this front was directed to meet the advancing units of the South-

western and Don fronts. With these assaults both flanks of the Nazi troops were breached. Powerful motorised Soviet units breached the enemy forces in depth and on November 23, four days after the outset of the offensive, linked up in the vicinity of Karpovka-Sovetsky to the west of Stalingrad. Twenty-two enemy divisions some 300,000 strong and much equipment were encircled. The advancing Soviet troops hurled the enemy far to the west. All attempts of the surrounded enemy divisions to break through the ring of encirclement failed, as did the counter-offensive in the vicinity of Kotelnikovo also aimed at piercing the ring of encirclement.

The terms of surrender set forth by the Soviet Command were rejected by the Nazis. Thus on January 10, 1943, the Soviet forces began the liquidation of the surrounded troop concentrations, a task which was completed on February 2, 1943. After the fighting 147 thousand enemy soldiers were buried. Another 91 thousand were taken prisoner, including 24 generals and 2,500 other officers. The Soviet troops captured a large quantity of enemy equipment.

The battle on the Volga ended in complete victory for the Soviet forces. Nazi militarism had been dealt a defeat from which it could not recover. Almost one-fifth of all fascist forces engaged on the Soviet-German front had been concentrated at Stalingrad. The battle on the Volga undermined the fighting spirit of the enemy.

The victory at Stalingrad demonstrated the expanded might of the Soviet Army and maturity of its command cadres and the fortitude and prowess of its officers and soldiers. This victory prompted a crisis in the camp of Hitler's satellites. The Volga battle became a symbol of courage and valour, of staunch resistance to fascism, and a harbinger of the total victory over the Nazis which still lay in the future. A fundamental turning point had been

reached, not only in the Great Patriotic War, but in World War II as a whole.

This battle paved the way for the major offensive operations of the Soviet Army in the winter of 1942-1943 on the entire front from Leningrad to the Black Sea. Soviet troops attacked on the Don and on the outskirts of Leningrad, on the frozen plains near Rzhev and in the Caucasus. The Nazis suffered one defeat after another, while the might of the Soviet Army continued to grow. Before the close of 1942 new divisions and tank armies joined the forces on the front. The Soviet military economy, having passed the critical point of development in 1942, was now stepping up the output of arms and ammunition. The combat training of Soviet troops was upgraded, as was the art of leadership of the military commanders.

During the winter campaign approximately 110 enemy divisions were wiped out. In certain sectors the Soviet Army advanced west as much as 600-700 kilometres.

Early in February 1943, at a military conference in the headquarters of the German High Command the "wolf's lair", in East Prussia, Hitler admitted: "I can say one thing: the possibility of ending the war in the East through an offensive action has now vanished. This fact must be faced squarely."

However Hitler and his Command, true to their adventuristic line, decided in the summer of 1943 to once again test fate on the Eastern front in order to gain the lost initiative and take revenge for Stalingrad.

Measures were taken to strengthen the army: a total mobilisation was carried out to fill the ranks and meet the needs of military production, more millions of workers were forcibly sent from the occupied territories to work in Germany. The production of new types of weapons was stepped

up. In 1943 the nazis managed to increase the output of tanks, aircraft and guns. The German Command placed high hopes on the new heavy tanks—the Tiger and Panther—and the self-propelled gun—the Ferdinand. Hitler augmented his army by approximately another 2 million soldiers.

Taking advantage of the involved configuration of the front line, the nazi Command drew up plans for converging blows against the Soviet forces from Kharkov and Orel and for levelling out the front near Kursk where Soviet troops had driven a wedge in the nazi defence lines. They intended to crush the entire southern wing of the Soviet front, and in so doing seize the roads leading from Moscow to the south. Hitler placed major strategic goals before his troops. In operational order No. 6, signed by him on April 15, 1943, it was stated: "This offensive is of decisive significance. It must be crowned with rapid and decisive success.... In the direction of the main thrusts must ... be sent the best units, the best weaponry, the best commanders and the largest quantity of ammunition. Victory near Kursk must be a torch for the entire world."

Once again the situation was becoming precarious. For two years the Soviet Union had carried on a single-handed effort against the nazis and their allies. In this struggle the Soviet Army had achieved a basic turn of the tide in favour of the USSR. But this victory had cost dearly. The fighting on the Eastern front was particularly bitter and sanguinary. Here Hitler brought up fresh troops in preparation for a powerful new blow.

At this difficult moment, when major operations by the German forces on the Eastern front were to be expected, the ruling circles in Britain and the United States of America once again, after a delay of a year, set back the timetable for the opening of a Second Front. Early in June 1943, they informed the Soviet Union that there would be no Second Front

for the remainder of the year. In a reply to President Roosevelt, dated June 11, 1943, Stalin wrote that a delay in the opening of a Second Front would create extraordinary hardships for the Soviet Union, which was fighting "almost single-handed against an enemy that is still very strong and formidable". A note sent to the British Prime Minister, Churchill, and dated June 24, 1943, ended with the following lines:

"I must tell you that the point here is not just the disappointment of the Soviet Government, but the preservation of its confidence in its Allies, a confidence which is being subjected to severe stress. One should not forget that it is a question of saving millions of lives in the occupied areas of Western Europe and Russia and of reducing the enormous sacrifices of the Soviet armies, compared with which the sacrifices of the Anglo-American armies are insignificant."

Availing themselves of the absence of a Second Front in Europe, the nazi Command concentrated a powerful strike force within reach of the Kursk salient. Five infantry divisions and five air groups were transferred from France and Germany to the districts south of Orel and north of Kharkov. The strike force consisted of 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorised divisions. Two-thirds of the entire tank force on the Eastern front was now concentrated near Kursk. More than 2 thousand aircraft were to support this force.

The absence of vigorous military activity on a large scale in Western Europe strengthened Hitler's army and stimulated once again the hope among the nazi Command that the war could be redirected in Germany's favour.

In his order to begin the offensive Hitler wrote that the defeat to be inflicted on Russia by this attack must wrest the initiative away from the Soviet Command in the immediate future if not

exert decisive influence on the subsequent course of events as a whole.

The Soviet Command, in its estimation of the options open to the enemy, chose an active defence as the best means of wearing him down and establishing the preconditions for the counter-offensive to follow.

At the cost of immense effort and sacrifice the nazis succeeded in driving a wedge in the Soviet defences to a depth of 10 to 30 kilometres, but could not progress further. The nazi forces suffered a defeat after deadly battles, in some of which both sides sent in up to 1,200 tanks. The offensive thus ended in the full rout of the enemy.

In the middle of July a powerful counter-offensive was launched by the Soviet Army. On August 5, the cities of Orel and Belgorod were liberated. Moscow saluted the victorious Soviet forces. The nazis, pursued by Soviet units, rolled back to the Dnieper, hoping to entrench themselves on this natural frontier. But such hopes were in vain. The Soviet Army, moving rapidly to the west, on the march forced the Dnieper on a front extending 700 km. On November 6, 1943, Kiev—the capital of the Soviet Ukraine—was liberated.

The Battle of Kursk was one of the outstanding events of World War II. Both sides threw into this battle more than four million men, roughly 70 thousand guns and mortars, some 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 12 thousand aircraft.

In 1943 the Soviet people were once again forced to bear alone the brunt of the fighting against the nazi forces. In the summer of 1943 the Soviet-German front pinned down 196 nazi divisions as well as 32 divisions and 8 brigades of Hitler's allies. The enemy concentrated the bulk of its tank and air strength here. The Allied landing in Sicily brought no significant modification in the balance of power.

It suffices to point out that at the moment of the Allied landing in Sicily there were in all 9 Italian and 2 German divisions stationed there. By September 1943 the number of German divisions in Italy had increased to 18, at the cost of reductions in France.

By the close of 1943 the Soviet Army had—without a Second Front—liberated almost two-thirds of its territory. On the entire Soviet-German front the nazis were forced to move to strategic defence.

The success of the Soviet offensive was ensured by the self-sacrificing work carried out in the rear. By 1943 the economy had as a whole been successfully reconstructed to meet the needs of the war. Industrial enterprises evacuated to the east had restored full production. In addition in the Urals and in Siberia the construction of new as well as the modernisation and expansion of existing enterprises proceeded apace. Through the selfless efforts of employees in industry the extraction of coal, oil, and ores increased rapidly and the output of steel, electric power and cast iron shot up. Output in the war industries also climbed rapidly. The country's economy was providing the front with all the necessary goods on time. Between 1943-1945 the Soviet Army received annually an average of 30 thousand new tanks, roughly 40 thousand planes, up to 120 thousand field guns, close to 500 thousand machine-guns and 5,000 thousand rifles and sub-machine-guns. As a result it had more airplanes, tanks and other weapons than were at the disposal of the nazi armies. In addition, the quality of Soviet military equipment was much higher than that of the enemy.

The collective-farm peasantry also performed feats of labour during the war years. The war served as a major test for the collective-farm system. During the first years of the war the enemy occupied the country's major agricultural regions. The mobilisation of a substantial proportion of the collective-

farm peasantry into the army and the requisition of tractors, automobiles and horses for war needs seriously complicated the situation for agriculture. The comprehensive aid given by the country—the mobilisation of urban people to carry out agricultural tasks, the effort to provide the collective and state farms with agricultural machinery and the selfless dedication of the collective-farm workers themselves ensured the Soviet Army and the country's civilian population of a steady stream of agricultural produce and of industrial raw materials.

Those who worked in the hinterland not only provided the requisites for the front, but also transferred their personal savings and valuables to the fund of the Soviet Army.

Partisans played an important role in ensuring the success of the Soviet offensive through their activities behind enemy lines. The partisan movement arose in the first months of the war. By August 1, 1941, there were in operation in Byelorussia 230 partisan groups and detachments, numbering 10 thousand members. By October of the same year there were 738 partisan detachments in the Ukraine. All in all, by the end of 1941 there were 3,500 partisan groups and detachments at work in the areas under enemy occupation.

By the close of 1943 there were 250 thousand people's avengers fighting the enemy. They killed fascist soldiers and officers, derailed troop-trains and blew up railways and bridges, disrupted enemy transport and communications, and otherwise hindered nazi attempts to function in the temporarily occupied Soviet lands.

The nazi Command was forced to remove large forces from the front to combat the partisans. In 1942 about 10 per cent of the German land forces operating on the Soviet-German front were engaged against the partisans. In 1943 the nazis threw into the struggle against the partisans—in addition to the



police, the SS, SD, and some 500 thousand soldiers of auxiliary units—25 divisions of the field forces. But no effort could stop the partisan movement, this struggle by Soviet patriots in the defence of freedom and the independence of their socialist homeland.

The military successes achieved by the Soviet troops in 1943 placed the nazi army on the border of catastrophe. Now the Hitlerite Command hoped only to drag out the war. In all aspects the Soviet Army was stronger than the nazi army.

In 1944 as before Hitler's basic forces remained on Soviet territory—236 divisions and 18 brigades. But the Soviet Army intensified its blows against the enemy with every passing day. In January-February 1944 the nazis were hurled back from Leningrad and the liberation of Soviet Estonia began. Concurrently on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front 10 enemy divisions were encircled and eliminated in the area of the town Korsun-Shevchenkivsky. In the spring Soviet troops drove to the frontier of the USSR along the Prut River. By the middle of April 1944 the powerful enemy forces located in the Ukraine to the west of the Dnieper were routed. Soviet troops began the liberation of Rumania. In the middle of May Hitler's forces stationed in the Crimea were liquidated. It became clear that the Soviet Army through its own efforts would defeat the nazi army and liberate the peoples of Europe from the fascist yoke.

On June 6, 1944, Anglo-American troops under General Eisenhower landed in Normandy, in France. In the middle of August American and French forces carried out landings in the region of Toulon and launched an offensive inland. On August 18 French patriots revolted in Paris and freed the French capital of Hitler's troops.

By the autumn of 1944 France, Luxemburg, Belgium and part of Holland had been liberated by the Allies. Approximately 90 fascist divisions re-



Troops parade in Red Square in Moscow, November 7, 1941

J. V. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill at the Yalta Conference in the Crimea (February 1945)

Victory parade in Red Square, June 24, 1945



sisted the Anglo-American drive, while the basic forces remained as before on the Soviet-German front.

In the summer of 1944 Soviet forces undertook one of the war's largest operations—the encirclement and defeat of 30 Nazi divisions in Byelorussia. Soviet troops helped in the liberation of Norway and Yugoslavia, and successfully pursued the retreating enemy in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

With each blow of the Allied forces the strength of the fascist army diminished. However, stubborn resistance continued. In December 1944 the Nazis launched an unexpected offensive in the Ardennes on the Western Front. The Allies' lines were breached and the Anglo-American army placed in a difficult situation. The Ardennes operation was intended to inflict a major defeat on the Anglo-American forces and incline the USA and Britain to conclude a separate peace with Germany, to free the latter's forces for the continuation of the effort against the USSR.

The Nazi offensive placed a serious menace before the Allies. Churchill sent a message to Stalin requesting that the Soviet advance be intensified. The Soviet Army was at this time completing preparations for a new strategic offensive. Honouring its obligations to its Allies the Soviet Supreme Command decided to begin the offensive well ahead of the intended date. On January 12, 1945, Soviet forces moved to the offensive along the entire length of the Soviet-German front. By the spring of 1945 East Prussia had been taken, Poland and Hungary liberated, Vienna entered, and the approaches to Berlin reached. All in all, the offensive had carried the Soviet Army 500-700 kilometres.

The Allies made note of the decisive role played by the Soviet Armed Forces in the struggle against the common enemy. In a greeting sent by Churchill on February 23, 1945, it was observed: "The

Red Army celebrates its twenty-seventh anniversary amid triumphs which have won the unstinted applause of their allies and have sealed the doom of German militarism.

"Future generations will acknowledge their debt to the Red Army as unreservedly as do we who have lived to witness these proud achievements."

In light of the approaching end to the war, the leaders of the USSR, the USA and Britain met at a conference in the Crimea (Yalta). They committed themselves to the extermination of German militarism and Nazism, and to the creation of firm guarantees of peace in Europe. Germany's Armed Forces were to be liquidated entirely and the General Staff disbanded. The war industry was to be dismantled. Germany was to pay reparations for the destruction and loss caused by the Nazis.

At Yalta the decision was also made to create the United Nations Organisation. The boundaries of Poland were resolved and co-operation pledged in the democratic reconstruction of Europe. The Soviet Union, in the hope of a speedy termination of the war, agreed to aid in the struggle against Japan and to declare war against the latter two to three months after the capitulation of Germany.

The Crimean Conference demonstrated the unity of the Allied Powers and their determination to continue to co-operate in the post-war period.

During the latter half of April 1945 the Soviet Army began its last offensive. The forces of the Allies successfully advanced into the heart of Germany from the west. The soldiers of the armies of the anti-fascist coalition pressed forward, anxious to speed up the long-awaited victory.

Having broken the defence lines of the enemy on the western bank of the Oder and the Neisse rivers, Soviet troops advanced towards Berlin. By April 25, the Berlin enemy group had been totally surrounded by units of the First Ukrainian and First Byelorussian

sian fronts. On the same day troops of the Fifth Guards Army of the First Ukrainian Front made contact with units of the American First Army on the Elbe. The officers and soldiers of the Allied armies joyfully greeted one other.

On May 2, after stubborn resistance the Berlin Garrison surrendered. The banner of victory was raised over the Reichstag. In the Battle of Berlin Soviet troops suffered more than 300 thousand casualties, many more than those suffered by the other Allied forces during the entirety of 1945.

On May 8, 1945, in one of the suburbs of Berlin, representatives of the German Command signed an unconditional capitulation.

The war in Europe had ended with the crushing defeat of nazism.

The leaders of the three Great Powers—the USSR, the USA, and Britain—met once again in the summer of 1945 in Potsdam, near Berlin. The decisions stemming from this conference determined the concrete measures to be taken to rebuild Germany on a democratic and peaceful basis, through demilitarisation and denazification.

The Soviet Union firmly upheld the agreed-upon decisions, while the USA and Britain ignored the understanding that had been reached and moved to rearm German militarism.

World War II did not end with the defeat of Hitler's Germany. The imperialist war unleashed by Japanese militarism continued to rage in the Far East in direct proximity of the borders of the USSR.

The combined Anglo-American forces in the Pacific succeeded in inflicting a number of blows against Japan's navy. However Japan's immense land forces were still capable of carrying out a protracted struggle.

In specific fulfilment of the obligations to its Allies and wishing to ensure the security of its borders as well as help bring World War II to a speedy

conclusion, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan. With powerful blows the Soviet forces smashed in a short time Japan's crack land force—the Kwantung Army. This predetermined the rapid capitulation of militarist Japan. On September 2, 1945, Japan surrendered.

The defeat of nazi Germany did not represent a fortuitous chain of circumstances, but rather a logical phenomenon conditioned by the social structures of the belligerent states.

The war demonstrated the superiority of the Soviet socialist social and state system. The country's economy, established by this system, not only withstood blows of immense destructive force but also permitted within the briefest of times an economic restructuring on a war basis and the steady flow of necessary supplies to the Armed Forces.

The war further demonstrated the social and political unity of the Soviet people, their high patriotic and moral fibre, their selflessness and fortitude and their willingness to give their lives for their socialist homeland. Once again it underscored the significance of the guiding and organising role of the Communist Party in socialist society. The Communist Party consolidated millions of people in their fight against the fascist aggressors and organised the uninterrupted work carried out in the rear. The selfless dedication demonstrated by the Communist Party during the war years further solidified the trust, respect and love it enjoys among the Soviet people.

## Chapter X

### THE COUNTRY HEALS ITS WOUNDS

The victory salutes died out and the Soviet people returned to their peacetime labours.

The war had done colossal damage to the Soviet Union. There was no equal in history to the bloody war through which the USSR had just passed. Virtually every family had suffered a loss during the fighting. It had swept away more than 20 million human lives. For the future of their homeland, its freedom and independence, millions of soldiers had given up that which is most precious—their lives.

On the territories of the USSR, which had been occupied, the fascist aggressors tortured or killed more than six million peaceful citizens—men, women and children. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet people wasted away in the nazi concentration camps. More than four million Soviet citizens were driven into Germany by the invaders. The majority of these perished in the so-called labour camps.

Where the Hitlerites had reigned there remained but ruins. History knows of no destruction, barbarity and inhumanity on the level of that practised by the nazis on Soviet soil. The fruits of the work to which Soviet people had given their labour, talent and love had been destroyed by the nazi occupa-

tional forces. The enemy had methodically ruined cities, factories, collective farms and cultural centres. The nazi general Stülpnagel, reporting to Hitler of the damage inflicted upon the economy of the Soviet Union, assured him that it would take no less than 25 years to restore this economy.

Destroyed or severely damaged had been some 32 thousand industrial enterprises. 65 thousand kilometres of railway, roughly 100 thousand collective and state farms, almost three thousand machine and tractor stations. The immense metallurgical factories and power stations of the south lay in ruins. The mine shafts of the Donets Basin had been flooded.

The nazis had ravished and plundered 1,719 cities and turned more than 70 thousand villages and hamlets into ashes. They had burned or otherwise razed more than six million buildings. Approximately 25 million people were left without shelter. Among the obliterated or most heavily damaged cities were such major industrial and cultural centres as Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Smolensk, Novgorod, Pskov, Orel, Kharkov, Voronezh, Rostov-on-the-Don. The country had been depleted of roughly 30 per cent of its national wealth.

As soon as the large-scale liberation of Soviet territory from the nazi aggressors had begun, major efforts were initiated to rebuild and restore industrial enterprises, railroads and highways, collective and state farms and residential quarters. This was an unprecedented event; a country in the midst of such a difficult and sanguinary war was already beginning to repair the damage done to its economy.

Large sums of money and substantial material resources were dedicated to this effort. Work was begun on the reclamation of the Donbas coal mines, the metallurgical industries in the south, power stations, the railroad network and the collective and

state farms destroyed by the war. During the difficult war years the first steps were taken in the restoration of cultural and educational institutions, schools, theatres, libraries. But granted the scale of these measures, the fundamental effort to rebuild the cities and workers' settlements, major industrial centres, hundreds and thousands of agricultural enterprises, villages and hamlets was still ahead.

In the summer of 1945 a substantial proportion of those industrial enterprises hitherto concentrating on defence needs now switched to peacetime production. Those resources previously expended on war needs were redirected to the further development of the country's economy. Many millions of workers who had been taken out of production during the war years now returned to work. The socialist system and the planned economy allowed a smooth transition from a war to a peacetime economy. The entire complex process of restructuring was completed on the whole in 1946.

Soviet people were not intimidated by the unprecedented difficulties. They did not expect to relax after the war. Throughout the country people pitched in their efforts. They had not only to restore that which had been destroyed but also to surpass the pre-war level of industrial and agricultural production. This made up the main task of the post-war Five-Year Plan.

With this end in view, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government in August 1945 instructed the State Planning Committee to draw up the Fourth Five-Year Plan for the restoration and further expansion of the economy of the Soviet Union. In March 1946 a Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee approved the basic plan figures. Soon after this, a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, elected on February

10, 1946, approved the plan after a comprehensive and thorough discussion of it.

The basic economic and political tasks set by this plan were the rebuilding of those regions of the country which had suffered in the war, restoring the pre-war level of industrial and agricultural production, and further developing the economy of the USSR. The plan stipulated a rise in the living and cultural standards of the Soviet people. By the end of the Five-Year Plan the level of industrial production was to exceed the pre-war level by 48 per cent. Taking priority was the rebuilding and rapid development of the heavy industry sector including such branches as ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, machine-building and the fuel, chemical and power industries. Thus, the machine-building industry was to boost production almost twofold over its 1940 figures.

According to the plan, 250,000 million rubles were to be invested in the economy, of which 157,500 million were earmarked for industrial development.

In the sphere of agriculture the level of pre-war output was to be restored, and then surpassed by 27 per cent.

Work proceeded apace throughout the country. The Soviet people eagerly and energetically pursued the fulfilment of the tasks laid down by the plan. They rebuilt their cities and villages, their factories, mines and open pits. Through the efforts of working people from all corners of the land, the coal mines of the Donets Basin were put back into operation almost overnight. In 1947 the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station was restored. By 1948 many large enterprises were working at full capacity; such as the metallurgical works in Zaporozhye, the Azovstal Combine in Zhdanov, the Makeyevka Metallurgical and the Kharkov Tractor factories.

The self-sacrificing efforts of workers, collective farmers and the intelligentsia yielded tangible results in the space of two years. In December 1947 the rationed distribution of products was replaced by large-scale state and co-operative trade. A monetary reform was introduced at the same time.

By virtue of the efforts of the workers and peasants the Soviet Union was the first of the European countries which had participated in the war to stabilise its monetary system and to end restrictions on the supply to the population of foodstuffs and other consumer goods.

The living standard enjoyed by the Soviet people rose steadily. The Soviet state introduced several major price reductions on foodstuffs and household goods. It allocated substantial resources to housing construction and to the building of schools, medical facilities and cultural institutions.

The extremely complex and difficult tasks involved in the restoration of the damaged economy were satisfactorily resolved in the briefest of intervals. In 1948 the volume of industrial production in the USSR had not only reached, but surpassed the pre-war level. Accordingly it required only 2.5 years to restore industry.

The year 1949 marked a new stage in the development of the economy of the USSR. The successful development of industry and the substantial margin of overfulfilment of the quotas set by the Five-Year Plan for the restoration of the economy, permitted an increase in the control figures for industrial output for the subsequent two years.

A striking feature of the development of industry after the war, and particularly after 1949, was the rapid pace of modernisation of basic branches of industry through the production of up-to-date machinery and equipment.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state followed a policy in the area of technology which

ensured the introduction of the most advanced techniques in the national economy. Thus, even during the complex and difficult post-war years, programme lathes and automatic production lines were introduced, while rolling-mills, coal combines, turbo- and electro-drills and powerful excavators were fully automated. In the following years the Party and the Government ensured the rapid growth of output of a number of highly productive machines and assembly lines, as well as the introduction, on this basis, of an advanced technology which played a significant role in the industrial upsurge.

Much work was done to shore up the technological base for agriculture. This sector, which had lost 40 per cent of its power capacities during the war, desperately needed help—and it received it. Even the Fourth (immediate post-war) Five-Year Plan provided the village with enough machines not only to make up the losses inflicted by the nazi aggressors but also to push ahead the technological base for the collective and state farm system. In 1949 the number of tractors and agricultural machines turned over to the collective and state farms and MTS exceeded the 1940 figures by 150 and 300 per cent respectively.

The proportional deployment of productive forces throughout the country continued during the post-war plan period. In Central Asia and the Transcaucasus there arose new centres for the production of ferrous metals. Coal extraction increased in the Kuznetsk Basin, in Karaganda and the Urals. Thermal and hydroelectric power stations were built on the Volga and Kama rivers. Machine-building and chemical works were established in Estonia. An electro-machine building factory, and the Avtoelek-tropribor, were built in Riga, Latvia. In the same city the output of waggon coaches was expanded severalfold.

The unprecedented destruction and the distressing state of the war-damaged Soviet economy gave rise to no few dire predictions in the West. The foes of the Soviet Union believed that the country would be long in recovering from the heavy blows inflicted by the war. The post-war Five-Year Plan was regarded by bourgeois economists as a fantasy and pipe dream. The predictions of failure were unanimous.

The labour feat of the Soviet people and the organising and guiding role of the Communist Party once again created a "miracle". The Fourth Five-Year Plan was fulfilled ahead of time—in four years and three months. In this time more than 6,000 major industrial enterprises were restored; the output of metal, the fuel and electric energy increased manifold; many new industrial centres were created; the construction of major hydroelectric power stations such as the Kuibyshev, Kakhovka and Gorky was launched; the machine-building, coal, oil and chemical industries were expanded; and the output of consumer goods substantially boosted.

In the post-war period agriculture progressed under severe handicaps. In addition to the heavy losses incurred by the agricultural regions during the war, the situation was further complicated by the withering drought which in 1946 enveloped a large part of the Russian Federation—including the Volga region and the North Caucasus—as well as the Ukraine.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government took measures for providing aid, seeds, implements and livestock both to the regions which had been under fascist occupation and to those hit by the drought. Substantial loans were granted to help in the rebuilding of the collective- and state-farm economy, and a number of organisational and economic measures implemented. As a result of these measures by the

end of the Five-Year Plan agricultural production in the Soviet Union had reached the pre-war level.

The Soviet people had to rebuild the national economy in a complex post-war international situation. Reactionary circles in the countries belonging to the anti-Hitler coalition sharply altered their policies towards the Soviet Union. In March 1946, Churchill, speaking in Fulton, called for the uniting of Anglo-Saxons in the struggle against "Eastern communism". President Truman was present at this speech by Churchill, which was preceded by extreme boister. It was clear that he was in agreement with the fundamentals of this militant speech by the British Conservative.

A short time later, the US Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, gave a no less vociferous speech in Stuttgart, making clear that Washington was breaking with the agreed-upon policy on the question of Germany and was aiming at transforming West German militarism into a strike force of imperialism on the European continent. A year later Truman proclaimed the "right" of the USA to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries (the Truman Doctrine). This was followed by the Marshall Plan and preparations for the establishment of the North Atlantic bloc (NATO). Taking advantage of the serious economic difficulties facing the European states, the USA offered the necessary aid with the provision that US control would be instituted over foreign trade and in part over the industry and finances of these countries.

The strategy of the cold war, with its theories of "throwing back" and "intimidating" communism, was worked out. The authors of this political line did not conceal the fact that they were leaning on the US nuclear monopoly. President Truman stated that the atom bomb would be a fine club against the Russians. It was assumed that the nuclear monopoly held by the USA was a long-term one.



Using nuclear blackmail in its relations with the Soviet Union and other democratic countries, the leaders of the USA moved in the direction of a nuclear arms race. In addition, the production of conventional weapons was also stepped up. The US Army was rapidly outfitted with the fruits of modern technology. US military bases were built throughout the world, as closely as possible to the Soviet Union. The arms race quickly gathered momentum. Large-scale military preparations had as an end shoring up the economy during the major slump in industrial production which arose in the USA in 1949.

Military allocations in the United States increased in 1950 several dozen times over those of the pre-war period. During the first six years of Truman's presidency (1945-1950) the government spent more money on military needs than had all the American governments in the 150-year period preceding World War II.

Large-scale military preparations were also undertaken by the governments of the West European capitalist countries. Weapons were stockpiled, the armed forces boosted, preparations for a new war carried out and alliances and military blocs created against the USSR and other countries which had taken up the path of socialism.

The year 1948 saw the creation of the so-called Western European Union, including in its ranks Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg. In 1949, at the initiative of the USA, there arose the aggressive North Atlantic military bloc, spearheaded against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. Plans were drawn up for the rearmament of West Germany and, in particular, for the rebirth of German militarism.

In the summer of 1950 US imperialism moved from war preparations to direct acts of military aggression. With the support of the US Government

the puppet ruler of South Korea, Syngman Rhee, provoked a war against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea.

It is no wonder that the policies of the USA and the West European states following in its wake led to a heightening of international tensions.

Furthermore, fundamental changes took place in the international situation to the advantage of socialism. The defeat of nazi Germany gave rise to a new upsurge in the revolutionary movement. One of the most important consequences of this movement was the establishment of people's governments in a number of Central and South-east European countries—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. These countries, having introduced profound democratic transformations, turned in the direction of socialist development. The consistent policy of denazification and demilitarisation carried out in Germany by the Soviet Union in its zone of occupation, led to a rapid consolidation of democratic forces and the formation in 1949 of the German Democratic Republic, the first peace-loving German workers' and peasants' state. Socialism also sustained major victories in Asia.

The embarkment on the path of socialism by a number of European and Asian countries fundamentally changed the balance of power in the post-war world. The People's Democracies in Europe and the People's Democratic states in Asia together with the Soviet Union formed a powerful socialist camp.

The Soviet Union and all People's Democratic countries, vitally interested in peaceful progress, struggled persistently for the implementation of the programme of the post-war world build-up through the total extermination of fascism and the creation of conditions for the democratic development of the countries which had been liberated from fascist tyranny.

With the growing threat of a new war the policies of the Soviet Union were aimed at actively defending peace, at exposing and defeating plans to ignite a new war. The Soviet Government consistently practised the Leninist policy of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems. It consistently acted in defence of the peaceful resolution of outstanding international issues through negotiation, with due respect for the sovereignty and independence of the participants. The Soviet Government proposed the conclusion of a Pact of Peace between the Great Powers, as well as the cessation of tests and of the production of nuclear weapons and the reduction of conventional arms.

The Soviet Union demonstrated in practice its peace policy. Immediately after the end of the Great Patriotic War a substantial number of officers and soldiers were demobilised. By the end of the war there were 11,365 thousand men in the ranks of the Soviet Army; after demobilisation the number had fallen to 2,847 thousand. The USSR withdrew its troops from China, Korea, Norway, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.

Thus with the end of World War II there appeared two different approaches to international relations: on the one hand, the peaceful course held by the Soviet Union and other member-countries of the socialist community, one directed at the reduction of international tensions, at averting war, at arms reduction and at banning nuclear weapons; on the other hand, the aggressive pursuit of a new war, sponsored by the United States of America and its allies in the military blocs.

The young socialist European and Asian states were subjected to military threats and intimidation from the imperialist states, as well as to economic pressure and discrimination. The imperialist forces tried every measure to overthrow the power of the

people. The US Congress openly declared subversive activity in the socialist countries to be its official policy. In 1951 alone 100 million dollars were allocated to finance reactionary emigrant organisations, anti-socialist propaganda, sabotage and subversion in these countries.

The Soviet people considered it their duty to help the young People's Democracies repulse the attacks launched by imperialism and to ensure them free development in conformity with the stated desires of their people.

All of this placed a great burden on the Soviet Union. The international situation importuned that the country's material and technological base be brought, within a brief time-span, to such a level that would permit the strengthening of the Soviet Union's defence capacities in order to ensure the freedom and independence of all socialist countries, to offer them the necessary help in the building of socialism.

The Soviet Union was consistent in its attempts to achieve a ban on nuclear weaponry. However the USA, using its influence, blocked every proposal by the Soviet Government in this direction. Moreover, the United States construed its entire foreign policy after the end of World War II on the assumption of maintaining a nuclear monopoly. Naturally the liquidation of this monopoly would have a major impact on the international situation.

Soviet scientists had even prior to the war carried on substantial theoretical and experimental work in nuclear physics. On the base created by these fundamental achievements the conclusion was already made by the end of the 1930s that it was possible to induce the chain fission reaction of uranium atoms—a process releasing enormous amounts of energy. These estimates were done in the Soviet Union in 1939-1940 by Y. B. Zeldovich and Y. B. Khariton. In 1940 a long-range plan was



The ruins of Stalingrad  
 Stalingrad (now Volgograd) restored  
 Lenin the first atomic icebreaker

drawn up for massive research in the field of nuclear physics. The plan continued to be enacted throughout the war years.

In 1942 important measures were worked out for the continuation and expansion of theoretical research and experimentation towards the creation of a nuclear reactor and the inducement of chain reaction of nuclear fission. It was clearly no accident that the operation for encircling Hitler's troops and creating a "cauldron" near Stalin-grad in the autumn of 1942 was code-named "Uranium".

At the close of 1942 nuclear physicists were called together in Moscow. Many of them, including I. V. Kurchatov, were summoned from the front. After this meeting work in nuclear physics was intensified. Orders placed by these scientists with industrial enterprises were on the same level of priority as military orders.

When the war ended the Soviet Government was able to increase its allocations for the continuation of research, to boost the number of scientists involved and to put more of industry at the disposal of the project. Together, these measures facilitated rapid gains in the direction of nuclear power.

In 1946 the creation of the first nuclear reactor approached the finishing stages. At 2 p.m., December 25, assembly of the reactor was completed. Under the direct guidance of Kurchatov the first Soviet nuclear reactor produced a nuclear chain reaction. All present were overcome with joy. Kurchatov, turning to his colleagues, said: "Nuclear energy is now at the will of Soviet man."

One morning in August 1949 an American airplane on a routine flight brought down with it an air sample. Analysis of the air demonstrated that an atom bomb had been exploded at a very high elevation. On the same day it was reported to the President of the United States that the USSR had

carried out a nuclear explosion. The USA had been deprived of its nuclear monopoly.

However reactionary circles in the USA, seized by war hysteria, brushed aside this fact. As before they continued to appeal for the launching of a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union in an attempt to paralyse the country. There were no few discussions and "megadeath" counts—how many millions of Soviet people could be destroyed or mutilated in the event of war.

The Soviet Union was confronted with the rapid rearmament with advanced weaponry of the armies of the imperialist states, and above all the USA, which, stepping up the production of new equipment, lavished this equipment on the armies of the aggressive NATO bloc countries. The Soviet Union could not choose to ignore these facts. It was forced to redirect substantial resources to those sectors producing jet aircraft, radio-engineering, and, later, electronic-guided weaponry.

In urging on the arms race reactionary circles in the West assumed that the Soviet Union could not shoulder such a heavy economic burden nor carry the load of the huge expenditures connected both with the rebuilding of industry, the development of atomic industry, and the re-equipping of the army. They estimated that it would either throw overboard its plans for industrial development or move towards concessions to the imperialist bosses.

Neither of these expectations were fulfilled.

After the arduous and bloody war and the destruction and waste wrought upon large expanses of the country, Soviet people had performed a new feat, one no less important than the military feat. Almost overnight they had restored the national economy and taken a big step in the effort rapidly to enhance the country's military and industrial potential. In discussions "from positions of strength" as proposed by the imperialist powers, the Soviet

Union held a position which could not be ignored by even the most adventurist elements in the capitalist countries.

Without yielding to blackmail and military threats and without succumbing to war hysteria, the Soviet Union acted during these difficult years as a persistent defender of peace and advocate of reduced international tensions. In the Soviet Union as in the rest of the world there emerged a movement of adherents of peace—a movement bringing together hundreds of millions of people. While the military threat may not have been reduced in this period, it may be said with assurance that peace was preserved and the preliminaries established for the subsequent and successful effort to achieve international security.

## Chapter XI

### THE SUCCESSES OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Having achieved major progress in the development of the economy, the Soviet Union entered a period in which the foremost task was the further consolidation of socialism: the further development of the Soviet social and state system, advances in agriculture, industrial growth—above all, heavy industry, and continued improvements in the material and cultural well-being of the people.

The country made major strides in carrying out the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1950-1955), which was considered and approved by the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

The Fifth Five-Year Plan was fulfilled ahead of time—in four years and four months. In 1955 in terms of industrial production the USSR already exceeded by 220 per cent the prewar (1940) level and by 95 per cent the 1950 level. The number of new factories, mines and open pits increased throughout the country.

The socialist economic system ensured a rapid growth rate in industrial output. The average annual growth rate for national income and industrial output in the USSR was roughly double that of the corresponding indicators for the United States of America.

Heavy industry made rapid gains. The construction of the Cherepovets, Orsk-Khalilovo and Transcaucasian metallurgical works were brought to completion. New mines and pits were opened. Work proceeded at a brisk pace on the Kuibyshev, Kakhovka, Kama, Gorky and Angara hydroelectric power stations. The first currents pulsed through the Ural, Kuzbas and Donbas thermal power stations.

On August 10, 1958, the Volga (Kuibyshev) Hydroelectric Power Station, at that time the largest in the world, was successfully put into operation. This plant was unique in the world for its generating capacity and advanced technique. An outstanding American figure in the field of energetics, the president of Edison-Detroit, upon a visit to the Volga plant, removed his hat and bowed deeply in honour of the project.

A few weeks later the first line of the hydroelectric plant in Stalingrad was commissioned with a generating capacity exceeding that of the Kuibyshev station on the Volga. During these same years, thousands of kilometres from the Volga, on the shores of the Angara, Soviet hydroelectric engineers, having completed the construction of the Angara Hydroelectric Power Station, next turned to the building of the grandiose Bratsk station. But even this giant could not satisfy the daring creative designs of Soviet scientists and technicians. A project was drawn up, and work began on the Krasnoyarsk hydroelectric power plant on the Yenisei River, to have a generating capacity of six million kilowatts.

How immeasurably the Soviet economy had grown in the 30 years since that memorable 1928, when the USSR launched its First Five-Year Plan! While in 1928 steel production totalled 4,300 thousand tons, in 1958 it reached almost 55 million tons; the corresponding figures for oil extraction were

11,600 thousand and 113,000 thousand tons; coal — 35,500 thousand and 493,000 thousand tons; electrical energy output — 5,000 million and 220,000 million kilowatt-hours. In Soviet Russia in 1928 factories produced a few thousand tractors and automobiles. In 1958 the machine-building industry turned out 511 thousand automobiles and 220 thousand tractors.

The USSR had advanced far from the level of tsarist Russia. Gross industrial output in the USSR in 1957 exceeded that of 1913 by 33 times, the production of the means of production had risen 74 times, while machine-building and metal-working had advanced more than 200 times. Further, this industrial leap had been accomplished in an astonishingly brief interval—all in all 40 years. The reader will recall that for almost 18 years of this period the Soviet Union was forced to fight in wars inflicted by imperialism, and later to restore the destruction levelled upon the economy by the enemy.

A striking feature of the economic development of the Soviet Union in the 1950s was the wide-scale application of the achievements of science and technology and the rapid growth of productive forces on this basis. Such economic sectors as electronics, radio engineering, instrument-making, the chemical industry, energetics and machine-building developed at a rapid pace. Major progress was achieved in the technical modernisation of the leading sectors of the economy. The replacement and modernisation of outdated installation by new, more highly mechanised and automated plant was carried out on a large scale. In 1956-1958 alone, Soviet industry began production of more than 4,500 types of new machines, instruments and apparatus.

In a key branch of the machine-building industry—that of machine-tool construction, the output of new types of automated and semi-automated



lathes and assembly lines was stepped up, automatic machine-tools with remote control were created and high-precision machine-tools devised for instrument-making and radio electronics.

Major technical advances were made in the field of power-generating machine-building. The Lenin-grad metallurgical factory began production of steam turbines with a capacity of 150, 200 and 300 thousand kilowatts.

Transport was placed on a fundamentally new technological basis. The electrification of the railroad system, begun in the 1950s, and the transition of many units to diesel traction, facilitated the wide employment of these more advanced means of traction and the retiring of main-line locomotives by the end of the decade. Jet and turbine-propelled aircraft were put into service, including the TU-104, IL-18 and TU-114. Helicopters were more widely employed in the economy. On June 27, 1954, the first nuclear energy power plant—with a capacity of 5,000 kilowatts—was completed and put into operation.

The 1950s were marked by the intensive development of the country's eastern regions. The energy capacity of Siberia's plants advanced at a rate surpassing that of the rest of the country. The mighty Siberian rivers were tapped as a source of energy. Powerful thermal power plants making use of rich local fuel sources were built. Siberia produced for the homeland ever growing quantities of diamonds, gold, gas, oil, ferrous metals, iron ore and coal.

In the 1950s Soviet geologists discovered huge new deposits of iron ore, ferrous metals, oil, gas and other natural resources, far surpassing previously discovered deposits. As a rule these discoveries were made in the country's east. The level of industrial development in the USSR and the technological progress made permitted this wealth to

be placed fully at the disposal of the national economy.

During the Fifth Five-Year Plan advances were made in agriculture as well. The resolution entitled "On Measures for the Further Development of Agriculture" and adopted at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU in September 1953 was of enormous significance in further increasing agricultural output. The implementation of this resolution included measures for both increasing output and upgrading the income of the collective farmers. Many new specialists were sent to work on the collective and state farms. Industry was given the task of stepping up the creation and output of new and highly productive machinery.

Industrial growth and the building of new cities and workers' settlements led to rapid increases in the urban population. In 1950-1954 alone the population of the cities rose by 17 million, 9 million of whom were from the rural areas. In this connection further increases in agricultural output were needed. The growth in demand for agricultural produce was also spurred by the systematic upgrading of the country's standard of living. For example, the consumption of milk and milk products in the cities and workers' settlements doubled in 1956 over the preceding year. This explained the increased attention given by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government to progress in agriculture.

A large number of experienced production organisers and agricultural specialists were assigned to work on the collective and state farms. The government allocated substantial resources for the development of agriculture and the supply of agricultural machinery was significantly improved.

Of great importance for the upturn in agricultural production was the resolution adopted in February 1954 by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the

Soviet Government concerning the reclaiming of the virgin and uncultivated lands in Northern Kazakhstan, the Volga region, the Southern Urals and the Northern Caucasus. The exploitation of the virgin and uncultivated lands did not require excessive material inputs and, what is most important, within a short interval provided for marked increases in grain output. The appeal by the Communist Party to reclaim the virgin lands and increase grain output was met with enthusiasm by the Soviet people. More than 500 thousand young men and women, demonstrating a high degree of patriotism, took part in the fulfilment of this grandiose task. In the stern and uninhabited steppes they established new state farms, a task of no small difficulty. The first settlers were forced to live in tents and dug-outs, far from other settlements or railroad lines. But Soviet people exhibited stamina and assiduousness, persistence and selflessness in carrying out the goals set down by the party. This represented a heroic achievement on the part of Soviet youth, one that was highly acclaimed by the entire Soviet people. The Komsomol was awarded the Order of Lenin for its part in carrying out the virgin soil project.

The effort to reclaim the virgin soil was backed up by a powerful array of technology: more than 200 thousand tractors, thousands of combines and other vehicles. Help from all sides permitted the virgin soil settlers to overcome all difficulties encountered in the new localities. By 1956 approximately 36 million hectares had already been brought under cultivation. From this land the Soviet Union could gather in on the average no less than 2,000 million poods of grain annually. Virgin and uncultivated soil brought under the plough in three years alone surpassed the combined sown acreage of France, Italy, the FRG, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Spain and Sweden.

All the measures mentioned above facilitated a significant upswing in agricultural production. Thus for the five year interval 1953-1958 the country's grain production rose almost 20 per cent, that of wheat by 2,600 million poods—or by 23 per cent. Sugar-beet output rose by almost 150 per cent, meat procurements by 50 per cent and milk by 100 per cent. Gross agricultural output increased throughout the country. While in 1949-1953 the average annual output of agriculture equalled 300,000 million rubles, in the period 1954-1958 the figure climbed to over 400,000 million rubles.

Progress in industrial development made possible a fundamental tackling of housing construction, the pace of which increased from year to year. In 1960 the number of square metres of housing space constructed—100 million—almost equalled that built during the entire 1946-1950 period.

An inseparable part of the efforts of the Soviet people to complete the building of socialism were those measures enacted by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government to improve the material standard of living of the Soviet people. Among these measures were a reduction in the working day, improvements in the pension system, elimination of the small fees previously charged for enrolment in the 8-10 form secondary schools and in higher educational institutions, improvements in health care, etc.

The class structure of Soviet society underwent serious modification during the building of socialism. By 1960 workers and employees numbered 72 per cent of the total population (compared to 50.2 per cent in 1939), and collective-farm members 28 per cent (compared to 47.2 per cent in 1939). The rapid growth of socialist industry swelled the ranks of the workers. The mechanisation of agriculture and the increase in the network of state farms facilitated a substantial growth in the numbers of

workers in the villages. The profile of the collective-farm peasantry was in itself changed. Specialists—combine and tractor operators, drivers, machinists and mechanics—now represented a significant component in its make-up. The labour of the tiller of the soil was now turned into variegated industrial work. Hundreds of thousands of agronomists, livestock specialists, veterinarians, economists, engineers and mechanics were now engaged in the sphere of agriculture.

The socialist intelligentsia is playing an ever greater role in all spheres of developed socialist society. It is this fact which underlies the steady growth in the number of specialists engaged in industry, agriculture, health care and education. The numbers of scientific personnel grew with particular rapidity.

The USSR census of 1959 revealed that the population now stood at 208,826 thousand people. The census data testified to the high rate of growth marking the Soviet economy and to increases in the urban population. During the two decades preceding the census 503 new towns and cities appeared on the map. The census pointed to substantial changes in the territorial distribution of the population. In connection with the rapid industrial growth of the country's eastern regions the population gained rapidly in the area to the east of the Urals. While in the USSR as a whole the population increased by 9.5 per cent during these 20 years, in the Urals the rate was 32 per cent, in Central Asia and Kazakhstan—38 per cent, and in the Far East—70 per cent.

The second half of the 1950s was marked by the further development of socialist democracy and of the creative activity of the working people. An important role was exerted in this connection by the resolutions of the Twentieth Party Congress (February 1956) and of the June 1956 Plenary Meeting of

the CC CPSU concerning the overcoming of the cult of Stalin's personality as well as the consequences of this cult.

The party revealed the reasons for the emergence of the personality cult of Stalin, determined, on the one hand, by the historical conditions underlying the building of socialism in the USSR, and, on the other, by the negative features of Stalin's personality.

In criticising the negative sides of Stalin's activities, the party by no means diminished his services to the country and the international workers' movement.

The cult of Stalin's personality, particularly in the latter years of his life, inflicted serious damage to the cause of party and government leadership in socialist construction. However it could not disrupt the operation of the objective laws of the development of socialism nor alter the democratic nature of the Soviet system. Nor could it shake the organisational, political and theoretical foundations of the Communist Party.

The overcoming of the harmful consequences of the personality cult was facilitated by the consistent application of the principles of democratic centralism, collective leadership, criticism and self-criticism, the strengthening of ties between the party and the masses, improvements in the activities of the Soviets, the trade unions and other public organisations, and the expansion of participation by the working people in the affairs of government.

Working for the consolidation of peace as an important condition for the successful building of socialism, the Soviet Government, while carrying into life the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, actively and insistently searched for means to reduce international tensions. It brought forth concrete and coherent proposals for the creation of

collective security in Europe as well as a constructive programme for disarmament and the banning of nuclear weapons tests. The Soviet Union substantially expanded its economic and cultural ties with the developing Asian and African countries as well as with a number of capitalist countries in Europe, and North and South America. Economic aid from the Soviet Union to the developing countries grew by leaps and bounds.

This was all an important factor in the relaxation of international tensions and the improvement of relations between states with different social systems.

From its very first days the Soviet Government stood by the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems as the basis of Soviet foreign policy. This principle was elaborated by the founder of the Soviet state, Lenin. Thus the opinion currently in vogue in the West that the principle of peaceful coexistence was advanced only recently and out of considerations of the moment must be rejected out of hand. The Soviet Union has and could have no reason to provoke a war. The exploitative classes which, as a rule, are interested in expansionist wars as a means to seize and plunder the territories of others have been eliminated in the USSR. The Soviet Union, just as other socialist countries, is profoundly interested in the maintenance of peace, for it is peace which will expedite further progress in socialist construction.

Much energy as well as a persistent and intense effort for peace was needed in order to ensure peaceful coexistence. With each passing year the principle of international co-operation gained a larger following among world opinion. A large number of countries, firmly committed to a neutral stance, completely backed the Soviet initiative for peace. The rapid advances in military technology and the ever growing arms race have forced the

people of the world to ponder the catastrophic consequences of a new world war. Can war be averted, or is it inevitable—this problem became a question of life and death for many millions of people after the end of World War II.

The Twentieth Party Congress of 1956 analysed the international situation in detail and came to the conclusion that there exists a real possibility of averting further wars. The congress was guided in its conclusion by the fact that the balance of class and political forces on the international arena had profoundly changed by the 1950s. The socialist countries and above all the Soviet Union had at their disposal powerful resources with which to curb any aggressor. The international working-class movement had substantially gained in strength. Finally, there arose after World War II a wide-scale peace movement, uniting people of different classes, political outlooks and convictions. However the congress underscored that as long as imperialism exists, the economic basis for the outbreak of war also remains. But there is no fatal inevitability of war. It can be warded off if all forces working for peace are brought together.

The profound historical changes and fundamental progress achieved in the world to the benefit of socialism expedited the further growth of the international communist movement, contributed to the strengthening of the socialist system and created favourable opportunities to unite all groups working for peace, democracy and socialism.

In these circumstances the Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the CPSU took measures to enact a foreign policy designed to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union, intensify the effort to preserve world peace, and expand contacts with peace forces.

At the initiative of the socialist countries an armistice was concluded in Korea on July 27, 1953.

A year later, in July 1954, an agreement was reached in Geneva on a halt to military activities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The Soviet Government undertook important foreign policy actions designed to reduce international tensions in Europe. In September 1955 the Soviet Government withdrew its military base from Porkkala-Udd in Finland. At the initiative of the Soviet state a peace treaty was concluded with Austria, the latter accepting the solemn obligation of maintaining a policy of neutrality.

In the summer of 1955 relations were normalised between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Of great importance in bringing together all peace-loving forces was the further strengthening of co-operation and friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the peoples of Africa and Asia, which had taken up their struggle for national independence.

The steadfast and consistent effort of the Soviet Union on behalf of peace led to a meeting of the heads of state of the USSR, the USA, Britain and France. At the meeting, held in the summer of 1955 in Geneva, they discussed the pressing problems surrounding the relaxation of international tensions and, in particular, the problem of Germany, European security, disarmament and the development of contacts between East and West. The agreement reached between the heads of the Great Powers opened new perspectives for détente. But the governments of the Western powers soon reneged upon the agreements and continued to add fuel to the cold war.

The prospects for a further reduction of tensions and for a relaxation of the international climate frightened reactionary circles in the West. Trying to complicate the international situation these circles

organised a number of provocative acts against the socialist countries and states which had adopted an independent course of development and thrown off the colonial yoke.

Through their agents the imperialist forces made preparations for a counter-revolutionary fascist uprising in Hungary. At the close of 1956 internal counter-revolution with the active and comprehensive support of international imperialism attempted to overthrow with arms the people's power and to restore the dominance of the capitalists and land magnates. The socialist forces of people's Hungary extirpated the forces of counter-revolution. The Soviet Union, true to its internationalist obligations and at the request of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government, came to the aid of the working people of the Hungarian People's Republic.

At the same time Britain, France and Israel with the tacit support of the USA carried out a blatant act of aggression against Egypt, which had adopted the path of independent development. This represented an attempt to intimidate peoples of the East by the force of arms and to stem the growing tide of the national liberation movement in Asia and Africa.

The Soviet Union firmly and decisively acted in support of Egypt, sternly condemning the aggressors, and declared its determination to offer the Egyptian people the necessary support to crush the aggressors and restore peace in the Middle East. The firm stance of the Soviet Union exerted a sobering impact on the aggressors, forcing them to withdraw.

The subsequent attempts by the USA and Britain to occupy, respectively, the Lebanon and Jordan, also ended in failure. The interventionists were forced to withdraw their troops from these countries. The imperialist forces were in no position to suppress the revolution in Iraq, which resulted in

the ousting of the reactionary regime in power in that country.

The Western powers, in creating aggressive military blocs spearheaded against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, were waging on a rebirth of German militarism. As such, they encouraged the revanchist sentiments in the FRG.

Endeavouring to ensure security and preserve peace in Europe, the Soviet Union and the European socialist countries concluded in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, a Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Aid, stipulating the establishment of a united armed forces with a joint command. The Warsaw Treaty was an important factor in strengthening peace and security in Europe.

The close of the 1950s marked the final and complete triumph of socialism in the USSR. The realisation of profound social and economic processes in the 1920s and 1930s led to the victory of socialist relations in the USSR. Private ownership of the means of production was eliminated and replaced by socialist ownership. Exploitation of all forms was liquidated. In this context socialism had won a complete victory. Within the country there remained no forces or conditions which could lead to the restoration of capitalism.

However, the first socialist state in the world was under the constant threat of military intervention by the capitalist countries and faced the danger of a forcible restoration of capitalism by international reaction. The attacks launched by international imperialism against the Soviet state were successfully repulsed by the Soviet people. Emerging victorious in the Great Patriotic War, the USSR cleared the ground for a decisive change to the benefit of socialism in the balance of forces on the international stage. The rapid growth of the economic potential of the Soviet state, its military strength and the

establishment and consolidation of a system of socialist states made impossible the restoration of capitalism by means of military intervention from without. To be sure, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries received no guarantees against a military attack by the capitalist countries, but the world situation had so evolved that there existed no force capable of restoring capitalism in the USSR or any other socialist country. This meant that socialism in the USSR had won complete and final victory.



## Chapter XII

### A TIME OF GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS

At the close of the 1950s the Soviet Union entered on a new stage of social and political development, characterised by further improvements in the country's material and technological base and in social relations, by the comprehensive development of Soviet democracy, by the unrelenting growth of the cultural, educational and material standard of living of the Soviet people. The building of developed socialist society was begun and completed in the 1960s. Socialism achieved a high degree of maturity, stability and development.

The national economy of the USSR, founded on socialist relations of production and on the economic laws of socialist society, reached a high rate of growth of the productive forces. Qualitative changes accompanied these quantitative changes.

These qualitative changes were determined by the organic linking of the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of the socialist system. Such a fusion was manifested, above all, in the creation and rapid development of new branches of production, in the modernisation of old plant and facilities and of the technology of outdated sectors, the widespread

introduction of comprehensive mechanisation, automation and chemisation, and in the creation of fundamentally new tools and materials. The structure and territorial deployment of production was further rationalised. The substantial growth in the capacity and technological level of the economy was accompanied by improvements in the training of scientific and technical personnel.

Progress in the development of the productive forces was also conditioned by the unprecedented growth rate marking the Soviet economy.

By the end of 1970 there were in the USSR 50 thousand factories, quarries, mines, open pits, electric power stations and other industrial enterprises. There were 34 thousand collective farms and 15 thousand state farms, and thousands of construction, transport and communications enterprises. The value of the economy's basic funds amounted to 737,000 million rubles. Each month the country's industries produced an output equivalent to that of the entire pre-war year of 1940. A single per cent of the growth in industrial output in 1970 matched the figure of annual industrial output in pre-revolutionary Russia.

The material resources for the implementation of large-scale capital-intensive projects grew. By the first half of the 1950s annual capital investment hovered at the 13,400 million ruble mark, almost matching investment for the entire Second Five-Year Plan. During the second half of the 1950s annual average capital investment climbed to 24,700 million rubles. Capital input for 1970 alone amounted to 80,000 million rubles—50 per cent greater than the combined figure for investment during the pre-war five-year plans.

This permitted the creation of new types of production and new installations within brief space of time. It spurred the construction and operationalising of thousands of new enterprises. It

was specifically during the second half of the 1950s that immense machine-building, metallurgical and petrochemical enterprises were constructed together with high-voltage electrical transmission units, gas mains, and building-material plants.

In the 1950s a new stage began in the development of the power industry. The Kuibyshev Hydroelectric Power Station was commissioned. Construction was completed on the immense Stalingrad Hydroelectric Power Station on the Volga, with a capacity of 2,500 thousand kilowatts. Next followed the Irkutsk Hydroelectric Power Station on the Angara and the largest in the world, the Bratsk Hydroelectric Power Station. Construction moved into swing on a still larger power plant with a generating capacity of 6 million kilowatts on the Yenisei in the region of Krasnoyarsk. Evidence of the advanced technical level and originality of these projects is offered by the fact that the American corporation General Electric signed a special agreement allowing it to become acquainted with Soviet experience in hydroelectric power plant construction.

Work on thermoelectric power plants proceeded apace. As a rule these plants were furnished with a generating capacity of 100-200 thousand kilowatts each. It is relevant to note that the first Soviet hydroelectric power station—the Volkhov—had a capacity of 80 thousand kilowatts. The remarkable Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station can produce approximately 400 thousand kilowatts.

During the late 1960s many plants were fitted with power grids with generating capacities of 300 thousand kilowatts. Work proceeded on the 500 thousand kw grids at the Nazarovo state regional electric power station in Siberia.

The overall figure for electric power output reached in 1970 was 740,000 million kilowatt-hours. Annual growth stood at 50,000 million kilowatt-hours. We note in comparison that before the war

electric energy output in the USSR amounted only to 48,000 million kilowatt-hours.

In 1954 the first nuclear power plant in the world was put into operation in the city of Obninsk, not far from Moscow. Observations of its operations permitted in the 1960s the working out and comparatively rapid implementation of a plan to establish nuclear power stations with higher capacities and for industrial usage. The first major industrial-usage nuclear power station in the USSR was the Sibirskaia, commissioned in 1958. By 1965 it had reached its projected generating capacity of 600 thousand kilowatts. Subsequently work was begun on the Novo-Voronezhskaya and Beloyarskaya (in the Urals) nuclear power plants.

Soviet post-war industrial progress altered fundamentally the methods and technology of the construction industry. In 1940 this sector of the economy had at its disposal only 5,100 excavators, scrapers, bulldozers and cranes. The technical level of the 4,000 construction organisations operating in the country was extremely low.

In 1946 a separate Ministry of Construction and Road-Building Machinery was established. The rapid improvement in technical plant and facilities, production of prefabricated reinforced concrete assembly units and details and the introduction of standardised design paved the way for the transformation of the building industry into a truly industrialised branch of the economy. By the outset of the 1970s there were at the disposal of 18 thousand building and assembly organisations some 353 thousand excavators, scrapers, bulldozers and mobile cranes, as well as a vast array of advanced equipment.

Today the bulk of construction work is carried out with the help of machinery. Excavation is 99 per cent mechanised, the loading and dumping of stones, sand, gravel, metal as well as of concrete,

and reinforced concrete constructions—97 per cent, and plaster and painting work—67-75 per cent.

The transition in building to industrial methods made possible a fundamental modification in all stages of construction, stimulated economies of time and improved quality. In consequence, in the space of 30 years there were erected, restored and put into operation more than 30 thousand major state industrial enterprises. In the same interval more than 700 cities and 1,865 workers' settlements were built. Among these cities were Norilsk, Bratsk, Divnogorsk, Rudny, Sumgait, Togliatti, and Svetlogorsk. All of these new cities are major industrial and cultural centres.

In the 1960s the machine-building industry received pronounced development in the east. Large factories producing heavy machinery, precision lathes and ball-bearings sprang up in this region. In Siberia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the Urals, the Transcaucasus and the Volga region more than 125 machine-building factories were erected. In Kazakhstan the scale of the machine-building industry increased more than fourfold in the period 1959-1965, in the Amur region by almost four times.

The development of transport is pivotal for a country as immense as is the Soviet Union. Railways play a predominant role in the transport system of the USSR. Since the establishment of Soviet power the network of railways has grown significantly. Substantial material resources and equipment were put into the effort to build new lines, particularly in the country's eastern regions. While in 1913 there were 3.2 kilometres of rail for every 1,000 square kilometres of surface, the corresponding figures for 1940, 1958 and 1965 were 4.8, 5.5 and 5.9 kilometres. The technological modernisation of the railway system, the introduction of diesel

locomotives and the transition to electric traction on all the basic lines spurred a sharp increase in the freight turnover of the railways. Other forms of transport were also given attention. The proportional weight of truck haulage in overall freight turnover increased. Hard-covered roads are rapidly increasing in mileage, and have shown a rise from 235 thousand kilometres in 1958 to 483 thousand kilometres a decade later.

The construction of oil and gas pipelines was promoted. A pipeline connected the Volga region with Eastern Siberia. Another, called the Druzhba (Friendship) Pipeline, stretched from the Volga to the borders of Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. At the present time plans are in creation for the construction of gas pipelines from the source region in Western Siberia to Murmansk and from Eastern Siberia to Vladivostok.

Soviet civil aviation made substantial progress. Comfortable planes were put into operation for both domestic and international flights.

During the last 30 years the technological base of Soviet merchant marine fleet has been almost totally replaced and modernised. This task was an extremely difficult one by dint of the loss during the war of half of the Soviet Union's ships. Losses had to be recuperated and total tonnage increased as compared with the pre-war level.

Between 1940-1970 the freight-carrying capacity of the USSR merchant marine increased sixfold, from 2 to 12 million tons. In terms of technological and economic profile—speed, seaworthiness, bottom-capacity, reliability and design—Soviet ships are on a par with the highest world standards. Soviet sailors yearly visit almost a thousand ports in more than 100 countries, carrying out their worthy mission of promoting trade with all interested parties.

The Soviet state has always regarded technological upgrading as the basic means of improving agriculture. A composite plan for the mechanisation of agricultural work and the widespread application of mineral fertilisers was accordingly drawn up. However the war destruction and the difficult conditions of the post-war period blocked the allocation of sufficient resources to carry out this programme.

It is an established fact that until the end of the 1960s agricultural output was increased primarily through expanding sown acreage. This stage of agricultural development was historically inevitable and conditioned by that which was materially feasible for the Soviet state.

With the beginning of the 1960s the conditions were established in the USSR for increasing the production of mineral fertilisers, carrying out irrigation projects and bringing to completion the all-round mechanisation of agriculture. The economic might of the country now allowed the intensification of agricultural production through the widespread application of fertilisers, the development of irrigation, comprehensive mechanisation and the application of the achievements of science and progressive methods.

Electrification was substantially boosted and the technological level of plant and equipment in agriculture upgraded. While in 1950 only 15 per cent of collective farms and 76 per cent of state farms had electricity, by 1960, 71 per cent of the former and nearly all of the latter had received electricity. By 1965, 95 per cent of all collective farms had been electrified.

In 1970 every collective and state farm had an average of 90 tractors (in terms of 15 hp), 13 self-propelled combines and 25 lorries. This, and the supply of other equipment, permitted agricultural workers successfully to boost the output of food-

stuffs for the population and raw materials for industry.

Substantial gains were registered in the country's production of grain, cotton, sugar-beet, potatoes, meat, milk and other produce. A striking feature of grain production was the fact that increases in output were attained through higher yields. The productivity of livestock breeding also made gains.

These significant achievements made by all branches of the Soviet economy were possible because the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, using to good advantage the superior features of the planned socialist economy, were able to place at the service of the people the fruits of science and technology and the rich experience accumulated during the years of socialist and communist construction. They were able to apply the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution on a macro-scale and fundamentally alter the technological base of the economy, thereby accelerating the pace of development.

By virtue of the scientific and technological revolution the Soviet people in the short historical span of 12 years succeeded in increasing the capacity of the country's rail transport twofold, vehicular transport—threefold, air transport—fivefold, sea transport—sixfold, and pipeline—eightfold. The scientific and technological revolution advanced the construction industry to unprecedented heights and led socialist agriculture to register consistent gains.

Output in the machine-building and chemical industries increased in the period 1959-1970 4.3 times, electric energy output—3.1 times, and the production of automation instruments and facilities—5.5 times. The national economy gained advanced techniques in a volume that guaranteed an expansion and revolutionary change in the technological base of all sectors. Between 1959-1970

workers and industrial specialists, through the introduction of automation, complex mechanisation and other advances, increased the technical underpinnings of labour 2.2 times and labour productivity 1.9 times.

The experience of building a socialist economy convincingly demonstrates the immeasurable potential contained therein. In a remarkably brief historical interval, without private investment and with no inputs from foreign capital the country was successfully industrialised. Work which normally demanded 50 years or more to complete was carried out in 10 years.

The conviction had been held by the world's leading economists that a rapid rate of growth of social production was characteristic only of the initial stage of industrialisation. It was thus forecast that the tempo would decelerate with the attaining of an advanced level of economic development. However the socialist system has demonstrated an unprecedented growth rate of social production at the contemporary stage as well. This rate is significantly higher than that of the most advanced capitalist countries. Between 1951-1970 the Soviet Union's average annual rate of growth of the national income equalled 8.7 per cent. For the USA the figure was 3.5 per cent. For the USSR average annual growth in industrial output was 10 per cent; for the USA—4.1 per cent. For agriculture the corresponding figures were 4.1 per cent and 1.7 per cent. Industrial output doubles in the USSR every 8.5 years, in the USA—every 20 years.

All of the foregoing paved the way for a tremendous narrowing of the historically evolved gap in the production levels of the USSR and the USA. In the output of many important goods the USSR had not only caught up with but surpassed the USA by 1970.

Of major significance in boosting the economy's

growth rate was the perfection of management methods. The economic reform introduced in the mid-1960s was directed at improving the system of planning and of material and moral work incentives.

The problem of perfecting management forms and methods arose in connection with the sizeable growth of the economy and increases in scale. Many millions of working people, representatives of public organisations, specialists, scientists and industrial leaders were drawn into the discussion of this issue, which touched upon the modes and methods of leadership of the various sectors of the economy and of separate enterprises and a more effective utilisation of all management levers. The economic reform adopted after a comprehensive and thorough study was aimed at intensifying the scientific level of centralised planning in combination with the expansion of independence and initiative of enterprises. Economic methods of managing the national economy were placed first in priority.

The utilisation of economic levers, the role of commodity-money relations in the socialist economy, the regulation of a planned market—the economic reform posed these questions along new lines compared with the period of industrialisation and the two post-war decades. At the same time the perfection of the Soviet system of planning and management of the economy was enacted on the basis of the most important and time-tested principles of socialist planning. The Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-1970) already demonstrated the positive effect of the new system on augmenting the efficiency of socialist production. The growth of national income amounted to 41 per cent, compared to 32 per cent for the previous Five-Year Plan. The growth rates of the accumulation fund and the consumption fund were brought closer together. The difference in growth rate marking the produc-



At the helm of science

S. P. Korolev and Y. A. Gagarin

The space pavilion is always crowded



tion of the means of production and of consumer goods making up industrial output was narrowed, to 51 per cent and 49 per cent respectively.

The triumph of the October Revolution laid the foundations for a cultural revolution of unprecedented dimensions, and this cultural revolution became one of the key prerequisites for the socialist transformation of society. The scientific and technological potential of the Soviet Union, substantially expanded in the post-war years, allowed Soviet science to take the leading position in a number of important fields. This ensured the resolution of such problems of the century as the mastering of nuclear power and the exploration of outer space. The state organisation of science and industry played an important role in this context.

In 1957 at an international conference on rocketry held in Washington, the Americans exhibited a model of their future earth satellite, weighing 1.5 kilograms. On the following day journalists asked the Soviet Academician A. A. Blagonravov for information concerning plans to launch a Soviet satellite. The indefinite answer given by Blagonravov only increased the scepticism of the Americans *vis à vis* the Russians. But literally at this time the newspapers carried sensational headlines: the Soviet Union had launched the first artificial satellite, weighing 86.3 kilograms.

Under the leadership of the outstanding scientist Sergei Pavlovich Korolev an entire galaxy of satellites was forthcoming. The last to be worked out was a true spaceship, having on board a fully equipped laboratory. One major achievement of Soviet science was the establishment of the possibility of returning these spaceships to earth. The first passengers on such a ship were animals. Scientists made precise calculations and verified in several flights the ability of a live organism to withstand the stresses during take-off, flight in outer

space, during slow-down and landing. After a thorough and comprehensive verification of the research results the decision was taken to send the first human into space. On April 12, 1961, at 9:07 the first spaceship carrying a man aboard was launched from the Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan.

It would seem that all had been taken care of and verified with animals, but no one was sure how the human organism would stand up to the stresses and strains of space flight. How would man's psyche, consciousness and vestibular apparatus react?

The first man to step into the heavens was Yuri Gagarin—a citizen of the USSR. The launching of the rocket *Vostok*, which bore man into the orbital trajectory, was the result of the concerted effort of many collectives of scientists, engineers, technicians and workers.

There had been no such joyful holiday since Victory Day, May 9, 1945. Forty-five years of struggle, building, studies and creative effort. Forty-five years of ever more bold and daring plans and actions—now the Soviet people were the first to step beyond the confines of the Earth. In this holiday of Soviet science, technology and human prowess were engraved the efforts of those who contributed to the first Five-Year Plans, the exploits of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War and the unremitting labours of workers, peasants and the intelligentsia during the post-war restoration of the national economy.

Yuri Gagarin was followed into space by Herman Titov, Andrian Nikolayev, Pavel Popovich, Valery Bykovsky, Valentina Tereshkova, Vladimir Komarov, Konstantin Feoktistov and Boris Yegorov. Each exploit by these heroes represented a pushing back of the barriers of the unknown and a major exploration of outer space. This research programme was crowned with a unique experiment—a walk in space. This walk was carried out

by A. Leonov during the flight of the *Voskhod 2*, piloted by the cosmonaut P. Belayev.

Another sphere of the Soviet programme of space exploration excited man's imagination. In January 1959 the space station *Luna-1* was sent into orbit. The primary task of this launching was for the station to achieve second cosmic velocity on its way to the Moon. At that time the effort to land on the Moon had not yet gained momentum, for this was a task requiring superior precision of the control mechanisms. The self-guided interplanetary station *Zond-5* circled the Moon in September 1968 before returning to Earth.

A fundamentally new stage was reached by the flawless flights of *Luna-16* and *Luna-17*. The space station *Luna-16*, beginning its journey in September 1970, carried out a soft landing on the Moon, took soil samples and brought them back to Earth. In November 1970 a space station brought to the Moon the first self-propelled space research apparatus—*Lunokhod-1*. Controlled from the Earth, it carried out a large volume of scientific research.

The flights of these red-starred spacecraft to the Moon, Venus and Mars, filled new pages in the history of natural science.

The contribution made by Soviet scientists to the study of the peaceful uses of the atom represent an outstanding achievement in the modern world. Important progress was made in mastering the process of thermonuclear synthesis. In order to capture the immense energy released by thermonuclear reaction, taking place in the plasma, it is necessary to maintain the working agent at a sufficient density over a protracted interval at sufficiently high temperatures (roughly 100 million degrees, Centigrade). The taming of this process is one of the most complex tasks facing scientists.

In the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy

there was created under the guidance of Academician Artsimovich the *Tokamak* installation, a magnetic "bottle", within which plasma is heated to several million degrees (C). Under such a temperature any material will be transformed into steam. *Tokamak* represents the most promising installation for the magnetic isolation of heated plasma. A number of such installations have since been built in other countries, including the USA.

Another direction taken by research in this area is that of the usage of laser beams. With a powerful laser at their disposal scientists at the Physics Institute of the Academy of Sciences under the guidance of academicians N. Basov and O. Krokhin are carrying on work towards thermonuclear laser synthesis. The application of such lasers represents a new and original approach, and caused great agitation among scientists throughout the world when in 1968 they were first given a demonstration of laser-induced thermonuclear synthesis.

Long-range prospects for the peaceful application of atomic energy were opened up by scientific research on the creation of new types of reactors on fast neutrons paving the way for the reproduction of nuclear fuel. The establishment by Soviet scientists of the first experimental nuclear electric power plant with reactors on fast neutrons yielded positive results. On the basis of this research the first nuclear reactor for industrial use was installed in the city of Shevchenko.

Just as space research would be inconceivable without powerful rockets, so exploration of the microworld would be excluded without powerful elementary particle accelerators. The largest accelerators in the world have been built in the Soviet Union and are successfully functioning in Dubna, Novosibirsk, Yerevan, Kharkov. In 1967 construction was completed on the gigantic installations at Serpukhov—an elementary particle accelerator

with a capacity of up to 70,000 million electronvolts. Scholars from many countries, including the West, may be seen at work in this gigantic complex. This high energy physics research centre is taking on an international character.

Between 1959-1970 Soviet scientists achieved outstanding success in mathematics and computer techniques, in quantum electronics, chemistry, biology, astronomy and other branches of the fundamental sciences.

The Soviet Union became one of the leading scientific powers. While in pre-revolutionary Russia there were in all 298 scientific institutions and 11,600 scientific research personnel, by 1970 the number of such institutions exceeded 5,000, and the number of personnel—1,000,000. Since 1940 the overall number of scientific personnel has risen tenfold, now accounting for one-quarter of the world total.

The results of the cultural revolution are measured in truly astronomical figures. While in the general education schools of tsarist Russia there were enrolled in all 9,500,000 children, the number in the Soviet Union by the close of the 1960s exceeded 48,000,000. The comparable figures for teachers were 280,000 and 2,500,000 respectively. More than 80,000,000 people were in some way involved in education by the end of the 1960s.

More than 4,000,000 students pursued their studies in the country's 767 higher educational institutions, an enrolment almost 33 times higher than on the eve of the October Revolution, and 3.5 times higher than in Japan, France, Italy, and the FRG together. By the beginning of the 1970s the country boasted over 20 million citizens with higher and secondary specialised education. During 1966-1970 alone more than 7,000,000 specialists with higher and secondary specialised education received their diplomas.

It is of some note that at the close of the last

decade the country was producing more than 2,000 copies of books each minute, that 10 million people took part in amateur performance groups and that popular theatre festivals gave weight to the conclusion that the best of the 900 amateur performing collectives stood on a par with professional troupes.

In the early 1970s the Soviet Union was first in the world in terms of the number of visits paid to theatres, cinemas, concert halls and libraries. In the USSR annually 245,000,000 people attend the theatre and concert halls, almost 50,000,000—circus performances, approximately 10,000,000—the museums, and 4,600,000 million—the movies. Close to three-quarters of the population, or 180,000,000 citizens, hold library cards.

The most important achievement of socialism is represented by the socialist individual—the new culture of human interrelationships. A new man, a collectivist, a struggler, a revolutionary and transformer—has matured. In this man are mirrored the great things that have been achieved. He represents a guarantee of new triumphs.

Cultural gains in the non-Russian republics are of particular note. We cite Tajikistan as but one example. Tajikistan, the most southern of Soviet republics, boasts an ancient civilisation. Here were born the noted healer of medieval times, Abu Ali Ibn Sina, and the world-renowned poet Omar Khayam. In this very same region before the October Revolution there were but 369 children of privileged parents enrolled in schools and but 13 teachers. Literacy reached only 1.5 per cent of the population.

Now the capital of Tajikistan—Dushanbe—has its own university, Academy of Sciences and four of the 17 Tajik theatres. The republic has 62 daily newspapers, 22 journals and 1,200 libraries. There are 774,500 students enrolled in 3,088 schools.

The working class and the working people of the more advanced nations, and above all the Russian,

extended massive aid to the peoples of the outlying non-Russian regions. During the brief span of one generation the once exploited peoples of the formerly tsarist border regions, with the help of the other Soviet peoples, have made great progress in cultural terms and in the training of a qualified body of specialists and members of the intelligentsia from their own milieu. The implementation of the Leninist nationalities policy led to the liquidation of the cultural inequality among individual nations and nationalities, to the equalisation of living conditions and ensuring of the flowering and bringing closer of national cultures.

Progress made by the socialist economy between 1959 and 1970, the growth in the productivity of social labour, and the day-by-day concern shown by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government for increasing the national wealth have led to the unremitting growth of the national income—the basis for improving the living standards of the Soviet people.

The national income produced between 1966 and 1970 was distributed in the following manner. Of the 1,166,000 million rubles (or about 40 per cent more than in the 1961-1965 period) roughly three-fourths were allocated to consumption. Of this sum 518,000 million rubles were distributed in wages and salaries for workers and employees in the production sphere and in collective-farm income; 199,000 million went to education, health care and to the satisfaction of other cultural and day-to-day needs of the population and of public institutions. About 80,000 million rubles were extended in the form of disability payments (for work veterans and invalids, war invalids, and the temporarily disabled) and of grants and aids to students. Finally, 41,000 million rubles were allocated to scientific development.


At no earlier date had the Soviet Union possessed such resources for the satisfaction of the material

and cultural needs of its population. In comparison we note that in the period 1936-1940 the total volume of national income did not exceed 154,000 million rubles, a figure eight times lower than in 1966-1970. The rapid growth of the national income, and notably of the consumption funds, permitted the Soviet Government to direct greater and greater resources on wage and pension increases, medical services, free education, housing and the services for the population.

The concluding years of the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-1970) proceeded under the banner of further increments in the well-being of the people. The implementation of the economic reform was of great import. The transition by the majority of enterprises to new managerial guidelines and the growth of their incomes permitted the allocation of more substantial resources as remuneration for those who facilitated the fulfilment of the production plans. In 1970 alone industrial enterprises earmarked 9,000 million rubles for growth, social and cultural, and residential construction and material incentive funds. Of this figure 4,000 million rubles made up the material incentive fund. Average wages and salaries for workers and employees rose by 26 per cent, and for collective farm workers by 42 per cent.

The growth in the real incomes of the working people spurred changes in the level and structure of consumption. Increases were registered in the consumption of meat, milk and other dairy products, eggs, fish and fish products, and sugar. The proportionate consumption of low-calory foods declined. Sales of furniture, household wares and light industry products rose.

During the ten-year interval from 1960 to 1970 the number of vacuum cleaners in use rose from 1,800,000 to 7,600,000, of refrigerators—from 2,000,000 to 21,000,000, of washing machines



A collective farm field



The atomic power station



A gigantic blast furnace in Krivoy Rog



—from 2,900,000 to 34,000,000, and of TV sets—from 4,700,000 to 35,000,000.

At the close of the 1950s the opportunity arose of launching wide-scale housing construction. Already in 1957 10,000,000 people gained new housing—2,300,000 more than in the previous year. In terms of rate of construction and amount of living space built the Soviet state moved into first place in the world. In 1960 an average of 14 flats were built for every one thousand citizens. More than 100 million square metres of living space were annually readied for occupation. During the 1966-1970 period more housing construction was completed than during the entire period from 1917 to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Between 1959 and 1970 every month approximately 1,000,000 Soviet citizens either moved into new quarters or benefited from improved conditions in their existing residences.

Developed socialist society is characterised by the consolidation of social unity. On the whole not only have class antagonisms been overcome, but a new and higher level of co-operation among all strata of society has been reached by comparison with the previous period. The basis of social relations is made up of the union of the working class, the toiling peasantry and the working intelligentsia. In the conditions of developed socialism the homogeneity of society had become more pronounced. This process has been prompted not only by changes in the class structure (a growth in the proportional weight of the working class) but also by the obliteration of the boundaries between classes as well as the overcoming of the existing differences between manual and mental labour and between town and country. Of much import in this process has been the establishment of communist social relations, the consolidation of friendship, collectivism, mutual aid and comradesly solidarity.

The working class remains the chief guiding force of Soviet society and the Soviet people. This role is conditioned above all by the fact that the working class is directly connected with socialist property, the core of which is made up by industry, representing the foundation of the entire economy of socialist society. This role is further determined by the fact that, by virtue of its historical development, the working class represents the most closely-knit, organised social group infused with communism and capable of leading other social strata along the path to communism. The specificities of the working class, its experience gained in the struggle for communism, its unimpeachable authority stemming from this experience—predetermine the leading role of the working class in the effort to complete the construction of a new society. Thus the leading role of the working class in society is determined by objective conditions and imposes on the working class obligations of the highest order, without providing any advantages of a political, economic or legal order over the collective farmers or members of the intelligentsia.

Advanced socialism is distinguished by further consolidation of the friendship among peoples.

The friendship of the Soviet peoples is a major accomplishment of socialism, and a great victory for the Communist Party. Relations of fraternal co-operation and mutual aid among nations and nationalities are manifested daily and on a wide scale in all spheres of Soviet society. Here is but one, albeit typical, example. In April 1966 Tashkent was destroyed by an earthquake. Four hundred thousand residents of the Uzbek capital were left homeless. The entire country rushed to the aid of Tashkent. All the children were removed from the city during the summer and placed in sanatoria, holiday homes and pioneer camps throughout the Union republics. These children were surrounded

with tenderness and care wherever they went—in Russian cities and villages, in the Ukraine, in Byelorussia, Tataria, Bashkiria, Georgia or Armenia. Devoting endless hours to their care, people of all nationalities; both children and adults, tried to lighten their grief and help them forget the catastrophe through which they had lived. They did everything in their power to make these children feel at home. When winter came around, all the residents of Tashkent had a roof over their heads. Today the majority of apartment houses in Tashkent are decorated with the arms of one of the 15 Union republics, indicating the source of the funds which went into the building of the given house.

The aftermath of the Tashkent earthquake is yet another indication of the fact that the fraternity of nations and nationalities in the Soviet Union had evolved to such an advanced level and transformed into the awareness of belonging to a new historical community—that of the Soviet people.

The close of the 1950s was marked by an intensification of the Soviet Union's effort to relax international tensions, to preserve and strengthen the peace and security of nations. Given the division of the world into two systems the sole correct and reasonable guiding principle for international relations is the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

In January 1960 the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, at the suggestion of the CC of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, decided to carry out unilaterally a new and substantial reduction of the country's Armed Forces. The Supreme Soviet adopted a law reducing the army by another 1,200 thousand men, or by one-third, and significantly decreasing army and navy armaments as well as cutting military expenditures by approximately 16-17,000 million rubles.

The Soviet Government proposed the convening of a summit conference to examine the most pressing international problems, the resolution of which the entire world awaits with impatience. Under the pressure of public opinion the governments of the USA, Britain and France agreed to a meeting of heads of state and to setting a time and place for the meeting. However, reactionary circles in the United States of America were frightened by the prospect of a further relaxation of international tensions. Endeavouring to hurl the world back into the abyss of the cold war, they organised acts of military provocation against the Soviet Union. Just before the conference a US reconnaissance plane with hostile intent committed an aerial incursion of the USSR.

Similar provocative acts led to the rupture of the conference of heads of state, and this, in turn, led to a new exacerbation of the cold war by the Western powers. However the Soviet Government did not slacken its efforts to relax international tensions and establish a stable and lasting peace throughout the world. An important step in this direction was the Soviet proposal at the Fifteenth Session of the UN General Assembly in the autumn of 1960 on disarmament, on the granting of independence to the colonial countries and peoples, and on the reorganisation of the United Nations apparatus.

The Soviet Union endeavoured to provide solutions for controversial international problems on a democratic and just basis and in the interests of strengthening world peace. It advanced proposals for banning nuclear weapon tests and for establishing non-nuclear zones. The Soviet Union worked out a concrete programme for ending the arms race, for reduction of the armed forces and for the total banning of nuclear weapons.

Universal and complete disarmament—this is the most important problem in international relations,



and represents the key to peace. The Soviet Union tried to place on a practical basis the problem of disarmament. It was precisely this aim which inspired the proposal by the Soviet Union of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament. The draft Treaty envisaged three consecutive stages over four years in the process of disbanding all armed forces and completely liquidating armaments, military bases, ceasing military production, abolishing military institutions and ending allocations for military needs. The draft Treaty contained a system of controls to guarantee the fulfilment of the obligations for disarmament undertaken by the parties to the agreement.

However the Soviet Union's proposal was not supported by the ruling circles of the Western powers. They also remained deaf to the appeals of the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace, which was held in Moscow between July 9-14, 1962.

The powerful popular movement for disarmament and peace forced the ruling circles in the imperialist states to take into account the opinion of millions of people. In the summer of 1963, Moscow hosted the conclusion of a Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. This represented a major victory for the policy of peaceful coexistence promoted by the Soviet Union and was an important step in the direction of general and full disarmament.

The outset of 1964 marked a new peace initiative by the Soviet Government, namely the proposal to conclude an international treaty rejecting the application of force for the resolution of territorial and boundary disputes. This proposal was warmly received by world public opinion and the governments of dozens of countries. However the 1960s were not to witness the realisation of this project.

The efforts of the Soviet Government were directed at reducing the possibility of nuclear conflict. Soviet diplomacy succeeded in working out an international treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world. After a substantial exertion such a treaty was agreed upon and by mid-September 1969 had been signed by the governments of more than 90 countries. The enactment of this treaty was a major step in the limitation of the arms race.

The Soviet Government on numerous occasions brought forth concrete proposals for the resolution of outstanding issues such as the liquidation of the survivals of the Second World War in Europe. In its proposals the Soviet Union pointed out realistic approaches for a peaceful solution of the German problem through the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the normalisation of the situation in Berlin.

The consistent support given by the Soviet Union to the struggle against colonialism is of great importance for the preservation and strengthening of the peace. The anti-colonial revolution taking place in the post-war years had a true friend and ally in the Soviet Union. The sympathy expressed by the Soviet people and Government in relation to the struggle of the oppressed peoples does not represent an accidental position, nor is it temporary or passing.

One after another the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have adopted the path of independent development. The Soviet Union has granted generous and disinterested aid to these peoples who have achieved their political independence and are struggling for economic independence. In many Asian and African countries the USSR has helped build industrial enterprises, hydro-electric power stations, and established higher educational institutions and hospitals. For these

same countries the Soviet Union has trained large numbers of highly qualified specialists from among the native population.

In struggling for the consolidation of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems the Soviet Union acted firmly and decisively in the support of the small nations, whose sovereignty, freedom and independence were the subjects of encroachment by the reactionary circles in the imperialist states.

The expansion of economic ties with the USSR and the technical aid rendered by the socialist state permitted the young Asian and African countries confidently to conduct independent policies at the international level.

The provocation stirred up by militaristic circles in the USA and directed against revolutionary Cuba brought the world in autumn 1962 to the brink of nuclear war. It was only the firm and wise policy of the Soviet Government which saved the world from catastrophe. The US Government proclaimed its denial of attempts to invade Cuba and entered on negotiations for the normalisation of the situation. The Soviet Union was just as firm and unyielding in its support of the Yemen, Algeria, Cyprus and other countries when they were threatened with imperialist aggression.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries rendered substantial aid to the Vietnamese people in their heroic resistance to imperialist aggression. This aid was stepped up after early August 1964, when the American Air Force began the systematic bombardment of the territories of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Soviet diplomacy successfully carried forth the Leninist principles of the foreign policy of a socialist state. This foreign policy made a worthy contribution to the maintenance of peace and the relaxation of international tensions.

## Chapter XIII


### A NEW HISTORICAL COMMUNITY

In describing the international significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution Lenin observed that its impact was expressed in the revolutionary movement in other countries and in the repetition of the basic features of the Russian revolution on an international scale. Lenin wrote: "After proving that, by revolutionary organisation, we can repel any violence directed against the exploited, we must prove the same thing in another field by setting an example that will convince ... not in word but in deed, that a communist system and way of life can be created by a proletariat which has won a war. This is a task of world-wide significance."

And the Soviet Union had shown the entire world that the building of socialism could be successfully realised.

The economic successes of the socialist state were not to the liking of the reactionary imperialist forces. It was no coincidence that the first US Ambassador to the USSR, William C. Bullitt, said that the desire alone to match the US in steel production justified a preventive war against the USSR.

"We are exercising our main influence on the international revolution," Lenin said in 1921.



During the joint commemorative session of the CC CPSU, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, marking the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR. L. I. Brezhnev, CC CPSU General Secretary, addresses the session

A textile mill

Steel is produced

At the Electrosila Factory

"through our economic policy. The working people of all countries without exception and without exaggeration are looking to the Soviet Russian Republic. This much has been achieved. The capitalists cannot hush up or conceal anything. That is why they so eagerly catch at our every economic mistake and weakness. The struggle in this field has now become global. Once we solve this problem, we shall have certainly and finally won on an international scale."

The task of which Lenin spoke was successfully fulfilled by the Soviet people under the leadership of the CPSU. A decisive factor underlying this success was the bringing together of all the peoples of the country into a close-knit fraternal family. This was an event the significance of which for the country's history and for all its peoples is difficult to overestimate. The formation of a united multinational state opened up unprecedented opportunities for social, economic and cultural progress. This is why in December 1972 the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR was celebrated by the Soviet people and all progressive forces on all continents.

During this half-century the total volume of the country's industrial output increased 320 times. In a speech honouring the occasion of the anniversary, L. I. Brezhnev noted: "Some may say, of course, that any comparison with 1922 is not indicative, because it had been a year of post-war ruin and famine. In that case let us compare 1972 with the pre-war year of 1940. In that period alone, the Soviet Union's industrial output increased 14-fold. Soviet industry now turns out in one month more than it did in the whole of 1940."

The well-being and cultural standing of the peoples of the USSR are steadily being enhanced. The real income of the population in comparison to 1940 has increased more than fourfold, and retail

trade turnover—by more than sevenfold. The number of citizens with a higher or secondary education (whether complete or incomplete) increased 6.5 times in the same interval. Underlying these figures are sweeping changes not only in the economy, but also in socio-political relations and in the social structure, in ideology and culture, that have altered the profile of the entire Soviet society.

What in fact are these social changes? First of all, the greatest changes have occurred in the profile of the working class, the leading class in socialist society. The path traversed by the working class during the years of Soviet power included rapid numerical growth in all sectors of the economy. Today it is the most numerous class in Soviet society. In 1970 the working class included in its ranks 64,300 thousand people making up 55 per cent of the gainfully employed population, compared to 39.5 per cent in 1939. Of course, the place of the working class in society cannot be expressed strictly in figures, which change with the development of the economy and the rate of the scientific and technological revolution. Rather it is determined, above all, by the revolutionary spirit, discipline, level of organisation, collectivism of the working class and by the fact that it was and remains the basic productive force of society. But it may be added that the joining together of the social position of the leading class with numerical superiority is of notable import for the further development of society and the strengthening of its social unity.

The leading role of the working class as the builder of communism is consolidated in pace with its growing cultural and educational level and degree of political activity. In 1970, 55 per cent of all workers were in possession of a higher or secondary education. By 1975 the transition to universal secondary education for young people was essentially completed. The improvement of the general

educational level serves as the foundation for the professional mastery and qualifications of the workers. At the present time there is a steady increase of the number of workers who have totally mastered their profession yet continue beyond the secondary school level to assimilate the new achievements of science, technology and culture.

Anatoly Kryakiyev works as an instrumentalist in the tool workshop of the Onega Tractor Works. This man is an ardent music-lover and frequently attends concerts at the Petrozavodsk Philharmonic. But he is not merely a listener, for he is a soloist in a popular folk group called the Runa and travelled with this group on a performance tour of Scandinavia. In addition Anatoly Kryakiyev is furthering his specialised education. Hundreds of the factory's workers are enrolled in institutes of higher learning and specialised secondary schools. At the VAZ Works, with its modern plant and facilities, more than half of the workers have a specialised or a general secondary education.

Within the working class the proportional weight of highly qualified workers is increasing. The work of the latter is growing closer to that of engineers and technical employees. Thus, given the general numerical growth of the industrial work force from 1945 to 1965 by a multiple of 2.7, the number of workers connected with mechanised and automated processes and with new production technology increased 12- to 14-fold in certain branches of industry. This process was given particular impetus by the scientific and technological revolution.

Earlier the worker was but a direct producer of goods and the machine upon which he worked was created for him by scientists, designers and engineers. The scientific and technological revolution has led to the appearance of a new type of worker who produces material wealth through invention and design, creates automated units, guides production

operations carried without the direct participation of man and rationalises production processes.

At the First State Ball-Bearing Plant, for example, a movement has arisen under the motto: "We Are the Scouts of Technological Progress". In establishing technical initiative brigades the workers are trying to expedite the introduction of new advances in science and technology. One of the founders of this movement A. Viktorov, a fitter (now Secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions), drew up during the years of the Eighth Five-Year Plan more than 70 new designs for the plant. Speaking of the work of the brigade under his leadership, he observed: "The work is quite engrossing. Improving, raising the technical level of production.... We are equal participants with designers and technicians in the discussion of all innovations." It is no coincidence that in 1970 there were three million workers among the 5,400 thousand members of the All-Union Society of Designers and Inventors. Even in the Scientific and Technological Society, concerned with theoretical problems stemming from the scientific and technological revolution, the proportional weight of workers increased from 8.2 per cent in 1956 to 12.3 per cent in 1971.

The working class is not only the basic productive force but also the leading class of Soviet society. It has a guiding role in socio-political life which it carries out through the party, state and public organisations.

The most advanced and highly conscious segment of the working class is in the ranks of the CPSU. In 1975 membership of the party reached 15,694,000. Workers composed 41.6 per cent, representatives of the technical intelligentsia 20 per cent and collective farmers 13.9 per cent of this total. Congress resolutions have underscored the point that in the party's social composition the leading place should

belong to the working class. At present workers constitute 58 per cent of all those joining the party, which fully conforms to the character of our party and the place and role of the working class in Soviet society.

Workers' representation in the organs of state authority is steadily increasing. In the most numerous of these organs—the local Soviets of Working People's Deputies—35 per cent of those elected in 1969 were workers. In 1971 the proportion rose to 36.5 per cent, reaching 40.5 per cent at the 1975 elections. The membership of the USSR Supreme Soviet elected in 1974 includes 498 workers, who make up one-third of all deputies. Together with representatives of the collective farmers, workers constitute an absolute majority among deputies to local Soviets: 1,497,010 or 67.7 per cent of all deputies. This is also true of the Supreme Soviet, where worker and collective farmer deputies account for 50.7 per cent (709 deputies) of the total membership.

Certain historians in the West are engaged in an effort to demonstrate that the working class in the USSR does not play the leading role in socialist society, that it has even forfeited its position in the party and that it has allegedly lost its "revolutionary spirit", become "conservative" and incapable of leadership. The facts unambiguously demonstrate that by virtue of objective conditions the leading political role of the working class in contemporary society has in fact increased significantly. The historical experience of the world revolutionary movement and of the building of socialism and communism in the USSR and other socialist countries confirms again and again Lenin's statement that the working class represents "the intellectual and moral motive force and the physical executor" of the historical task of transforming capitalist society into socialist society.

The working class is playing a leading role in carrying out the grandiose tasks of communist construction and, as indicated in the Programme of the CPSU, "will have completed its role of leader of society after communism is built and classes disappear". It was precisely for this reason that L. I. Brezhnev emphasised at the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU that "the Party will continue to direct its efforts to securing the growth and strengthening of the influence of the working class in all spheres of the life of our society and to making its activity and initiative more fruitful".

On the basis of the socialist interests and communist ideals of the working class the unity of Soviet society is strengthening ever more, all classes and social groups of which in the course of historical development have moved to the political positions of the working class. As the essential differences between manual and mental labour are being obliterated the process of the drawing together of the working class with other classes and social groups is gaining momentum.

The peasantry is a prominent figure in societal life, for agriculture is one of the major sectors of the economy responsible for the delivery of foodstuffs to the population and raw materials to light industry. Sweeping changes in agricultural production have called forth corresponding changes in the social structure of the rural population.

We note first the modifications in the ratio between state and collective farms to the advantage of the former. The number of state farms increased from 4,159 in 1940 to 14,994 in 1970, whereas the number of collective farms declined from 236,900 to 33,600. As the industrialisation of agriculture proceeds the role and numerical strength of state-farm workers increases. In 1970 the number of state-farm workers made up about one-third of all people engaged in agricultural production. The overall

number of workers and employees working in state organisations in the village rose from 36 per cent in 1959 to 61 per cent in 1970, while the proportion of peasants in the country's overall population decreased from 49 per cent in 1959 to 30 per cent in 1971. Second, essential changes, stemming fundamentally from the development of the material and technological base of agriculture, have taken place in the internal structure of the collective-farm peasantry. The technical modernisation of agricultural production and deployment of complex machinery and tractors (the number of which has risen more than sixfold in 30 years) as well as mechanisation and electrification have promoted a sharp increase in the number of machine-operators. Among collective-farm workers their proportional weight has increased from less than 1 per cent in 1940 to 12 per cent (or more than two million machine-operators) in 1970.

A wealth of evidence points to the changes that have occurred in the spiritual make-up of peasant life. By 1975 almost half the rural working population possessed a higher or secondary education, while on the eve of the war it was possessed only by every sixteenth person. The educational gap between the town and the country has been narrowed by more than 50 per cent. In 1950 rural libraries had holding of 14 books for every reader; in 1970 the figure was 17. Rural inhabitants display a keen interest in the latest advances in science, technology and culture.

Thus, the drawing together of the working class and the peasantry is taking place on the basis of the development of the material and technological base of agriculture, the overcoming of the essential disparities in the plant, facilities and equipment available to industry and agriculture, and improvement in the cultural level and material well-being of the village work force.

The transition to monetary payments for work as


well as the introduction of a pension system and other measures are not merely improving the well-being of the peasantry but also bringing into close approximation the forms of work remuneration and the social benefits of the peasants with those of the workers. The reduction of the number of those engaged in unskilled labour is drawing agricultural and industrial labour nearer together. Whereas earlier the collective-farm peasantry served as a source to boost the numbers of the working class, today a tendency to mutual interchange is in evidence.

The collective-farm peasantry is drawing closer to the working class in level of political consciousness as well. There are millions of Communists living and working in the village today and not a single collective or state farm without a party organisation. Communists are the acknowledged vanguard of rural labourers and set an example in the struggle for further gains in agricultural production.

Finally, the growth of the productive forces in agriculture, the cultural upsurge and the restructuring of everyday rural life are leading to changes in the social profile and the psychology of the peasant. Of more and more prominence are features held in common with the worker. This drawing together of two classes of Soviet society is one of the most important processes and results of the sociopolitical development of Soviet society.

Under the impact of the scientific and technological revolution and the transformation of science into a direct productive force, all categories of brainworkers—and, in particular, scientific and technical personnel—are expanding rapidly. The number of scientific personnel rose between 1960 and 1970 from 354 to 927 thousand. During the Eighth Five-Year Plan period the number of engineers increased 50 per cent to reach the 2,500 thousand mark. Between 1966






Yak 40 in flight

The first of the Soviet hydrofoil ships

A challenge



Siberia. The Abakan-Taishet railway line

A new city

A new blast furnace is being built

and 1970 higher educational institutions graduated 2,618 thousand, and secondary specialised educational institutions—4,446 thousand specialists. In the subsequent five-year period the number of trained specialists with secondary or higher education increased still further to exceed 9 million people.

The intelligentsia engaged in the creative arts is active in the country. The Writers' Union had 7,174 members in 1971, the Artists' Union—13,049, the Architects' Union—12,085, the Film-Makers' Union—4,648 and the Composers' Union—1,733. Art personnel working in professional theatres numbered more than 32 thousand individuals. All in all the creative intelligentsia included more than 30 million people in its ranks. According to the census of 1970 there were 95 million people in the country with a higher or secondary education.

There is taking place a certain decline in the share of those engaged directly in material production, while the relative weight of those working in education, health, science and art is growing. These gains—both absolutely and relatively—in the size of the Soviet intelligentsia express both historical law and the policies of the CPSU and Soviet Government aimed at an all-out acceleration of the rate of scientific and technological progress and at enhancing the cultural and educational level of the people. In this context it must be kept in mind that gains in the relative numerical strength of personnel engaged in mental labour are in any case the offshot of gains in the labour productivity of the workers.

At the present time the Soviet intelligentsia is fully evolved as a socialist social grouping. Marxism-Leninism is its ideological base; and in its practical activities it is guided by the interests of the people as a whole. More than two-thirds of Communists with the occupational category "employees" are engineers, agronomists, teachers, doctors, and figures in science, literature and art.

Sometimes bourgeois sociologists, referring to the rapid growth of the intelligentsia, claim that it is precisely this group rather than the working class which exerts the leading role. However, no facts can be mustered to demonstrate the loss by the working class of its place in socialist society or to show that the intelligentsia has taken up a position allowing it to counterpose the working class or exert claims for an independent leading role. The intelligentsia in socialist society functions together with rather than in place of the working class. With the working class retaining its leading role, all classes and social groups are noticeably drawing closer together and the process of obliteration of the essential differences between physical and mental work, between living and work conditions in the town and countryside, is continuing quite actively. The social homogeneity of Soviet society is becoming more and more pronounced.

The Soviet Union, with a population of 250 million in the middle of 1973, represents a community of more than 100 nations and nationalities, from the Russians with a numerical strength of 129 million (1970 census), to the Yukagirs with 600 representatives in all. The strengthening of the inter-national community of working people was particularly intense in conditions of the concluding of socialist construction and the creation of a developed socialist society. The latter 15 years are characterised by the consolidation of national statehood and the enhancement of its role in communist construction. During this period the rights of the Soviet republics in the area of planning and the responsibility of the republican-level organs for the drawing up of national economic plans were extended. Control over budget allocations in a number of branches of both the economy and of culture was turned over to the governments of the Union and autonomous republics. Representation was enlarged of the Union

and autonomous republics and regions in the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the legislative activity of the republican Supreme Soviets was stepped up. These as well as other measures to increase the rights and boost the initiative of the republics were combined integrally with the strengthening of centralism in state administration as a whole and the consolidation of the political unity of the peoples of the USSR.

Major advances were achieved in the economic sphere of nationalities relations. In L. I. Brezhnev's report at the joint jubilee meeting of the CC CPSU, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR, the following data were presented. Since the formation of the Soviet Union Kazakhstan's industrial production has increased 600 times, that of the Tajik SSR—by more than 500 times, of Kirghizia—by more than 400. Gross yields of cotton in Turkmenia have increased 90-fold, and of grain in Kazakhstan—30-fold. Economic co-operation among the Soviet republics has, together with the overcoming of actual disparities, become more diversified and sizable. During the post-war five-year plans a major step has been taken in equalising the level of economic development of the Soviet republics. Whereas industrial output in the USSR stood at 1,190 per cent in 1970 as compared to 1940, in the eastern regions the corresponding figure was 1,550 per cent.

In the course of one generation the peoples of Uzbekistan, to cite but one example of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, completed the leap from feudalism to socialism, bypassing the stage of capitalism. A powerful and modern industry has been established in Uzbekistan. The republic has 1,300 major factories and more than 100 different branches of industry. The output of the most

important types of industrial goods increased several hundreds, and even thousands of times over the 1913 level. Thus, electric power output increased 7,100 times. Earlier this republic even imported its nails! Now Uzbekistan produces airplanes, tractors, excavators, bulldozers, earth-scrapers, powerful cotton-picking machines, elevators, refrigerators, power transformers, a variety of cables, and complex technical installations for the textile, cotton-processing and chemical industries. Output in the machine-building industry increased 348-fold over the pre-war 1940 figure.

The rate of increase of per capita capital investment for Central Asia, Byelorussia, Lithuania and Moldavia by far outstripped that for the USSR as a whole. Republican industries took on a multi-sectored character. The formerly backward Soviet republics now not only produce but export output of the light and heavy industries, both to other republics and to foreign countries. Thus, together with the development of the economies of the republics, their contribution to the country's overall production and to the solution of tasks on the level of the entire Soviet Union has become more versatile and substantial. This means that the economic basis of the union of all peoples of the USSR has expanded.

The fraternal common effort is clearly manifested in major construction projects, requiring a sizeable labour force and a large variety of highly qualified personnel. More than 26 thousand people from all the Union republics worked together in the reclamation of the land of the Golodnaya Steppe. The blueprints for the construction of economic units are drawn up by 19 specialised design and research institutes in Moscow, Alma-Ata, Dushanbe and other cities.

The Bratsk Hydroelectric Power Station, the result of the efforts of workers and specialists of 52

different nationalities, serves as a living monument to the friendship of the Soviet peoples. Other such projects are the Kazakhstan metallurgical combine, which was built by representatives of 100 different nationalities, the Nurek Hydroelectric Power Station in Tajikistan, and many others.

The economy of the Soviet Union does not represent a simple arithmetic sum of the economies of the individual republics and regions. Rather it is a unified economic organism, evolved on the basis of the common economic interests of all peoples of the USSR.

The cultural drawing together of the peoples of the Soviet Union is progressing successfully.

Before the victory of the October Revolution Central Asia was plagued by almost total illiteracy. According to the census of 1897, only 3.6 per cent of the population could read and write. During the 1914/1915 school year there were in operation in the present-day territories of the Central Asian republics 165 general education schools with a student body of 18 thousand made up primarily of the children of the local élite, tsarist officials and wealthy parents. In the 40 years subsequent upon the incorporation of Central Asia the tsarist government introduced in this region an average of 9 schools yearly. The journal *Vestnik Vospitaniya* commented in 1906 that if that rate of opening new schools were extended into the future, illiteracy would be liquidated in Central Asia in 4,600 years! In this huge area there was not a single institute of higher education or national theatre and but a scattering of libraries. Today in Uzbekistan alone there are 9,400 general education schools with an enrolment of over 3,500 thousand. There are 41 institutes of higher education with a student body 230 thousand strong. Secondary specialised educational institutes boast an enrolment of 177 thousand. In addition there are some six thousand libraries,

almost four thousand film-projectors, 3,500 clubs and a large number of museums and sports facilities.

In 1939 the rate of literacy in Moldavia, Kirghizia, Turkmenia, Lithuania and a number of other republics was substantially lower than the all-Union figure. In 1970 all Soviet republics had achieved universal literacy. Between 1960 and 1970 the number of specialists in the USSR as a whole rose from 16 to 26 per 10 thousand citizens. In Kirghizia, Kazakhstan and Moldavia their number doubled. Although in absolute figures of specialists graduated by institutes of higher learning per 10 thousand citizens these and some other republics still lag somewhat behind the average all-Union figure, in growth rates they surpass all other republics.

In the post-war years science has made great advances in all the Soviet republics and large numbers of scientists have been trained. Whereas in the Soviet Union the number of scientific personnel increased 9-fold, in Tajikistan the increase was 13-fold, in Kazakhstan—15-fold, in Kirghizia—18-fold and in Moldavia—31-fold. Thus the rate of expansion of scientific personnel in the republics greatly surpassed that of the Soviet Union as a whole.

The development of inter-national cultural community was accompanied by the blossoming of the national cultures. The cultures of the peoples of the USSR have been mutually enriched and have drawn together. New cultural traditions and values, common to all nationalities, have been evolved. New forces, representing dozens of nationalities, have joined the ranks of the creative intelligentsia. The sweeping internationalisation of culture was promoted by the consolidation and perfection of its material and technical base. Television viewers in all the Union republics are offered a central programme carried by a united television network. Soviet radio programmes are offered in 61 languages. New forms

of cultural exchange have found broad application, for example Seven-Day and Ten-Day Literature and Art Festivals, film festivals, and reciprocal tours by theatre groups and other performing collectives. As a result national art and literature becomes more and more international in character.

Since the formation of the USSR a Soviet socialist culture has evolved and flourished, united in spirit and fundamental content, and including the most valuable features and cultural traditions of each of the Soviet peoples. This is a culture socialist in content and in the main thrust of its development and diversified in its national forms, yet internationalist in character. It represents an organic fusion of the cultural riches produced by each and every nationality.

The strengthening of the political, economic, ideological and cultural unity of nations and nationalities is leading to integration. This merger is taking place in the context of concern for national specificities and for the development of Soviet national cultures. The substance of party and government policy on this question consists of a careful assessment of both the general interests of the Soviet Union as a whole and the particular interests of each of its republics.

A new historical community evolved in the course of the development of the socio-class and international community, namely, the Soviet people. This qualitative change took place as a result of the profound and comprehensive changes in the country's life, changes of both a material and cultural nature. The new historical category operates in developed socialist society, which is characterised by a powerful material and technological base, the comprehensive development of industry, expanding at a high and stable rate through uninterrupted scientific and technological progress. Whereas during the preceding stages production growth was

brought about primarily through the building up of production capacities and manpower increases, under developed socialism it is achieved, above all, through the intensification of production and heightened productivity of labour. In developed socialist society the impact of the scientific and technological revolution is most effectively incorporated and economic development proceeds more harmoniously and in proper proportion.

Developed socialist society is characterised by more rapid growth rates of the material and cultural levels of the population and the approximating of the living standards of the various social groups. In developed socialist society the process effacing the differences between town and country, between physical and mental labour is accelerated. The drawing together of the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia is stepped up. Other features are the further advancement and gradual coming together of the socialist nationalities on the basis of the interests of both the Soviet Union as a whole and each of its republics. Developed socialism is marked by the high level of culture and education of its people, the flowering of science, the uninterrupted expansion of socialist democracy, and the enhanced role of public organisations in the governing of state. The unification of all members of Soviet society, all its social strata and classes and all nationalities and peoples on the basis of a common economy, policy, ideology and culture led to the formation of a new historical community, the Soviet people, representing the generalised outcome of the economic and socio-political changes that have taken place in the country.

The socialist community emerged and is developing under the guidance of the CPSU which, as the result of the victory of socialism and the consolidation of the unity of Soviet society, has become the party of the entire people.

## Chapter XIV

### EVERYTHING FOR MAN

Everything for man is the key motto of the party's socio-economic policy as embodied in the resolutions of the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth CPSU congresses. In the history of the USSR the party congresses represent historical landmarks of the basic stages of the revolutionary and transforming activities of the Soviet people. They accumulate the collective will and intelligence of the vanguard of the working people and serve as a forum of the ruling party of a socialist power, having experience of leadership in both the revolutionary struggle and the constructive work of the people engaged in building a new society.

The congresses of 1971 and 1976 clearly demonstrated to the whole world the consolidation of the USSR's economic might and foreign policy positions, the general upsurge of Soviet society's productive forces and culture, the fundamental acceleration in the growth rates of the people's material well-being and its steady upward advance that is the supreme goal of party and state.

The resolutions of the Twenty-Fourth Congress proposed "to ensure a considerable rise in the living standards and cultural level of the people on the basis of rapid development of socialist production". The Twenty-Fifth Congress developed and gave

concrete shape to the fundamental guidelines of the party's economic policy under the conditions of developed socialist society. It indicated that the principal task for the coming five-year period and beyond was *"the consistent application of the Communist Party's line of raising the standard of living of the people both materially and culturally through a dynamic and well-balanced development of social production and its increased efficiency, faster scientific and technological progress, higher labour productivity and better quality of work throughout the national economy"*.

Of course, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government devoted much attention to the people's well-being before too. Indeed, in the final result, the full satisfaction of man's material and spiritual needs—such is the goal of communism, expressed in the well-known postulate of the correlation between production and consumption in communist society: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." But initially it was impossible to set to the complete resolution of this task.

The difficult legacy inherited from tsarist Russia, three wars during a half century, and the difficulties standing before the first and (for a long time) the only country laying the road to socialism—all this forced the party and people to direct their main efforts to the solution of other problems. Although from the first days of Soviet power everything possible was done to improve the living standards of the working people, the historical possibilities themselves were limited.

Now the opportunities have expanded significantly. The development of the economy has permitted a more concentrated focus of efforts to improve living standards.

During the five-year plan 1971-1975 the national income increased by 28 per cent; its absolute growth amounted to 7,600 million rubles. Approximately



four-fifths of the national income went directly to improving the people's well-being. The overall production of consumer goods increased by 37 per cent, while the output of cultural and household goods in particular rose by 60 per cent. The variety of such products was expanded and their quality improved. Wages of workers and office employees and payments made to collective farmers for their labour, which constitute the basic sources of income of the population, rose by 20 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. Minimum wage rates and the basic wage rates and salaries of middle-income workers and office employees in the sphere of material production were raised, the salaries of teachers and doctors, the allowances paid to students in higher educational institutions and technical colleges and old-age and invalid pensions were increased and monetary grants for children in low-income families were introduced. As the result of measures which have been implemented the wages of 75 million people increased. The average wages of workers and office employees reached 146 rubles in 1975, amounting to 198 rubles per month with payments and benefits from social funds. The incomes of 40 million people grew through higher pensions, grants and allowances. A total of 544 million square metres of living accommodation was built (it may be noted that the USSR is building more living accommodation than all the Common Market countries taken together). Payments and benefits to the population from social consumption funds increased during the five-year period by 40 per cent.

The achievements that have been recorded have made it possible to set even more sweeping goals. The Guidelines for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1976-1980 envisage that by 1980 the average wages of workers and office employees will have risen 16-18 per cent and the incomes of collective farmers will have risen 24-27

per cent. Payments and benefits to the population from social consumption funds will grow 28-30 per cent. A total of 545-550 million square metres of living accommodation, as well as kindergartens and crèches for 2,500 thousand children and general-education schools for seven million pupils will be built.

Some foreign economists and sociologists have asserted that the economy can develop in a socialist society without the living standards of the people rising. The fallaciousness of conclusions of this kind is clearly shown by the growth in the real wages of working people. If 1940 is taken as a base figure of 100, the real wages of working people reached 251 in 1960, 298 in 1965, 398 in 1970 and 416 in 1971. On average the real incomes of working people double approximately every 15 years.

Between 1971 and 1975 production of consumer goods rose by 37 per cent, production of domestic items growing by 60 per cent, while trade turnover, given a stable level of state retail prices for basic foodstuffs and manufactured goods, rose by more than a third. The sale of consumer durables—furniture, refrigerators, etc.—increased most rapidly. Over the five-year period car sales increased 600 per cent per annum.

Between 1976 and 1980 the output of industries producing consumer goods is to increase by 30-32 per cent. In absolute terms this means that in 1980 the value of goods produced will be 54,000-56,000 million rubles more than the value of goods produced in 1975. Production will develop at an accelerated rate and the variety of new types of high quality fabric, knitted goods, shoes, clothes and items made of natural and synthetic fur will be improved. In order to ensure an increase of 60 per cent in the output of domestic, recreational and other consumer goods, it is envisaged that the growth in production of such goods at electronics

and radio factories will be 200 per cent, in the defence industry—90 per cent, in aviation-instrument factories and ferrous metallurgical plants—50 per cent, etc. The aim has been set of both increasing output and significantly improving the quality of goods. It is not for nothing that the 1976-1980 five-year plan has been called a five-year plan of efficiency and quality.

The expansion of consumer goods output increases the demand for the building of new and remodeling of existing enterprises in the light and food industries, as well as the introduction of new techniques. Over the next few years the production of equipment for the light and food industries, including fundamentally new types of machinery, will increase by 30-40 per cent. Thus, instead of spinning machines with spindles and looms with shuttles, spindleless spinning machines and shuttleless looms will be produced on a wide scale, making it possible to reduce labour consumption 50-150 per cent. The production of automated complexes for automatic enterprises in the food industry and of many other technical innovations will be inaugurated.

Over the five years the overall volume industrial production has increased by 43 per cent. More than 500,000 million rubles have been invested in all branches of the economy, making it possible to increase basic production funds by 50 per cent. The growth in basic production funds, taken over a ten-year period, amounts to 100 per cent. "To the economic potential which had taken nearly half a century to build we have been able to add as large a potential in only ten years," L. I. Brezhnev said at the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU. "Such is the great advance of developed socialist society." The structure of industrial production is being actively improved. This found concrete expression in the increase between 1970 and 1975 of the share held by machine-building, power engineering and

the chemical and petrochemical industries from 31 to 36 per cent. These are the industries which play the greatest role in determining the technical advance and efficiency of the entire national economy and which constitute the foundation of the economy and of further improvement of the people's well-being. The overall increase of 70 per cent in the output of the engineering industry included a 300 per cent rise in the production of computer technology and an 80 per cent increase in the output of automation technology. During the five-year period 16,500 new types of machines, equipment and instruments were put into production, that is, twice as many as during the 1966-1970 period.

During the five-year period 1976-1980 these trends will be further developed. The production of automation facilities and computer technology will increase by 60-80 per cent. In recent years the stock of machine-tools in the engineering industry has been substantially renewed. Approximately 55 per cent of the total stock of machine-tools is 10 years old or less, a higher proportion than in many of the industrially developed Western countries. The switch from creating and introducing individual pieces of machinery to the development and wide-scale introduction of highly efficient systems of machinery, equipment and technological processes is being consistently implemented. This is ensuring the mechanisation and automation of all production processes, including auxiliary, transport and warehouse operations. The aim is both to increase machine-building output by 50-60 per cent and to see that the machinery, equipment, instruments and technological processes created exceed the best Soviet and world achievements in terms of their technical and economic indicators.

The fuel and power base has been substantially strengthened. In 1975, 491 million tons of oil and 289,000 million cubic metres of gas were extracted,

of which 150 million tons of oil and almost 38,000 million cubic metres of gas came from newly opened-up areas of Western Siberia distinguished by their being difficult of access and by severe weather conditions. Coal extraction grew to 701 million tons, while electricity generation reached 1,038,000 million kilowatts. The proportion of electricity generated by nuclear power stations rose. In particular, the Leningrad Nuclear Power Station, which has a capacity of two million kilowatts, was commissioned. In the future nuclear generation of electricity will be even more intensively developed. Thus, the overall growth in generating capacity is to be 60-70 million kilowatts and 13-15 million kilowatts of this will be accounted for by nuclear power stations. With this goal in mind the production of nuclear reactors with a capacity of 1-1.5 million kilowatts is being inaugurated. By 1980 the extraction of oil will have reached 620-640 million tons. For gas the corresponding figures will be 400,000-450,000 million cubic metres and for coal—780-810 million tons.

Industrial output will have grown 35-39 per cent by 1980; within this overall figure the output of means of production will have grown 38-42 per cent and the output of consumer goods 30-32 per cent.

Agriculture has developed amid conditions of hard-fought struggle against natural calamities. The year 1971 was not favourable for a number of districts.

The cold winter of 1972 devoid of snow cover destroyed much of the winter crops. In the summer large regions of the country were subject to a merciless drought which dried up the rivers, parched the soil and set aflame the forests and peat deposits. Under these conditions a truly self-denying struggle for the grain was launched. In regions spared of the drought it was imperative to harvest the crop as rapidly as possible and with a minimum of spoilage, since cold weather and snow set in early. This battle

was won: Kazakhstan, Siberia and the Urals gave the country 34 million tons of grain. If a calamity of such a scale had descended upon pre-revolutionary Russia, famine would have been the unavoidable result. Even given the 1955 levels of technique in agriculture only 80 million tons of grain could have been gathered in similar weather conditions. In 1972, however, 168 million tons were harvested and 60 million turned over to the state.

The measures undertaken by party and government and strenuous, heroic work brought their rewards. Between 1971 and 1975 the average annual volume of agricultural production increased by 13 per cent by comparison with the preceding five-year period, while the average annual grain yield grew by 14 million tons. Notable successes were achieved in cotton-growing. The average annual cotton crop amounted to 7.7 million tons as compared with 6.1 million tons in 1966-1970. The production of meat reached 14.1 million tons and the production of milk 87.5 million tons.

These figures are based on consolidation of the material and technological foundation of agricultural production. Almost 131,000 million rubles were invested in its development over the five-year period: 49,000 million rubles more than between 1966 and 1970. Agriculture has been supplied with 1.7 million tractors, for the most part powerful new makes from the Chelyabinsk, Kharkov, Volgograd, Minsk, Kirov and Altai plants, more than 1.1 million trucks and 15,800 million rubles worth of agricultural machinery and other technology. More than 300 million tons of mineral fertiliser were also supplied to agriculture. A large programme of land improvement and irrigation work has been carried out. A total of 4.5 million hectares of land was irrigated and opened up to exploitation and 4.4 million hectares of overmoist land were drained through the expenditure of state and collective-farm funds.



The folk dance troupe

The Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow

A reading room in the Lenin Library in  
Moscow



At an art exhibition

A family band

Pupils of the Moscow State Choir School

The basic thrust of the CPSU's agrarian policy, as the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress emphasised, consists, firstly, in making agriculture a highly productive and highly efficient branch of the economy, assuring the country of a reliable supply of food and agricultural raw materials and constantly maintaining sufficient reserves for this end; and, secondly, in continuing to move towards the alignment of material and cultural conditions of life in town and country.

Over the five years between 1976 and 1980 agricultural production will grow 14-17 per cent. The average annual grain yield will be raised to 215-220 million tons and the average annual yield of raw cotton to not less than 9 million tons. The corresponding figures for sugar-beet, meat production, milk and eggs will be 95-98 million tons, 15-15.6 million tons, 94-96 million tons and 58,000-61,000 million respectively. These indicators are to be achieved by the extension of complex mechanisation and automation of production, increased use of chemical fertilisers, land improvement and better use of existing technology and labour resources. During the five-year period agriculture will be supplied with 1,900,000 tractors, 1,350,000 trucks, 533,000 combine harvesters and 23,000 million rubles' worth of agricultural machinery, including 10,300 million rubles' worth of machinery for animal husbandry and fodder production. By 1980 the supply of mineral fertiliser is to be raised to 115 million tons. A total of four million hectares of irrigated and 4.7 million hectares of drained land will be developed through state capital investments. In addition, 37.6 million hectares of pasture land in desert, semi-desert and mountain areas will be irrigated.

Between 1976 and 1980, 171,700 million rubles will be allocated for the development of agriculture, including the construction of buildings for production purposes, living accommodation and recreati-

onal, trade and other premises, 115,700 million rubles of which will be provided by state capital investments. New forms of production are being increasingly introduced and inter-farm co-operation and agrarian-industrial integration is going ahead on a broad front. There are emerging inter-collective farm and state-collective farm production amalgamations, agro-industrial complexes where the output of agricultural produce is carried out on an industrial basis and linked up with processing.

The face of today's countryside is also changing. Living and working conditions, both in terms of the supply of material goods and of the cultural level and life style, are coming increasingly to resemble those obtaining in town.

The USSR's economy is characterised by accelerated rates of development. Here are the basic indicators in comparison with the USA. The average annual rate of increase in national income in the USA in 1961-1965 equalled 4.9 per cent, in 1966-1970, 3.2 per cent. For the USSR the figures were 6.5 and 7.8 per cent respectively. Between 1951 and 1960 the growth rate of industrial production in the USA amounted to 4.1 per cent, and of agriculture to 1.6 per cent. Between 1961 and 1970 the comparable figures in the USA were 4.4 and 1.0 per cent. For the USSR the first set of figures (1951-1960) was 10.5 and 2.9 per cent, and the second (1961-1970), 7.5 and 4.2 per cent. During the five-year period 1971-1975 industrial production in the USSR increased by an average of 7.4 per cent per annum, while the comparable figure for the United States and the Common Market countries was 1.2 per cent. These figures reflect a firm trend and not a temporary state of affairs. Over the 25 years from 1950 to 1975 average annual growth rates for industrial output in the USSR and the member-countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance were more than twice those in the developed capitalist countries,

amounting respectively to 9.6 per cent and 4.6 per cent. The USSR now produces more pig iron, steel, oil, coal, tractors, diesel and electric locomotives, cotton, wool, flax, mineral fertiliser and many other products than any other country. The number of such products is constantly growing. This is a fact of no small significance, since a specific feature of the contemporary state of economic development is the sharp increase in the role of economic and scientific and technological competition between the two world systems—the socialist and capitalist.

In the resolution of economic tasks the CPSU and the Soviet Government took a scientific approach to the determination of the material sources available for the expansion of production. That is how matters stand now as well. The normal sources—the redistribution of resources between sectors and the application of supplementary manpower—have to a large extent been exhausted and are today extremely limited. Therefore the primary source now is enhancement of production efficiency.

In the period between the Twenty-Fourth and the Twenty-Fifth Party congresses labour productivity in industry increased 34 per cent, in agriculture 22 per cent and in the building industry 29 per cent. This accounted for approximately 80 per cent of the growth in the national income. The general line now being followed in all economic strategy consists in the sharp stepping up of efficiency in industry. It is sufficient to note that between 1976 and 1980, 85-90 per cent of the growth in the national income, approximately 90 per cent of the growth in industrial output and all growth in agricultural production and the building industry are to be achieved through increased labour productivity. Closely related is the perfection of the structure of industrial production and, in particular, the reduction of per unit outlays. It is also necessary to work for the more economical

utilisation of manpower and curtail the proportion of non-efficient manual and heavy physical labour. Much attention is being devoted to a more effective utilisation of the production funds and of capital input.

The Soviet people are confronted by a task of historic importance: that of making maximum use of all the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution and combining them with the advantages of the socialist economic system. The USSR's scientists are making an enormous contribution to accelerating the rate of scientific and technological progress. In 1975 the 250th anniversary of the USSR Academy of Sciences was celebrated. This became a convincing demonstration of the achievements of Soviet science, which stands at the frontiers of knowledge. Successful development of fundamental and applied research promoted the solution of key economic problems and made possible new and outstanding achievements in various branches of science and technology and in the conquest of space between 1971 and 1975. It is sufficient to recall the unique photographs of the surface of Venus and the appearance there of the two first, Soviet, satellites.

During the Tenth Five-Year Plan further development of fundamental and applied scientific research in the fields of the social and natural sciences and technology will be ensured. The attention of scientists will be concentrated on the most important issues of scientific, technological and social progress, solution of which will, to a considerable extent, determine the successful development of the economy, culture and science itself.

A draft Comprehensive Programme for scientific and technological advance and its socio-economic consequences between 1976 and 1990 has already been elaborated by academic institutes in conjunction with ministries and departments. This will pro-



vide the pointers necessary for successful direction of the economy and forms an organic part of current and long-term-planning.

"Each of our five-year plans is an important landmark in the history of the Fatherland," L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, pointed out. "Each of them is, in its own way, worthy of note, each bears the unique features of its time and each will be for ever stamped on the memory of the people. At the same time they are inseparable from one another. They are remarkable chapters from one great book telling of our people's heroic labour in the name of socialism and communism." New chapters in this book will tell of intensification of social production and fuller utilisation of the economy's capacity for multiplying national wealth and consolidating the country's might. The new scale of production and consumption requires more flexible management methods. Today the system of management is being improved through higher levels of scientific planning, structural modification and increases in economic incentives, as well as broader involvement of the working masses in the management of production. Creation of the most favourable conditions for comprehensive development of the capacities and creative activity of men and women, society's main productive force, is a decisive factor in implementing economic plans and a guarantee of successful attainment of the goals which have been set forth. The programme worked out by the CPSU for heightening production efficiency through the encouragement of mass initiative has pointed out the most effective path for the utilisation of the economic possibilities marking developed socialist society.

A direct result of the economy's rapid growth and the successes of the policy of peace and international détente is the growing significance of external

economic links, which are an effective means of promoting economic and political goals. The USSR is making comprehensive use of the opportunities offered by socialist division of labour and intensified specialisation and co-operation in production among socialist countries. The Comprehensive Programme for the further intensification and improvement of co-operation and the development of socialist economic integration of the CMEA member-countries, adopted in July 1971, at the 25th Session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, has special significance for the extension of co-operation among the fraternal peoples, a further rise of efficiency in social production and the most rational utilisation of scientific and technological achievements and distribution of productive forces. This programme is intended to be implemented by stages over a period of 20 years.

Socialist economic integration represents the process of the international division of labour, the rapprochement of the economies of the member-countries and the formation of a modern and highly efficient structure for the national economies—a process consciously and systematically guided by the Communist and Workers' parties and the governments of the CMEA. It represents the steady drawing together and equalisation of levels of economic development, the formation of deep and stable ties in the basic economic sectors and in science and technology, the expansion and consolidation on this basis of the international market for these countries, and the improvement of commodity-money relations.

The main goals of socialist economic integration consist in improving the material and cultural living standards of the peoples of the CMEA countries, the establishment of the conditions favouring the more rapid quantitative and qualitative development of their productive forces and the building of

socialism and communism. The Comprehensive Programme set forth about 200 specific measures encompassing the spheres of production, science and technology, foreign trade, currency and finances, as well as improvements in the mechanisms and legal forms of co-operation itself. It provides for the joint exploitation of natural resources, the joint construction of major industrial combines intended to satisfy the needs of each of the participants and co-operation among both individual enterprises and entire industries in socialist countries.

The adoption of the programme stimulated the creation of international co-ordination centres and scientific-production amalgamations and the further development of various forms of the international division of labour in a number of economic spheres. It prompted the construction of a number of enterprises through the joint efforts of the interested countries. The USSR is playing an important role in this project. As of January 1, 1972, the number of enterprises and installations already built and under construction abroad with the participation of the Soviet Union had reached 2,560, of which 1,767 were to be found in the socialist countries. During the five years from 1971 to 1975 trade turnover between the USSR and the CMEA countries doubled and now amounts to 26,000 million rubles per annum.

In the summer of 1975 a co-ordinated programme of integration measures covering the period 1976-1980 was adopted by the CMEA countries. The plan lists a series of key economic problems which must be resolved by joint efforts on the basis of special programmes of long-term co-operation. "The matter is not only one of considerable mutual economic advantage, but also of tremendous political significance," L. I. Brezhnev said at the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU. "It is a matter of strengthening the material basis of our community."

It is worthy of note that from 1950, the first year of the functioning of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, through 1972 the member-countries of the CMEA increased their industrial output eightfold as compared to a threefold increase for the developed capitalist countries. The 27th Session of CMEA, convened in May, 1973, which looked into the progress in carrying out the Comprehensive Programme, determined that during the preceding two years growth in industrial production for the CMEA member-countries as a whole exceeded 15 per cent. The comparable figure for the capitalist countries was 8.8 per cent.

At the time of the establishment of the CMEA the member-countries, comprising 18 per cent of the earth's territory and roughly 10 per cent of the world's population, accounted for approximately 20 per cent of world industrial output. At that time the share of the USA in world industrial output was 44 per cent. In a little over 20 years the United States' share has fallen to below a third, while the CMEA countries' share has risen to one-third of world industrial production.

The immense socio-economic and scientific and technological progress made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is a vivid demonstration of the advantages of their political and economic system, of the futility of attempts to restrain their growth through the erection of tariff barriers, discriminatory legislation and other similar measures. Having surpassed the USA in gross industrial output and consolidated their defence capacity, the countries of the socialist community headed by the USSR have placed before the leading capitalist countries the necessity of moving from opposition to negotiations with the USSR.

While during the time that capitalism possessed economic and military superiority, the struggle by the USSR for peaceful coexistence was distorted by

imperialist propaganda as a temporary tactic postulated upon the relative weakness of socialism, now, when the USSR and other socialist countries are consistently using their augmented influence in the world, both political and military, in the cause of peace, bourgeois ideologists are having a quite difficult time linking communism and war.

In the contemporary international circumstances the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government are doing everything in their power to ensure favourable international conditions for the building of communism in the USSR and the defence of the world socialist system as well as for peace and freedom. The foreign policy of the USSR invariably links the necessity of repulsing the aggressor with a constructive line aimed at the peaceful settling of international problems.

The Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU proposed a detailed Peace Programme which received warm support from all progressive forces on all continents. The congress appealed for the repudiation of the use of force to settle urgent issues, for the elimination of military hotbeds in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, for political settlement on the basis of respect for the legitimate rights of nations subjected to aggression. The congress pointed out the importance of normalising the situation in Europe, the source of both world wars, and the necessity of accepting the changes which have taken place on its territories since the defeat of fascism. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government have promoted détente in Europe while simultaneously taking practical steps to ensure collective security on the European continent. They have proposed the liquidation of foreign military bases, reductions in armed forces, above all in Central Europe, and the working out of a system of measures reducing the possibility of unforeseen incidents which could lead to war.

Thus, the foreign policy programme advanced by the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress provided the entire world with a real alternative to the threat of thermonuclear war: peaceful coexistence, the recognition of the territorial integrity of all countries and non-interference in their internal affairs, the repudiation of force and the threat of its application in mutual relations, the banning of weapons of mass destruction, the limitation of conventional arms, the relaxation of tensions, expansion of economic ties and of scientific and cultural co-operation among all countries.

Life has confirmed the immediacy and realism of this programme. During the period between the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth congresses the USSR achieved significant progress in consolidating the principles of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems. Recent events indicate that a change has occurred in international life: the cold war has receded before the advance of détente. The aggression has ended in Vietnam—the most protracted of the so-called local wars accompanying the cold war. The people of Vietnam emerged victorious because of the broad movement of international solidarity and comprehensive aid by the countries of the socialist community. Because of the energetic efforts of the USSR a cease-fire was decided upon in the Middle East. The policy of non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic has suffered defeat. The restoration of relations with Portugal and improved relations with Greece reflected the great and positive changes that have taken place in the political atmosphere of Europe.

An event of world-historic significance was the conclusion at summit level of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held in Helsinki, which was convened at the initiative of the USSR and other European socialist countries. The

conference provided a necessary political summing up to the Second World War. It confirmed the futility and harmfulness of policies conducted from a position of strength and laid down the main paths to be followed by states, including those with different social systems, in pursuance of the aim of transforming Europe into a continent of durable peace and co-operation. The results of the conference make it possible to map out the prospects for co-operation in the economic field, science and technology, culture and information. Practical realisation of the principles proclaimed at Helsinki is now of paramount importance and the Soviet Union is making every effort to bring this about.

The growth of trade ties with the industrially advanced capitalist countries is a result of the active foreign policy efforts of the Soviet Government. Between 1960 and 1972 trade turnover between the USSR and these countries rose from 1,900 to 5,900 million rubles. During the same interval the share of the developed capitalist countries in the Soviet Union's foreign trade turnover rose from 9.5 to 22.5 per cent. The Federal Republic of Germany held first place in this trade, with 3.2 per cent. Then came Japan (3.1 per cent), Finland (2.3 per cent), Britain (2.2 per cent) and France (2.1 per cent). The volume of trade with the USA was less than with most of the major capitalist powers, amounting to a mere 1.9 per cent of the total trade turnover. However, while trade with the FRG nearly trebled (from 286 million rubles in 1960 to 828 million rubles in 1972) and with France increased threefold (from 183 to 544 million rubles), with Japan it increased more than sixfold (from 123 to 816 million rubles) and with the USA—from 75.9 to 583 million rubles.

The volume of the USSR's foreign trade grew overall from 22,000 million rubles in 1970 to 51,000 million rubles in 1975. Complete sets of equipment were received for almost 2,000 units in a variety of

industries, in particular, in the chemical, automotive, light and food industries. Forty per cent of imports were made up of consumer goods and raw materials for their manufacture. The volume of cultural exchanges over the five-year period increased 50 per cent.

The USSR's economic, scientific and technological links with capitalist countries have significantly expanded and changed qualitatively. New and broad aspects of external economic activity have made their appearance, including solution of the problem of energy and raw materials, protection of the environment, the conquest of outer space, utilisation of the resources of the world ocean and the elimination of dangerous and epidemic diseases. New forms of economic co-operation are developing, in particular compensatory agreements, whereby new enterprises wholly owned by the USSR are set up in co-operation with foreign firms. These firms provide licences, equipment and credits and receive a part of the output of these or other enterprises as repayment.

The Soviet Union has at its disposal a sufficiently wide variety of goods of interest to the capitalist countries. Among those products which have been favourably received in Western markets are machinery and installations of original design, as well as instruments and electronic equipment. Rolling mills have, for example, received broad acclaim, and have been installed in factories in the USA, Japan, Britain, the FRG and Sweden. Also in demand on the world market are installations in the fields of energetics and medicine, transport facilities as well as certain types of metal-cutting lathes.

Imperialism has had to face the untenability of its foreign policy notions based on the "position of strength" doctrine. Such notions are now being replaced by a growing understanding of the inevitability of peaceful coexistence, the principles of

which were proclaimed during the first years after the establishment of Soviet power.

Although progress in international relations is being accompanied by certain changes in the policies of the ruling circles of a number of the powers or by the accession of new leaders capable of realistically evaluating the situation and inclined to accept the principles proposed by the USSR of non-interference and mutually beneficial political and economic co-operation and to repudiate the arms race, nevertheless in the West to this time influential forces are still active in their attempts to maintain the atmosphere of the cold war.

Observing that the world climate has warmed up and that an era of normal peaceful relations has been initiated, L. I. Brezhnev stressed in his speech of July 26, 1973: "All this, of course, does not mean ... that the difference between the two social systems—socialism and capitalism—has vanished. The bourgeois states remain bourgeois, while the socialist states continue to be socialist. We must not forget that there are states where influential circles wish to see the world continue to live in a state of fever and tension, to see inflated military budgets and to see the arms race go on." In the FRG the Right forces are continuing to attack the policy of normalising relations with the socialist countries. These forces essentially adhere to revanchist positions and do not want to recognise the changes brought about by the Second World War. In the United States attempts have been made to interfere in the USSR's internal affairs by linking the removal of discriminatory measures in the field of trade to the carrying out by the Soviet Union of certain political demands. Of course, this was not and will never be acceptable to the Soviet state.

Despite the strivings of these circles, however, the tendency soberly to evaluate the circumstances is becoming more prominent in the policies of the

capitalist states. Specifically, many problems inherited by the modern world as a legacy of the Second World War and left unsolved for decades have at long last been settled. In the retreat from the policy of confrontation—a retreat which began, one might say, with the visit of the late President de Gaulle to Moscow in 1966—an important role was played by the treaties signed in 1970 by the USSR, Poland and the FRG recognising the inviolability of the borders established in Europe in the wake of the Second World War: by the signing of the Principles of Mutual Relations Between the USSR and France (Paris, October 1971); by the conclusion in Moscow in May 1972 by L. I. Brezhnev and the President of the USA of the Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the USSR and the USA, the first point in which declares that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence; by the series of multilateral and bilateral agreements on West Berlin; by the December 1972 Treaty on the Bases of Mutual Relations Between the GDR and the FRG; the visit of L. I. Brezhnev to the FRG in May 1973, and a month later, to the USA, during which a number of important agreements were concluded, including the Agreement Between the USSR and the USA on the Prevention of Nuclear War—of enormous historic significance. The first Soviet-American space expedition—the joint flight and link-up of the *Soyuz* and *Apollo* space vehicles—was a fine example for the achievement of understanding in the world.

The series of agreements that have been reached with the United States have laid a firm political and legal foundation for the development of mutually beneficial co-operation. They are opening up good prospects for the future to the extent to which relations between the USSR and the USA develop on this jointly created basis, although the policy of

crude interference in the internal affairs of peoples on the side of forces of oppression and reaction, which the USA is conducting in a number of countries and which is being decisively opposed by the Soviet Union, is complicating these relations.

The Peace Programme was further developed in L. I. Brezhnev's Report to the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU. This programme places paramount importance on supporting political détente by military détente and on bringing about an end to the arms race and the transition to disarmament. To these ends the Soviet Union will do everything possible to complete the preparation of an agreement between the USSR and the USA on limiting and reducing strategic weapons and to conclude an international agreement on the complete prohibition and universal cessation of nuclear arms tests, the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and prohibition of the creation of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet Union will make effort to advance the talks on reducing armaments and armed forces in Central Europe and will seek to bring about the reduction of military expenditure and the speedy convening of a world disarmament conference. The programme also proposes that measures be taken to eliminate remaining military flashpoints, to transform the Final Act of the Helsinki conference into reality, ensure security in Asia and to conclude a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, complete elimination of the remnants of colonialism and the wiping out of inequality and discrimination in economic relations.

The Peace Programme is being steadily realised. Although attempts to undermine faith in the policy of peaceful coexistence are continuing and political circles in the capitalist countries expressing the interests of the military-industrial complex are zealously opposing normalisation of the internatio-

nal situation, the political climate throughout the world has altered sharply for the better. Positive changes have taken place that correspond to the interests of all countries and peoples and to the interests of peace throughout the world; the historical goal which the USSR is now struggling to realise consists in giving practical material substance to the process of international détente and making it irreversible. "In its foreign policy, the Soviet Union intends to search patiently and consistently for more new ways of expanding peaceful, mutually advantageous co-operation between states with different social systems and more new ways leading to disarmament. We shall continuously augment our efforts in the struggle for lasting peace," L. I. Brezhnev told the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress.

Under the leadership of the CPSU the Soviet people are successfully carrying out the programme to enhance the economy and culture, raise the living standards of the working people, develop socialist democracy, bring closer together the peoples of the USSR, consolidate the unity of Soviet society and achieve full social homogeneity. This is a programme of unrelenting struggle against imperialism and aggression, for peace, democracy and socialism.

That which we have seen in the Soviet Union, wrote Y. Ogame, the leader of the delegation of the Socialist Party of Japan, after its visit to the Soviet Union in 1973, produced a profound impression on us. Ogame indicated that the advantages of the socialist system over the capitalist are immediately evident. Noting the major progress achieved by the Soviet economy, and the rise in living standards, he underscored that the USSR is obliged for all its progress to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The entire history of the Soviet Union demonstrates the superiority of the socialist system and



the correctness of the policies of the CPSU. The country developed at a pace unprecedented in history. Its productive forces have grown immeasurably. By the 58th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution the country's basic production funds had increased 32-fold and their value had reached almost 800,000 million rubles. Industrial output had increased 203-fold. In fifty odd years it traversed the distance between the wooden plough and the space flights, the kerosene lamp and the nuclear power stations. In a backward and war-devastated country and despite unbelievable difficulties a powerful economy was created, illiteracy eradicated, and a major flowering of culture, science and art attained. These achievements offer clear testimony to the advantages of the socialist system. Lenin wrote: "Only socialism will be the beginning of a rapid, genuine, truly mass forward movement, embracing first the *majority* and then the whole of the population, in all spheres of public and private life."

Only socialist society, the development of which is wholly subordinated to the interests of the working people, can create the opportunities for such a rapid pace of social progress. Only under socialism can the bulk of the population directly, actively and conscientiously participate in the work of building a new society. Brought together by the Communist Party into a united multi-national family, the Soviet people are contributing to this society the joy of work freed from exploitation and the creative initiative and energy for centuries constricted by the fetters of feudal and capitalist society.

Under the impact of the victory of socialism in the USSR the world revolutionary process has been immeasurably accelerated, which is a striking feature of the modern world. The development of socialism from a utopia to a science lasted the 300 years

separating Thomas More's *Utopia* from the phalansteries of Charles Fourier. It was only in the fourth decade of the preceding century that Marx and Engels gave socialism a sound scientific footing. Nearly 150 years separate the English bourgeois revolution and the Great French Revolution. Another 80 years passed before the emergence of the prototype of the first workers' state—the Paris Commune. But from the victory of the October Revolution to the formation of the world socialist system there passed but 28 years.

Through the force of example the socialist system is revolutionising the minds of the working people in the capitalist countries, convincing them of the evident advantages of the socialist system and inspiring them in the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism. With its might it guarantees the security of each of its member-nations and thereby makes feasible the building of socialism in any country, regardless of size, numbers, economic or military potential. The peoples of all countries have the opportunity of relying upon the support of the socialist system in defending their rights and interests against the encroachments of the reactionaries and against imperialist aggression.

History is demonstrating that it is precisely socialism and communism which provide the opportunity for fulfilling the hopes and aspirations of all who support progress and democracy, regardless of their social position. And if the teachings of Marxism-Leninism are gaining wider and wider circulation, and winning more and more adherents, this is above all because these ideas are backed up by the praiseworthy activities of the Soviet people and its Communist Party, by the history of the USSR, the first socialist state in the world.



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Journalist Vitaly Moyev and press photographer Anatoly Garanin offer a pictorial record of a Leningrad worker, of his family, his friends, his factory and his town. The pictures are accompanied by the journalist's commentaries on the role of the working class in modern society, on scientific and technological progress and occupational prospects, on the working man's free time and on the nature of the harmonious personality.

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Education in the USSR gives a detailed account of the content of school education (elementary and secondary), shows the variety and coherence of all types of school, and analyses in detail every curricular subject in the general polytechnical secondary school.

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The material in this book provides a picture of Lenin's correspondence, conversations and meetings with the youth of 26 countries in Europe, Asia and America. It covers the period from 1907 to 1922 and includes biographical materials, his writings, excerpts from the works of historians and memoirists, and commentary to the interesting photographs included by the authors.

Lenin carefully followed the development of revolutionary events abroad. His advice to young revolutionaries provided a concrete programme of action and pointed to the need for a Marxist analysis of concrete social and political circumstances and for the creative application of the Russian experience. Citing numerous facts and examples, the authors show how Lenin's ideas influenced many young representatives of the revolutionary proletarian movement in many countries.

On the basis of a broad range of factual material the authors convincingly demonstrate that the lives of those who reached maturity in the early part of the century are inextricably tied up with Leninism and the implementation of Lenin's ideas.

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P. Reshetov, Assistant Professor at the Academy of Social Sciences under the CC CPSU, and V. Skurlatov, a senior research worker at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Scientific Information on the Social Sciences, have employed a broad range of factual material based to a considerable degree on the research of Soviet sociologists. The book recounts what the socialist state has done for its youth in the 60 years of its existence. The reader will acquaint himself with a variety of facts on the life of Soviet youth. Citing the opinions of young workers, peasants and students, the authors reveal the attitude of today's youth to Soviet reality. The account of the USSR's younger generation is illustrated with facts concerning the participation of Soviet youth in the economic, political and social life of Soviet society and the role they play in the decision-making process. The book gives a good picture of how young people take advantage of the possibilities they are offered for the development of the personality. One of the important topics covered is the internationalism of Soviet youth and their international ties.

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**Our Gagarin (The First Cosmonaut and His  
Native Land)**

This book, whose publication marks the fifteenth anniversary of man's first flight into outer space, has an unusual form.

Author-compiler Yaroslav Golovanov has linked numerous materials of the most varied kinds into a single story: Yu. A. Gagarin's own autobiography *The Road to Space*, books and articles about the first cosmonaut, published in the Soviet Union and abroad, his wife Valentina Gagarina's recollections, and accounts written specially for this publication by writers and journalists. The book describes Gagarin's life and tells of his family and his native Smolensk region. It also gives an account of the events leading up to man's first flight in space and includes a reportage of the historic "Gagarin's Day" (April 12, 1961). It includes colour and black-and-white photographs presented by Gagarin's family, the Zvezdny Gorodok (Star City) Museum and the Baikonur launch site, as well as those which have appeared in books, magazines and newspapers in the Soviet Union and abroad.

The book's beautiful design is the work of D. Bisti, winner of several international book competitions.

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ILYIN V. Made in USSR

The English press has been informing its readers about the widespread sale of Soviet automobiles, watches and cameras. Is the increase in Soviet exports to industrially advanced countries an incidental fact or a natural development? Journalist V. Ilyin's story may help to answer this question. He describes the Soviet export trade since the time of the revolution, its present dimensions, and the success enjoyed by Soviet goods—steel casting units, planes, machine-tools, nuclear power plant equipment and other industrial hardware—on the world market.

The book includes photographic illustrations which give a good picture of the manufactured goods bearing the stamp "Made in USSR".